Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-055 *22 March 1955*

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Hungary's Keleti Arrives on Official Visit

AU2103162595 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti arrived in Tirana today on an official visit. Heading a military delegation, Keleti will hold talks with his counterpart, Zhulali, and other high-ranking Albanian officials.

Zhulali assessed the visit of his counterpart to be a testimony to the very good relations between the two countries and the common efforts toward conforming with Atlantic standards.

FYROM Albanian Newspaper on Papoulias Visit

95P20646A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 14 Mar 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by Arben Muka: "Karolos Papoulias in Tirana—Relations Must Be Regarded With Objectivity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tirana, 13 March—Yesterday, Greece's top diplomat, Karolos Papoulias, arrived in Tirana at lunchtime in a very interesting political and diplomatic setting, heading an official delegation that will be in Tirana until 14 March. Many things have changed in the political and economic spheres since 13 November 1993, when the top diplomat of that same neighbor state visited Tirana. Only four months after the 1993 visit, relations between the two countries underwent rapid changes for the worse, with brusque statements and confrontations and mutual excuses. The Athens-Tirana dialogue has been centered on two key elements: the macabre act of a Greek commando at a border point in southern Albania (the Peshkepi incident); and the trial of the five ethnic-Greek Albanians, the Omonia activists, who were accused of espionage and illegal possession of weapons. These "touchstones," which each side commented on according to its own position, and even involved others, could not be surmounted without consequences. The Albanians suffered greatly from this worsening of relations. The Greek police began a very harsh operation to send back to Albania thousands of Albanian emigres who were working in Greece for economic reasons. Some of the returnees were beaten and mistreated by the Greek police and many others were prevented from crossing the border, even though they had the required documents. The tension was raised to the point of expelling a diplomat and there was even talk about reviewing the lists to reduce the number of personnel in the embassies of the two countries.

Perhaps the turn toward the positive in relations between Athens and Tirana was not achieved as much by bilateral diplomatic measures as by a decision of the Albanian Supreme Court at the beginning of this year in regard to the five activists of the Greek minority organization, Omonia. Although it found the five defendents guilty of espionage and illegal possession of weapons (just as the lower courts had), the Supreme Court released four of them conditionally (one had been released a short time before, by decree of President Sali Berisha), making a move that assisted diplomatic policy on both sides of the border.

Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi, and a group of high officials from his ministry, greeted his Greek counterpart at Rinas Airport. There was no preliminary speech about the visit from Papoulias, while Serreqi said the same things he said last Saturday, when he stressed that bilateral relations should be viewed objectively and cooperation should be in the interest of Albania and Greece and of stability in the region. Serreqi has the idea that relations should be unshakeable and characterized by a spirit of constancy.

In the afternoon, at the Albanian foreign ministry, the heads of the two delegations sat down at the conference table for a one-on-one meeting. Later, Serreqi and Papoulias began discussions on the issues specified in the protocol for the meeting. [passage omitted].

Deputies Approve Penal Code, Condemn Extremists

AU2203111595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Report by Gezim Qinami]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a plenary session this morning, the deputies of the People's Assembly approved the new code of penal procedure. The code, which will take effect on 1 June this year, constitutes an important aspect of the legislative reform that is being carried out in our country. It will serve to strengthen and democratize the work of our judicial bodies, ensuring fair, equal, and regular procedures in order to defend individual freedoms and rights and the legitimate interests of the citizens, as well as strengthen the judicial order.

Human Rights Union Deputy Kosta Makarjadhi read a statement condemning the attempts of Greek extremist circles to create a new incident in Albania. We learned from the media about the latest attempts of reactionary extremist circles or persons to create malicious incidents in order to impair Albanian-Greek relations and the traditional friendship between the Albanian and Greek peoples, as well as to blacken the role and values of the Greek minority community position in these relations, Makarjadhi said.

We condemn and unreservedly denounce these attempts, and declare that the Greek minority in Albania has not and will never have any ties with such people. It has its own legal political organization and representatives elected in all sorts of authorities, and it is fighting to further democratize the country's life, thus demanding all rights as an ethnic minority, Makarjadhi concluded.

With this, today's proceedings closed.

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PS Leader Warns Against 'Strategy of Tension'

AU2103133195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 20 Mar 95

[Article by Rajmonda Nelku, including excerpts of interview with PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi in Tirana; date of interview not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] All Socialist Party [PS] structures must adopt more active stands in order to end the current political crisis. This was the topic of a report given by PS deputy chairman Servet Pellumbi at a PS Steering Committee meeting.

According to the PS Steering Committee, in essence this crisis is characterized by:

[Begin Pellumbi recording] ... a strategy of constantly increasing tension that the Democratic Party [PD] leadership and President Sali Berisha personally are pursuing. It seems to us that this strategy of tension is a direct reflection of the crisis that the government, presidency, judicial authorities, and PD itself are experiencing. [end recording]

Talking about ending the crisis, Pellumbi said that the issue of the constitution, as a symptom of the crisis, requires a consensus so that Albania can have a constitution, and suggested that the four opposition forces compile an alternative draft so as to overcome the crisis. Pellumbi added:

[Begin Pellumbi recording] It is important to draw up a program of further privatization and the continuation of reforms on the basis of as wide a consensus as possible. We should discuss the current situation and current economic difficulties realistically. [end recording]

As regards the statement read later by PS deputy chairman Namik Dokle, Mr. Pellumbi said it warns government officials not to pursue this strategy of tension so that, as they put it, the preelection situation will not lead to aggravations that may create dangerous precedents.

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Zhelev Adviser Gives Figures on Draft Budget

AU2203114895 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 20 Mar 95 p 1

[PARI staff report: "Foreign Debt Takes 40 Percent of Receipts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft budget for 1995 is based on expected revenues of 324 billion leva, Boyan Slavenkov, President Zhelev's economic adviser, told the Balkan Agency. The proposed budget plans for a deficit of 27 billion leva, or about 4.5 percent. About 40 percent of the receipts will be used to service the foreign debt, and 30-40 percent will be allocated to the army, police, and social sector.

In 1994 alone, the country accumulated debts of $840 million. Slavenkov predicts that the most difficult year for the Bulgarian economy will be 1996, when the country will begin payments on the loans provided by the World Bank. In this year, the five-year gratis period on the loans expires, and Bulgaria will have to pay about $1.3 billion. In Slavenkov's view, the state can assume these payments, but the government has take precautions against unfounded demands by the Paris Club. Slavenkov recalled that during Professor Berov's administration the Paris Club, without good reason, wanted to burden us with an additional debt of 1.6 billion German marks.

Commentary: 'United Opposition' Not Imminent

AU2103213695 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Mar 95 p 5

[Commentary by Valentin Georgiev: "The 'United' Opposition Is at Present a Mirage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The unenviable position in which the main opponent of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] found itself after the elections has outlined the beginning of a new situation in Bulgarian politics. The drop in confidence in the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] forced its leader to seek an adequate structural formula and appropriate behavior through which they could successfully oppose the leftist government.

The changing of the guard in the SDS National Coordinating Council was accompanied by a declaration on an "opening" to "all anticommunist forces with a view to creating a united opposition." A victory in the municipal elections in the autumn has been pointed out as the basic strategic goal, and synchronizing the efforts against the "BSP policy of restoration" as a tactical move.

The SDS's first blunder was a result of 134 Rakovski Street's [SDS headquarters] desire to be the natural and only leader of the future united opposition. Even [SDS leader] Ivan Kostov, considered to be more pragmatic, thinks that the SDS, as the second most powerful political force in the country, merits, as a rule, the role of leader and center of gravitation. Despite the current attempts to survive by adopting a party-like structure, it appears that the new political nucleus of the blue [SDS] coalition has not relinquished the bankrupt messianic attitude that for many months kept Filip Dimitrov and his circle away from the requirements of our time.

Through its disastrous election defeat, the SDS actually legitimized two of its rivals in the rightist political space—the "Savov-Mozer" People's Union and George Ganchev's Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB]. Both powers entered parliament, in which the SDS does not enjoy the privileged place it occupied in the preelection period.

Let us not forget that the People's Union [NS] was founded significantly later, was still weak in anything related to its structure and organization, and relinquished voluntarily its right to use the electronic mass media. Its appearance rather proved the necessity of forming an alternative to the blue coalition. Its participation in future configurations would only be a matter of a tactical character. The NS does not need a mechanical variant of consolidation for "strengthening" the "main" opposition force.

Furthermore, if certain forecasts—according to which half-forgotten figures expelled years ago from the SDS are beginning to gravitate around Stefan Savov, and could turn into President Zhelev's main support in his attempt to win a second mandate as president—are true, 134 Rakovski Street could find itself in a situation of self-isolation. There is already a persistent rumor that the Radical Democratic Party [RDP] is leaving the SDS and merging with the NS after its congress.

As far as the BBB is concerned, it is striving toward a new rightist-centrist policy, free of confrontation and the futile "anti-." Here the confrontation with the SDS is even more obvious and relates to a line of behavior. However, this group and its leader have yet to prove that they measure up to their intentions. Meanwhile, the "constructive opposition" principle of the BBB, appears to be alien to the SDS deputies, who automatically classified the BBB as a BSP partner....

The "united opposition" notion for the time being appears to be close only to the heart of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS]. The DPS lost the crucial role as a balancing factor that it enjoyed at the 36th National Assembly, became the fourth largest force in parliament, and could not overcome its ethnic nature. Thus, its influence decreased considerably and the need to find a new role with which to fill up the political vacuum that emerged around the DPS appears to be pressing. However, the DPS's participation in a united opposition would be attached to "dividends" that the movement hopes to obtain.

The development of events will determine the changes in the configuration of the political forces in Bulgaria, whether a serious opponent emerges as an alternative to the BSP and whether the BSP will be able to respond to such a development by forming a broad leftist coalition.

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At least for the time being, the "united opposition" is a mirage. It is far from emerging as a real entity with a serious presence. Joint participation in a public rally against the Land Bill is a lonely swallow, which does not herald any imminent political spring.

Kostov on Changes in SDS, Opposition to Policy

AU2103195195 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 15 Mar 95 p 9

[Interview with SDS leader Ivan Kostov by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "SDS Could Comprise Parties, but It Must Become an Organized Social Force"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Veleva] You are facing the problem of whether the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] should be a coalition of parties or a single party group.

[Kostov] The SDS must become an organized social force. It also must comprise parties. They must have their own life, but the SDS must be an organized force. The fact that the SDS is not an organized force represents a major problem.

[Veleva] Certain parties within the SDS are not exactly happy with the changes in the SDS coalition. Do you think that they could cause trouble at the upcoming SDS conference?

[Kostov] Anything could happen. There is always resistance to change. However, this is not the resistance of a particular party or group in the SDS, but our internal resistance to change. We must overcome it.

[Veleva] Do the personal ambitions of certain leaders within the SDS not influence this resistance?

[Kostov] The leaders of the parties that form the SDS have their importance within the National Coordinating Council. One should not seek conflict where none exists.

[Veleva] What will you say to the old coordinating councils, which are gradually marching toward oblivion?

[Kostov] We are not eliminating the coordinating councils. They have their own rights and functions, which we will clarify to them. I hope they will understand. None of us have much choice. There only is one road, and if we do not follow it we all will simply perish. The elections for mayors, which are taking place now, show that the SDS and the other opposition parties are incapable of blocking the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] at present. The BSP is in the midst of an upsurge. It would be nice if we could unite our forces and try to block the BSP, but for various reasons this is not happening.

[Veleva] Would you explain the People's Union [NS] refusal to take the hand you offered it and the fact that it does not want to cooperate with you by Stefan Savov's strong disappointment in the National Coordinating Council?

[Kostov] If we again fail to establish contact with them during this week, we will begin to think in that direction. For the time being we are trying to show understanding. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] Has your concern about the discrepancy between the BSP's election program and the government's activities during its first 50 days in office been confirmed?

(Kostov] Let us be tolerant and say that it would be better to await the 100 days and allow the government to show its entire potential. However, one could already note certain serious acts of forgetfulness regarding the BSP election program, and I fear—even the government statement. I could mention the social policy, personnel policy, and the promise to revive production through investments. You remember Zhan Videnov's emphatic statement during the debate with Filip Dimitrov: "Not through subsidies, but through investment, Mr. Dimitrov!" So, where are those investments? I cannot see them. The government also does not have a well-thought-out social policy or a clear strategy on resolving the social part of the BSP program through appropriate bills. There are some vague references about the future. It appears that the election promises were just made up.

[Veleva] Do you think the opposition is responding adequately to the cabinet's policy?

[Kostov] Our actions are appropriate. Perhaps they have not been sufficiently clarified, but it is impossible to ask us to do more. We are a minority. The scope of our activity has been determined by the number of votes we received.

BSP Organization Accuses Videnov of 'Dictating'

AU2203070395 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 12 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Krustev: "Party Members Accuse Videnov of Dictating"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leader Zhan Videnov and the leaders from 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] were accused of dictating and practicing totalitarianism at a meeting of the largest BSP municipal organization in Plovdiv on 11 March.

The prime minister attended the meeting and personally heard what local party members had to say about the BSP leadership.

Docent Evgeniy Ganev, deputy chairman of the BSP Plovdiv City Organization, said that pseudodemocracy and a lack of openness prevailed in the BSP, something that emerges at every party election. He thus submitted his resignation.

BSP Plovdiv party members sharply criticized the way in which the 18 December election lists were formulated, an issue that prompted them to replace almost the entire city party leadership.

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The large BSP loss in Bulgaria's second-largest city produced an internal struggle in Plodiv's BSP organization. In an attempt to explain precisely the election mechanism, Rosen Khubenov had to read a classified stenographic record of the BSP Supreme Council's 12 November 1994 meeting, at which the BSP candidates had been discussed. From this document, it emerges that he had warned the party back then about the possibility of an eventual conflict between Sofia and the province.

In an attempt to demonstrate party unity, the BSP center decided, prior to the election, to simultaneously nominate Zhan Videnov in Sofia and Plovdiv. However, Videnov himself admitted at the 11 March meeting in Plovdiv that the coordination between the BSP center and the local structures was not very good.

According to Videnov, if the BSP is to continue the changes, the Socialists must also win the upcoming municipal elections. Only thus could effecting the BSP policy through the legislative and executive powers be guaranteed. According to Videnov, for the time being, the changes within the BSP are progressing better than those in kindred parties in Poland and Lithuania.

Genrykh Lykhin, Russian consul general in Plovdiv, also attended the conference.

BSDP Leader on BSP Relations, Elections

AU2103213495 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 Mar 95 p 9

[Interview with BSDP leader Petur Dertliev by Todor Tokin; place and date not given: "The BSP Will Become a Democratic Party When It Learns To Work With Partners, Not Vassals"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tokin] Do you think it was a mistake to establish the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR]? There is such an opinion....

[Dertliev] The DAR was the most social-democratic group created to date. This has been recognized by the Socialist International, which supported us with a special declaration. However, we lost the elections because of the 0.2 percent that prevented us from entering the National Assembly and guaranteed the absolute majority of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. Our presence at the 37th National Assembly would have made uncomfortable those people who are not used to working with partners. The BSP will become a real democratic party when it learns to work with partners, not vassals.

[Tokin] However, there are currently people in the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP] leadership who insist on closely cooperating with the BSP.

[Dertliev] If those people would have posed the issue of appearing together with the BSP in the elections because the BSP has become a social-democratic party, I would have understood. However, they are talking about close cooperation with the BSP after an election defeat. This is an interesting psychology that implies at least three things: confusion, fear, and weak nerves. It is very indicative that immediately after the defeat, people who were categorically against any alliance, or even contacts, with the BSP have suddenly become ardent BSP supporters. Apparently, they identified the party with their own transformations. However, our party does not think that way. The positions of certain people in the Executive Bureau were simply incredible: Let us join the government, otherwise we will perish. Others said: We will be persecuted; therefore, we must join the BSP. From the BSP's point of view, this is an insult, because this means the BSP is a nondemocratic organization—or, to put it in more modern terms, a party that is undergoing recommunization.

[Tokin] People are talking about your support of Zhan Videnov and his centrist group....

[Dertliev] ...but before it, we must relinquish DAR—that is, punish the Civic Alliance for the Republic for treason, eliminate the "Marxist Platform," and cope with the Alliance for Social Democracy. Only someone with a good sense of humor could accept this. It resembles Stoyan Ganev's effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian issue. [passage omitted]

[Tokin] Has this government prove, up to now that it can effect a transition whose burden can be socially acceptable?

[Dertliev] It is very easy to say: no. However, I am fully aware of this cabinet's difficulties. The BSP is paying for the sins that the Bulgarian Communist Party accumulated over 45 years. Zhan Videnov is doomed to pay for the sins that the BSP accumulated over the last five years and the liberal policy it followed. Now this young man and his team are working under exceptionally difficult conditions and with hostile institutions—I am referring to the Presidency, the Office of the Chief Prosecutor, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. The BSP membership is divided into young and progressive people and older, conservative members who dream of Zhivkov's time. Videnov's possibilities are very limited. Even with the best will, he cannot conduct a leftist social-democratic policy. [passage omitted]

[Tokin] The presidential elections will be held soon, and your name has been mentioned as the candidate of the united left, including the BSP.

[Dertliev] No one's name has been mentioned more than mine in the last five years. I can tell you one thing: Until now we were rather passive in anything related to the presidential elections. Despite the fact that I was a member of the Grand National Assembly, I did not participate in the election, which was staged by Andrey Lukanov and Zhelyu Zhelev through Zhelev's personal assistants Dimitur Ludzhev and Stoyan Ganev. I refused to participate in the second election. We supported Dr. Zhelev only in the second round. Now our party will

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participate in a very active manner. Both the president and the BSP should understand that our party will no longer be a victim of the political system.

BSP Plenum Discusses Relations With Cabinet

AU2103195295 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 13 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Iva Petroni: "For Time Being, Zhan Overpowers Apparatus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 12 March plenum of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] decided that the cabinet, deputies, and 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] will be equal and must coordinate their actions. The proposal according to which the party center and its commissions should have a decisive role in political decisionmaking has been dropped. The center would only exercise political control over the main issues of government.

As expected there was no clash between the cabinet, deputies, and provincial party apparatus. A participant in the plenum said that this was the first BSP open plenum, the participants were shy, and, anyway, there was no reason to wash the party's dirty linen in public. Most of the ministers did not attend the plenum.

The controversial issue of the prerogatives of the party center's commissions, which duplicate the ministries, will be discussed later. The plenum only adopted a decision on the number and names of the commissions. Participants in the plenum pointed out that the fact that the commissions' prerogatives and relations have not been clarified could engender disputes in the future.

In his speech, Zhan Videnov demanded greater freedom for the ministers and deputies. According to Videnov the unhealthy practice exists according to which party structures interfere in administrative issues, instead of concentrating on party affairs.

Aleksandur Lilov has demanded at least 100 days of grace for the cabinet, without any internal criticism. According to Lilov, the attacks have begun too early. However, he also pointed out that election promises must not be forgotten, because otherwise the party would face a shock greater than the 1989 one. According to Lilov it is a mistake to give the political leadership an important role only prior to the elections.

The participants recommended to the prime minister that he have monthly contact with the nation. Many delegates said that the party's information policy was weak. According to them, the opposition works better with the media, and organizes attacks from the flanks against the BSP.

BSP Signs Cooperation Agreement With Alliance

AU2103195095 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Vesela Doncheva: "Patriotic Alliance Entered Into Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At various times and locations during the last 10 days, Zhan Videnov, Petko Simeonov, and Svetoslav Shivarov put their signatures to an agreement on postelection cooperation between the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and its coalition, on the one side, and, on the other, the Patriotic Alliance. The two sides agreed to start joint consultations on drafting new legislation for local government and investigating the possibilities for joint action in the forthcoming local elections. They will cooperate with the executive while the government of the Democratic Left is in power on the basis of the Democratic Left's program. The cooperation includes participation by Patriotic Alliance members and supporters in the executive structures and the state administration at the central, oblast, regional, and municipal levels. The Patriotic Alliance commits itself to propose candidates for such posts who have proved their business efficiency, have a clear political image, and are ready to implement the government's policies.

Patriotic Alliance speaker Svetlana Sharenkova commented on the fact that the Ecoglasnost Political Club did not initialed the document, saying that in her view this was a matter of formality. However, Stefan Gaytandzhiev, organizing secretary of the Ecoglasnost Political Club, and its deputy chairman Boris Kolev, held a different view. They claim that the agreement confirms commitments only on the part of the BSP and nowhere states that the Patriotic Alliance will support any particular initiatives in the government program, help to implement the program, or bear any responsibilities in this connection. For these reasons, the Executive Bureau of the Ecoglasnost Political Club did not sign the agreement.

Aleksandur Tomov, leader of the GOR [Civic Alliance for the Republic], stated at a briefing yesterday that the Patriotic Alliance had sold itself for posts, because every leader of the alliance would get some minor post or another. He supported his words with examples, pointing out that Ginyo Ganev would become chairman of the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad; Khristo Smolenov a chief secretary in the Defense Ministry; Elenko Bozhkov, a chief secretary in the Committee for Power Supply; Svetlana Sharenkova, a deputy chairman of the Committee on Youth and Sports; and Emiliya Maslarova, chief of the Foreign Aid Agency.

According to Nikolay Dobrev, member of the BSP Executive Bureau, the agreement stems from the BSP's preelection commitments to the Patriotic Alliance and represents a first step toward increasing the number of the BSP's political partners.

BSP Supreme Council Meeting Postponed

AU2103150795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 21

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has informed the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] that the meeting of the BSP Supreme Council that was to take

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place on Saturday has been postponed till the end of next week, Klara Marinova announced at the regular weekly news conference of the BSP, which took place today.

The meeting has been postponed in order to allow the Executive Bureau and the Supreme Council commissions to again discuss the 1995 draft national budget.

According to Stefan Gaytandzhiev the National Assembly is facing a difficult week. Tomorrow the parliamentary faction of the Democratic Left will submit to the National Assembly a new draft bill on restoring ownership of nationalized real estate property. The so-called anti-Panev Bill, which the president returned to the National Assembly, will also be discussed. The draft bills on the Bulgarian state railroads and on medicines and pharmacies will also be discussed.

The debate on the Bulgarian national coat of arms will also begin. Lastly, the debate on the Land Bill amendments will continue.

Election Results, Names of Representatives

95BA0108A Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian No 107, 30 Dec 94 pp 9-15

[Text of Central Electoral Commission Resolution No. 500, dated 27 December 1994]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 34, paragraph 1, item 5, of the Law on the Election of National Representatives, Municipal Councillors, and Mayors, the Central Electoral Commission has adopted the following

Resolution:

1. Announces the results of the elections for National Assembly, held on 18 December 1994, based on the actual votes cast for parties, coalitions of parties, and independent candidates registered for participation in the elections, as follows:

Registration No.	Party, Coalition, Independent Candidates	Votes	Percent
1	2	3	4
1	Bulgarian National-Radical Party	27,853	0.54
2	Union of Democratic Forces	1,260,374	24.23
3	Patriotic Union	74,350	1.43
4	"New Choice" Alliance	77,641	1.49
5	People's Union [NS]—BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Party], DP [Democratic Party]	338,478	6.51
6	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	28,3094	5.44
7	Union of Nonparty Guarantors	1,357	0.03
8	"Forward, Bulgaria" Movement	10,105	0.19
9	Democratic Party in Bulgaria	6,439	0.12
10	"Bulgarian Eagle" Party	1,605	0.03
11	Movement for the Protection of Pensioners, Unemployed, and Socially Weak Citizens	18,934	0.36
12	Organization of Heart Patients and Socially Weak Citizens in Bulgaria	12,978	0.25
13	Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party	4,703	0.09
14	"Era-3"	8,923	0.17
15	"ON-DO" [Union of the Nation-Movement of the Underprivi-leged] Bulgarian Party	57	0.00
16	"Stefan Stambolov" National-Liberal Party	2,876	0.06
17	Bulgarian Business Bloc	245,849	4.73
18	"Bulgarian Kingdom" Union of Monarchic Forces	31,884	0.61
19	Union of Bulgarian Communities	1,165	0.02
20	"Justice" Union	5,029	0.10
21	Bulgarian National Union	3,565	0.07

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Registration No.	Party, Coalition, Independent Candidates	Votes	Percent
1	2	3	4
22	"Transfiguration"	7,447	0.14
23	Free Cooperative Party	4,300	0.08
24	Front of Progressive Forces in Bulgaria	3,457	0.07
25	Coalition—BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], BZNS "A. Stamboliyski," and (BSPASEK) Ekoglasnost PK [Political Club]	2,262,943	43.50
26	Christian Democratic Union	8,246	0.16
27	Union for Socialism	6,019	0.12
28	Bulgarian League for the Defense of the Rights of Man and the Citizen	5,957	0.11
29	"Bulgarian Kingdom" National Movement for Crowned Democracy	40,642	0.78
30	Party of Democratic Changes	14,145	0.27
31	"Kingdom of Bulgaria" Federation	73,205	1.41
32	National-Christian Union	0	0.00
33	Democratic Party of Justice	24,023	0.46
34	Free Democratic Party	7,463	0.14
35	Republican Party in Bulgaria	1,973	0.04
36	Bulgarian Communist Party	78,606	1.51
37	Bulgarian Democratic Party Pro-European and World States	1,924	0.04
38	Confederation "BZNS-National Bloc for the Turnovo Constitution"	13,176	0.25
39	Union of Free Democrats	3,999	0.08
40	"Unification"	143	0.00
41	Party of Property Owners in Bulgaria	3,558	0.07
42	"National Union" Bulgarian Fatherland Party	3,652	0.08
43	Democratic Labor Party	2,450	0.05
44	Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party	3,827	0.07
45	Christian-Republican Party	0	0.00
46	Democratic Alternative for the Republic, DAR	97,057	3.79
47	Bulgarian Worker-Peasant Party	3,661	0.07
48	"Civil Initiative" Movement DGI-SDS	372	0.01
	Total for Eight Independent Candidates	12,561	0.24
	Total	5,202,065	100

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2. Allocates the mandates in the National Assembly as per Article 46, paragraph 1, of the ZINPOSK [Law on the Election of National Representatives, Municipal Councilors, and Mayors], based on the D'Ondt method, as follows:

No.	Parties, Coalitions	Mandates	Percentages
2	Union of Democratic Forces	69	28.65
5	BZNS-DP People's Union	18	7.50
6	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	15	6.25
17	Bulgarian Business Bloc	13	5.42
25	Coalition—BSP, BZNS "A. Stamboliyski," and Ekoglasnost PK	125	52.08
	Total	240	100

In accordance with Article 86, Paragraph 2, of the ZINPOSK, this distribution does not include parties and coalitions of parties with less than four percent of all valid votes. No mandates are issued to the independent candidates as well, since they failed to reach the district electoral quotas.

3. The distribution of mandates among parties and party coalitions by electoral districts is as follows:

No.	District	Total Mandates	2. SDS	5. BZNS, DP	6. DPS	17. BBB [Bulgarian Business Bloc]	25. BSPASEK
1	Blagoevgrad	10	3	0	1	0	6
2	Burgas	12	3	1	2	1	5
3	Varna	13	5	1	0	2	5
4	Veliko Turnovo	9	2	1	0	1	5
5	Vidin	4	1	0	0	0	3
6	Vratsa	8	1	1	0	0	6
7	Gabrovo	5	2	0	0	1	2
8	Dobrich	7	1	1	0	0	5
9	Kurdzhali	6	0	0	4	0	2
10	Kyustendil	5	2	0	0	0	3
11	Lovech	5	2	0	0	0	3
12	Mikhaylovgrad	6	1	0	0	0	5
13	Pazardzhik	9	3	1	0	0	5
14	Pernik	5	2	0	0	0	3
15	Pleven	10	2	2	0	1	5
16	Plovdiv-City	10	6	0	0	1	3
17	Plovdiv-Okrug	11	4	2	0	0	5
18	Razgrad	5	0	0	3	0	2
19	Ruse	8	2	0	0	1	5
20	Silistra	4	0	0	1	0	3
21	Sliven	7	1	1	0	0	5
22	Smolyan	4	1	0	0	0	3
23	Sofia 1	12	6	1	0	1	4
24	Sofia 2	11	6	1	0	1	3
25	Sofia 3	11	5	0	0	1	5
26	Sofia Okrug	8	2	1	0	0	5
27	Stara Zagora	11	3	2	0	1	5

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No.	District	Total Mandates	2. SDS	5. BZNS, DP	6. DPS	17. BBB [Bulgarian Business Bloc]	25. BSPASEK
28	Turgovishte	4	0	0	1	0	3
29	Khaskovo	9	1	1	1	1	5
30	Shumen	6	1	0	2	0	3
31	Yambol	5	1	1	0	0	3
	Total	240	69	18	15	13	125

4. Declares the following candidates as elected national representatives in the respective electoral districts.

District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
1st Electoral District - Blagoevgrad				
1	2	SDS	1	Filip Dimitrov Dimitrov
1	2	SDS	2	Spas Simeonov Dimitrov
1	2	SDS	3	Ivan Petrov Budimov
1	6	DPS	1	Osman Ahmed Oktay
1	25	BSPASEK	1	Emil Strakhilov Kostadinov
1	25	BSPASEK	2	Georgi Vladimirov Yurukov
1	25	BSPASEK	3	Dragomir Georgiev Shopov
1	25	BSPASEK	4	Dimitur Petrov Dimitrov
1	25	BSPASEK	5	Vladimir Georgiev Kotsakov
1	25	BSPASEK	6	Elena Dimitrova Yaneva
2d Electoral District - Burgas				
2	2	SDS	1	Stoyan Chilov Raychevski
2	2	SDS	2	Nikola Stoilov Katsarski
2	2	SDS	3	Krasmir Atanasov Momchev
2	5	NS	1	Stoyan Trifonov Prodanov
2	6	DPS	1	Ahmed Demir Dogan
2	6	DPS	2	Ibrahim Totun Tatarlu
2	17	BBB	1	Kristiyan Borisov Krustev
2	25	BSPASEK	1	Georgi Sedefchov Purvanov
2	25	BSPASEK	2	Chavdar Yordanov Kyuranov
2	25	BSPASEK	3	Radostin Ivanov Dimitrov
2	25	BSPASEK	4	Lyubomir Todorov Nachev
2	25	BSPASEK	5	Yanka Atanasova Kyurkchieva
3d Electoral District - Varna				
3	2	SDS	1	Aleksandur Yordanov Aleksandrov
3	2	SDS	2	Aleksandur Dimov Bozhkov
3	2	SDS	3	Vladimir Todorov Abadzhiev
3	2	SDS	4	Blagoy Nikolaev Dimitrov
3	2	SDS	5	Dimo Georgiev Gyaurov
3	5	NS	1	Ventseslav Asenov Dimitrov
3	17	BBB	1	Zhorzh Ganchev Ganchev

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
3	17	BBB	2	Rumen Yordanov Rusev
3	25	BSPASEK	1	Krasimir Andreev Premyanov
3	25	BSPASEK	2	Petur Vladimirov Dimitrov
3	25	BSPASEK	3	Dobromir Martinov Zadgorski
3	25	BSPASEK	4	Stoyko Zhekov Penchev
3	25	BSPASEK	5	Meglena Ivanova Plugchieva-Aleksandrova
4th Electoral District - Veliko Turnovo				
4	2	SDS	1	Nadezhda Nikolova Mikhaylova
4	2	SDS	2	Vasil Stoyanov Gotsev
4	5	NS	1	Veselin Metodiev Petrov
4	17	BBB	1	Doncho Yordanov Dimitrov
4	25	BSPASEK	1	Doncho Donchev Konakchiev
4	25	BSPASEK	2	Georgi Mikhaylov Mikhaylov
4	25	BSPASEK	3	Blagovest Khristov Sendov
4	25	BSPASEK	4	Boyko Stefanov Velikov
4	25	BSPASEK	5	Plamen Dimitrov Denchev
5th Electoral District - Vidin				
5	2	SDS	1	Petur Stefanov Stoyanov
5	25	BSPASEK	1	Nikola Petrov Koychev
5	25	BSPASEK	2	Mimi Mitkova Vitkova-Petkova
5	25	BSPASEK	3	Dobomir Filipov Todorov
6th Electoral District - Vratsa				
6	2	SDS	1	Ivan Kirilov Stanchev
6	5	NS	1	Nikolay Ivanov Khristov
6	25	BSPASEK	1	Filip Georgiev Bokov
6	25	BSPASEK	2	Milko Kostadinov Torbov
6	25	BSPASEK	3	Boris Todorov Kolev
6	25	BSPASEK	4	Dimitur Georgiev Dimitrov
6	25	BSPASEK	5	Boris Tsvetkov Bankov
6	25	BSPASEK	6	Khristo Borisov Bonov
7th Electoral District - Gabrovo				
7	2	SDS	1	Tson'o Georgiev Botev
7	2	SDS	2	Svetlana Grigorova Dyankova
7	17	BBB	1	Dilyana Nikolova Dimitrova
7	25	BSPASEK	1	Elena Borislavova Poptodorova-Petrova
7	25	BSPASEK	2	Mariya Zakharieva Stoyanova
8th Electoral District - Dobrich				
8	2	SDS	1	Aleksandur Dimov Bozhkov
8	5	NS	1	Kalcho Petrov Chukarov
8	25	BSPASEK	1	Todor Yordanov Todorov
8	25	BSPASEK	2	Lyubomir Panayotov Kolarov
8	25	BSPASEK	3	Zhecho Yordanov Popov
8	25	BSPASEK	4	Gincho Marinov Pavlov

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
8	25	BSPASEK	5	Stanimir Kalchev Kalchevski
9th Electoral District - Kurdzhali				
9	6	DPS	1	Gulbie Erdzheb Osman
9	6	DPS	2	Remzi Durmush Osman
9	6	DPS	3	Hasan Ali Hasan
9	6	DPS	4	Yumer Yusein Yumer
9	25	BSPASEK	1	Georgi Sedefchov Purvanov
9	25	BSPASEK	2	Kalin Nikolov Dimitrov
10th Electoral District-Kyustendil				
10	2	SDS	1	Loreta Metodieva Nikolova
10	2	SDS	2	Evgeniy Peykov Ekov
10	25	BSPASEK	1	Ivo Purvanov Atanasov
10	25	BSPASEK	2	Valery Pavlov Sturshelov
10	25	BSPASEK	3	Spas Dimitrov Stankov
11th Electoral District - Lovech				
11	2	SDS	1	Evgeniy Svetoslavov Mikhaylov
11	2	SDS	2	Nelson Maknev Nenov
11	25	BSPASEK	1	Nora Krachunova Ananieva
11	25	BSPASEK	2	Yordan Atanasov Roynev
11	25	BSPASEK	3	Ivan Penev Bratulev
12th Electoral District - Montana				
12	2	SDS	1	Petur Stefanov Stoyanov
12	25	BSPASEK	1	Vladimir Vladimirov Topencharov
12	25	BSPASEK	2	Emil Veselov Filipov
12	25	BSPASEK	3	Todor Ivanov Zhivkov
12	25	BSPASEK	4	Rusi Ivanov Statkov
12	25	BSPASEK	5	Ivan Yosifov Ivanov
13th Electoral District - Pazardzhik				
13	2	SDS	1	Ekaterina Ivanova Mikhaylova
13	2	SDS	2	Mikhail Rashkov Mikhaylov
13	2	SDS	3	Ivan Khristov Dimitrov
13	5	NS	1	Borislav Dimitrov Kitov
13	25	BSPASEK	1	Ivan Georgiev Genov
13	25	BSPASEK	2	Svetoslav Stoyanov Shivarov
13	25	BSPASEK	3	Petur Georgiev Bashikarov
13	25	BSPASEK	4	Spas Atanasov Muletarov
13	25	BSPASEK	5	Ilko Savov Savov
14th Electoral District - Pernik				
14	2	SDS	1	Vasil Nikolaev Mikhaylov
14	2	SDS	2	Charodey Petrov Chernev
14	25	BSPASEK	1	Stefan Iliev Stoilov
14	25	BSPASEK	2	Dimitur Stanimirov Doychinov
14	25	BSPASEK	3	Rusalin Simeonov Arnaudov

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
15th Electoral District - Pleven				
15	2	SDS	1	Yordan Georgiev Sokolov
15	2	SDS	2	Dyanko Georgiev Markov
15	5	NS	1	Mitko Dimitrov Nitov
15	5	NS	2	Iliya Petkov Danov
15	17	BBB	1	Khristo Nikolov Stoyanov
15	25	BSPASEK	1	Andrey Karlov Lukanov
15	25	BSPASEK	2	Rumen Vasilev Gechev
15	25	BSPASEK	3	Todor Yordanov Pandov
15	25	BSPASEK	4	Lyuben Yordanov Petrov
15	25	BSPASEK	5	Tosho Ivanov Mukhtanov
16th Electoral District - Plovdiv-City				
16	2	SDS	1	Ivan Yordanov Kostov
16	2	SDS	2	Pavel Dimitrov Shopov
16	2	SDS	3	Grigor Kostov Malev
16	2	SDS	4	Muravey Georgiev Radev
16	2	SDS	5	Vasil Zhelyazkov Doykov
16	2	SDS	6	Vladimir Nikolov Nikolov
16	17	BBB	1	Ivo Krumov Traykov
16	25	BSPASEK	1	Rosen Khubenov Stoilov
16	25	BSPASEK	2	Khristo Ivanov Khristov
16	25	BSPASEK	3	Boris Yanev Stoyanov
17th Electoral District - Plovdiv-Okrug				
17	2	SDS	1	Konstantin Vankov Todorov
17	2	SDS	2	Ivan Milkov Kurtev
17	2	SDS	3	Ruslan Marinov Serbezov
17	2	SDS	4	Ivan Penchev Tosev
17	5	NS	1	Anastasiya Georgieva Dimitrova-Mozer
17	5	NS	2	Atanas Georgiev Atanasov
17	25	BSPASEK	1	Stoycho Mikhaylov Shapatov
17	25	BSPASEK	2	Donka Stefanova Doncheva
17	25	BSPASEK	3	Angel Georgiev Dimov
17	25	BSPASEK	4	Elisaveta Petrova Milenova
17	25	BSPASEK	5	Khristoz Dobrev Khristozov
18th Electoral District - Razgrad				
18	6	DPS	1	Gyuer Behchet Tahir
18	6	DPS	2	Stoyan Georgiev Denchev
18	6	DPS	3	Seyhan Kasim Saduk
18	25	BSPASEK	1	Georgi Todorov Bozhinov
18	25	BSPASEK	2	Mincho Boev Koralski
19th Electoral District - Ruse				
19	2	SDS	1	Stefan Antonov Sofiyanski
19	2	SDS	2	Dimitur Tsonkov Ivanov

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
19	17	BBB	1	Dimitur Ivanov Dichev
19	25	BSPASEK	1	Anchel Raymond Vagenshtayn
19	25	BSPASEK	2	Svetoslav Kolev Michev
19	25	BSPASEK	3	Georgi Stefanov Popov
19	25	BSPASEK	4	Ivan Kostadinov Ivanov
19	25	BSPASEK	5	Stefka Stefanova Naumova
20th Electoral District - Silistra				
20	6	DPS	1	Kelmal Eyup Adil
20	25	BSPASEK	1	Lyubomir Panayotov Kolarov
20	25	BSPASEK	2	Ana Georgieva Milenkova
20	25	BSPASEK	3	Vasil Todorov Kalinov
21st Electoral District - Sliven				
21	2	SDS	1	Dimitur Asenov Saruivanov
21	5	NS	1	Atanas Ivanov Zhelezchev
21	25	BSPASEK	1	Zlatimir Stoyanov Orsov
21	25	BSPASEK	2	Iliya Aleksandrov Mavrodiev
21	25	BSPASEK	3	Evgeniy Zakhariev Kirilov
21	25	BSPASEK	4	Yovcho Marinov Rusev
21	25	BSPASEK	5	Georgi Avramov Dimov
22d Electoral District - Smolyan				
22	2	SDS	1	Zvezdalin Vekilov Kafedzhiev
22	25	BSPASEK	1	Stefan Ivanov Prodev
22	25	BSPASEK	2	Petko Stoyanov Pekhlivanov
22	25	BSPASEK	3	Lilyan Yosifov Sirakov
23d Electoral District - Sofia 1				
23	2	SDS	1	Ivan Milkov Kurtev
23	2	SDS	2	Valentin Iliev Vasilev
23	2	SDS	3	Georgi Stefanov Panev
23	2	SDS	4	Mariyana Ivanova Lukova
23	2	SDS	5	Georgi Gervanov Ananiev
23	2	SDS	6	Ivan Ivanov Sungarski
23	5	NS	1	Aleksandur Asenov Dzherov
23	17	BBB	1	Orlin Vubarnov Draganov
23	25	BSPASEK	1	Aleksandur Ivanov Marinov
23	25	BSPASEK	2	Velko Vulkanov Ivanov
23	25	BSPASEK	3	Ivan Aleksiev Gaytandzhiev
23	25	BSPASEK	4	Stefan Veselinov Gaytandzhiev
24th Electoral District - Sofia 2				
24	2	SDS	1	Filip Dimitrov Dimitrov
24	2	SDS	2	Svetoslav Denchev Luchnikov
24	2	SDS	3	Ivan Zapryanov Glushkov
24	2	SDS	4	Krum Dimitrov Slavov
24	2	SDS	5	Mario Ivanov Tagarinski

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
24	2	SDS	6	Ivan Georgiev Sotirov
24	5	NS	1	Stefan Dimitrov Slavov
24	17	BBB	1	Valentin Stoyanov Stoev
24	25	BSPASEK	1	Zhan Vasilev Videnov
24	25	BSPASEK	2	Yordan Kirilov Shkolagerski
24	25	BSPASEK	3	Georgi Georgiev Pirinski
25th Electoral District - Sofia 3				
25	2	SDS	1	Edvin Stefanov Sugarev
25	2	SDS	2	Nadezhda Nikolova Mikhaylova
25	2	SDS	3	Georgi Benchev Karev
25	2	SDS	4	Luchezar Blagovestov Toshev
25	2	SDS	5	Vladislav Borisov Kostov
25	17	BBB	1	Georgi Dimitrov Dilkov
25	25	BSPASEK	1	Nikolay Georgiev Kamov
25	25	BSPASEK	2	Stanka Yanakieva Velichkova
25	25	BSPASEK	3	Petur Stefanov Georgiev
25	25	BSPASEK	4	Ivaylo Georgiev Kalfin
25	25	BSPASEK	5	Doncho Svobodanov Atanasov
26th Electoral District - Sofia Okrug				
26	2	SDS	1	Vasil Stoyanov Gotsev
26	2	SDS	2	Dimitur Atanasov Stoyanov
26	5	NS	1	Ivan Spasov Nevrokopski
26	25	BSPASEK	1	Nikolay Kirilov Dobrev
26	25	BSPASEK	2	Aleksandur Ivanov Gerchev
26	25	BSPASEK	3	Lyubcho Pavlov Kharalampiev
26	25	BSPASEK	4	Natasha Kirilova Tacheva
26	25	BSPASEK	5	Nina Lazarova Mikhaylova
27th Electoral District - Stara Zagora				
27	2	SDS	1	Asen Yordanov Agov
27	2	SDS	2	Dako Neykov Mikhaylov
27	2	SDS	3	Sasho Nachev Stoyanov
27	5	NS	1	Petko Iliev Penev
27	5	NS	2	Mon'o Khristov Khristov
27	17	BBB	1	Nikolay Petrov Kis'ov
27	25	BSPASEK	1	Aleksandur Vasilev Lilov
27	25	BSPASEK	2	Dimitur Nikolov Dimitrov
27	25	BSPASEK	3	Rosen Dinev Mikhaylov
27	25	BSPASEK	4	Ivan Dimov Zunzov
27	25	BSPASEK	5	Georgi Ivanov Zakhariev
28th Electoral District - Turgovishte				
28	6	DPS	1	Yunal Said Lyutfi
28	25	BSPASEK	1	Yuriy Mitkov Borisov
28	25	BSPASEK	2	Boncho Draganov Rashkov

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District No.	Party No.	Party Name	No. on List	Name
1	2	3	4	5
28	25	BSPASEK	3	Valentina Krumova Georgieva
29th Electoral District - Khaskovo				
29	2	SDS	1	Khristo Damyanov Biserov
29	5	NS	1	Georgi Pinchev Ivanov
29	6	DPS	1	Yudzhel Naim Atilla
29	17	BBB	1	Yasho Dimitrov Minkov
29	25	BSPASEK	1	Klara Vulova Marinova
29	25	BSPASEK	2	Angel Petrov Naydenov
29	25	BSPASEK	3	Ivan Asenov Atanasov
29	25	BSPASEK	4	Dimitur Velev Dimitrov
29	25	BSPASEK	5	Kosta Todorov Andreev
30th Electoral District - Shumen				
30	2	SDS	1	Aleksandur Yordanov Aleksandrov
30	6	DPS	1	Ahmed Demir Dogan
30	6	DPS	2	Mehmed Beytulla Hadzhiyumer
30	25	BSPASEK	1	Atanas Atanasov Paparizov
30	25	BSPASEK	2	Petur Petrov Slabakov
30	25	BSPASEK	3	Mariela Nikolayeva Miteva
31st Electoral District - Yambol				
31	2	SDS	1	Vasil Ivanov Zlatarov
31	5	NS	1	Stefan Petrov Lichev
31	25	BSPASEK	1	Ana Ivanova Karaivanova-Davidova
31	25	BSPASEK	2	Boyan Borisov Kirov
31	25	BSPASEK	3	Kiril Stoyanov Zhelev

The following individuals elected national representatives on more than one district electoral list must inform the Central Electoral Commission of the candidate list on which they consider themselves to have been elected within one day after being informed of their election. These are as follows:

1. Filip Dimitrov Dimitrov—1st and 24th Electoral Districts;

2. Ahmed Demir Dogan—2d and 13th Electoral Districts;

3. Georgi Sedefchov Purvanov—2d and 9th Electoral Districts;

4. Aleksandur Yordanov Aleksandrov—3d and 30th Electoral Districts;

5. Aleksandur Dimov Bozhkov—3d and 8th Electoral Districts;

6. Vasil Stoyanov Gotsev—4th and 26th Electoral Districts;

7. Nadezhda Nikolova Mikhaylova—4th and 25th Electoral Districts;

8. Petur Stefanov Stoyanov—5th and 12th Electoral Districts;

9. Lyubomir Panayotov Kolarov—8th and 20th Electoral Districts;

10. Ivan Milkov Kurtev—7th and 23d Electoral Districts;

The above candidates included in the proper electoral list will be declared elected by the Central Electoral Commission via an additional resolution.

5. Based on appeals, reports, and complaints, the Central Electoral Commission has established that violations of the ZINPOSK during the electoral campaign and the elections have not influenced electoral results. The voting took place in a peaceful atmosphere.

6. The legitimacy of the election of national representatives may be appealed to the Constitutional Court within one month from the announcement of the results.

Chairman: L. Dzhelepova
Secretary: Kh. Anchev

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Resolution No. 502 of 28 December 1994

The Central Electoral Commission announced the results of the elections for national representatives, held on 18 December 1994, via Resolution No. 500, of 27 December 1994.

Notification as per Article 92, Paragraph 1, of the ZINPOSK was received within the proper time period from the national representatives elected on more than one district electoral list, specifying the list of candidates for which they are to be considered elected.

On this basis, and in accordance with Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the ZINPOSK, the Central Electoral Commission has adopted the following resolution:

The following candidates are proclaimed elected national representatives: 1. Anatoliy Metodiev Velichkov, SDS, 1st Electoral District, Blagoevgrad, replacing Filip Dimitrov Dimitrov, SDS, also elected in the 24th Electoral District, Sofia 2.

2. Maksim Zhekov Dimov, DPS, 30th Electoral District, Shumen, replacing Ahmed Demir Dogan, DPS, also elected in the 2d Electoral District, Burgas.

3. Orlin Rizov Rizov, BSPASEK, 2d Electoral District, Burgas, replacing Georgi Sedefchov Purvanov, BSPASEK, also elected in the 9th Electoral District, Kurdzhali.

4. Vladimir Georgiev Shkodrov, SDS, 30th Electoral District, Shumen, replacing Aleksandur Yordanov Aleksandrov, SDS, also elected in the 3d Electoral District, Varna.

5. Dimitur Georgiev Zhelev, SDS, 3d Electoral District, Varna, replacing Aleksandur Dimov Bozhkov, SDS, also elected in the 8th Electoral District, Dobrich.

6. Tsvetan Ivanov Dimitrov, SDS, 4th Electoral District, Veliko Turnovo, replacing Vasil Stoyanov Gotsev, SDS, also elected in the 26th Electoral District, Sofia Okrug.

7. Svobodka Stefanova Encheva, SDS, 25th Electoral District, Sofia 3, replacing Nadezhda Nikolova Mikhaylova, SDS, also elected in the 4th Electoral District, Veliko Turnovo.

8. Emil Yanakiev Kapudaliev, SDS, 5th Electoral District, Vidin, replacing Petur Stefanov Stoyanov, SDS, also elected in the 12th Electoral District, Montana.

9. Georgi Dimitrov Georgiev, BSPASEK, 20th Electoral District, Silistra, replacing Lyubomir Panayotov Kolarov, BSPASEK, also elected in the 8th Electoral District, Dobrich.

10. Nikolay Dimitrov Nalbantov, SDS, 17th Electoral District,Plovdiv Okrug, replacing Ivan Milkov Kurtev, SDS, also elected in the 23d Electoral District, Sofia 1.

Chairman: L. Dzhelepova
Secretary: Kh. Anchev

Replacements in National Assembly

95P20606A

[FBIS Media Note] On 3 and 28 February, the official organ of the Bulgarian National Assembly, DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, announced decisions by the Central Electoral Commission on replacements for representatives in the National Assembly. All of the changes involve members of the governing coalition, the BSPASEK (Bulgarian Socialist Party, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-Aleksandur Stamboliyski, and the Ekoglasnost Political Club). These changes are as follows:

1. Kol'o Velkov Kolev replaces Lyubomir Todorov Nachev in the 2d electoral district in Burgas.

2. Rumyana Nikolova Shubekova replaces Doncho Donchev Konakchiev in the 4th electoral district in Veliko Turnovo.

3. Emiliya Todorova Tomova replaces Mimi Mikova Vitkova-Petkova in the 5th electoral district in Viden.

4. Zavarin Spasov Marov replaces Svetoslav Stoyanov Shivarov in the 13th electoral district in Pazardzhik.

5. Mariana Simeonova Khristova replaces Rumen Vasilev Gechev in the 15th electoral district in Pleven.

6. Petko Todorov Ganev replaces Mincho Boev Koralski in the 18th electoral district in Razgrad.

7. Chavdar Atanasov Dobrev replaces Zhan Vasilev Videnov in the 24th electoral district in Sofia.

8. Sashka Georgieva Karakasheva replaces Georgi Georgiev Pirinski in the 24th electoral district in Sofia.

9. Chervenko Krumov Lazov replaces Angel Petrov Naydenov in the 29th electoral district in Khaskovo.

10. Todor Raychev Popov replaces Radostin Ivanov Dimitrov in the 2d electoral district in Burgas.

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Germany's Ruehe on NATO, Bilateral Ties

LD2103154595 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1328 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague (DDP/ADN)—In his talks in Prague today, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe emphasized the direct connection between the proposed strategic partnership of the United States with Russia and the admission of new member states to NATO. The timing of these two steps must be seen in "close context," Ruehe told the press at midday. The important thing is the "dual approach of integration and cooperation, of membership and partnership," which all NATO partners recognize as the fundamental course, Ruehe said.

Ruehe dismissed rumors circulating in the Czech Republic, according to which NATO is likely to station nuclear weapons in new member states, as "absurd speculation." Ruehe said he sees no reason for the current trend toward a concentration of these weapons to be reversed.

Ruehe called for a "new quality" in German-Czech relations, modeled on French-German cooperation. He said he proposed, in addition to the agreed direct bilateral exchange, to give Czech officers the opportunity to gain an insight into the structures and work of the French-German brigade. His meeting with his counterpart Vilem Holan was "part of the the dialogue initiated by both sides," which is "clearly oriented not toward the past but toward the future," Ruehe said. [passage omitted]

Military Cooperation Planned With Germany

LD2103145795 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] German Minister of Defense Volker Ruehe is holding talks in Prague today. After meeting his counterpart Vilem Holan, Ruehe said that the Armies of the two countries would participate in 80 joint actions such as training, military education, and exercises.

Ruehe said that the language-barrier problem had to be resolved so that the training of Czech officers could continue with the same intensity.

The German minister should now have talks with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Afterward he will be received by the president of the Republic Vaclav Havel.

Klaus: Kinkel Lacks Feeling for Sudeten Issue

LD2103201695 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1720 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Lucie Weissova; place and date not given: "A Meeting With the Prime Minister of the Czech Government"—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Prime Minister, Czech-German relations have currently made it onto the newspapers' title pages, although politicians from both countries are dealing with them very seriously. On Friday they were even discussed in the Bundestag. In this context I was interested to hear that, while the speech by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was quite well received in this country, it was sharply criticized in Germany. German Social Democrats even stated that Czech-German relations were in crisis and blamed the Federal Government. What, in your view, is the situation?

[Klaus] First, I think that what happened last month is a pity. Strong words on our part, including the interpretation of the Constitutional Court decision [to uphold the validity of the Benes Decrees] and the pronouncement made on the German side, unnecessarily exacerbated this matter and dragged it to the forefront. And that is a pity, I think.

Regarding Foreign Minister Kinkel's speech, I cannot accept that it put symmetrically side by side the war sufferings and the expulsion of Germans, as if these were the same matters. To me, this is, has been, and will always be unacceptable. These matters are not simply the same. They did not exist side by side; they followed each other. The first was the cause of the second and not the other way around.

The fact that this was said in the speech by the German foreign minister amounts, in my view, to a strong lack of feeling for these matters.

On the other hand, I have been continually repeating that the year 1945 is a closed past just as is the breakup of Austria-Hungary or any other development of the past, and the attempt to delve or poke into it and to try to change it in some way is destined to fail. And so, it seems to me that the whole of last month led to nothing. We should have moved forward and discussed matters of the future. [passage omitted]

My meeting with CSU Chairman Theo Weigel on Sunday [word indistinct] was carried out in the spirit I have just described here. My impression is that our discussion was rather pragmatic. [passage omitted]

[Weissova] According to the German press, another topic was the possibility of simplified granting of Czech citizenship to Sudeten Germans. Did you talk about it?

[Klaus] Naturally, we talked about it. On the German side this was a fact-finding discussion. It was a response to the recent and not very clear statement by our foreign minister. You see, in no case have I pursued the point, and people should not be under that impression. I think that, as far as we are concerned, it is absolutely clear that no dual citizenship is acceptable for us. Thus the idea that some should retain their German citizenship and still have the Czech one is not on. This is a matter on which we are absolutely clear, and we have said this on many occasions.

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I think it would be absolutely different if someone in Germany should decide on becoming a Czech citizen and renouncing his German citizenship. This, I think, would be a totally different matter, it would be a totally different kettle of fish that could be in some way and at a certain point perhaps discussed, although nobody has suggested this. I think that the concept of not allowing two citizenships shifts the whole matter into a different sphere.

[Weissova] In connection with various affairs and disagreements at the present time, there is talk about a crisis in the coalition. Do you understand the current situation as a crisis?

[Klaus] If my evaluation of this issue were to be based on some statements made by some forces in the ruling coalition, I would perhaps use stronger words. But because I know what the relations within the coalition are, I will retain the word crisis for an even worse period.

[Weissova] Do you think there is sufficient willingness for compromise and for going jointly to the elections?

[Klaus] First of all, we must say what kinds of compromises there are. Political compromises, naturally, are a reality of political life because I know very well that the political party I represent has 51 percent of votes in the elections—or 99 per cent. [passage omitted]

In this sense, political compromise is a matter of absolute necessity for all normal thinking people. Possible compromises, as you say, in matters that are not political—that is a different thing. These are matters of criminal proceedings, and they do not belong to the sphere of compromises or the sphere of political interference into these affairs. [passage omitted].

[Weissova] The last topic of today's interview: Slovak Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik said that in July a new payment system should be in force between Slovakia and us. Did you talk about it, or is this a Slovak proposal, which has not been officially presented yet?

[Klaus] I have never seen Mr. Kozlik, and I never have had any talks with him. I cannot take seriously chance statements in Bratislava yesterday. I repeat: We are preparing materials for comprehensive talks with the Slovak Government and the Slovak prime minister. This question belongs among them. [passage omitted]

Havel's View of Czech-German Relations Analyzed

95CH0165A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Feb 95 p 14

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "Havel's Return Home: The Czech President Reconciles Himself With His People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague, 19 Feb—When the president, accompanied by the sounds of organ music, exited the assembly hall of the Carolinum in Prague, a good many of those who were lining the street had already heard the Pentecostal bells ring. Every year at Pentecost, you know, the annual meeting of the Sudeten Germans takes place in Bavaria, and they have been doubly affected by Havel's speech on German-Czech relations. For the "reconcilers" among the refugees, the president, up to now, has been a kind of lonely pillar of hope. After all, five years ago he courageously opposed public opinion in his country and found critical words on the subject of the expulsion of the Germans.

With his most recent speech on fundamentals at Charles University, however, Havel withdrew far behind his former positions. The moderate expellees who had formerly bet on Havel are now finding themselves helpless and lost. And those who had always been distrustful of the peace have been given new ammunition. "With this speech, the dramaturgy for the next meeting of the Sudeten Germans has been written," was the fear of a disappointed German in Prague, who would have preferred a different course of events.

Havel's anxiously anticipated speech on the historically heavily burdened relationship between Germans and Czechs turned out to be a special kind of act of reconciliation. A president reconciled himself with his people, who to this day have not understood why their head of state has maintained a different, troublesome opinion on an intensely emotionalized question, on which there is virtually complete unanimity in the country. To be sure, Havel had never called into question the first dogma of the Czechs, according to which the expulsion of approximately 3 million Sudeten Germans following the Second World War was inevitable and, most importantly, is irreversible.

According to the majority of the people and the political elite, however, in the past Havel has gone too far in throwing doubt on the myth that depicts the Czechs exclusively as the victims of the troubles and horrors of this century and the Sudeten Germans mainly as (co)perpetrators.

With his most recent speech Havel, in spite of many differentiations in passing references, returned to the bosom of popular belief. The media for this were almost apodictically presented (although by no means undisputed) historical assessments, according to which, in the final analysis, the Sudeten Germans themselves were to blame for their "evacuation." Havel's appeal for the exploration of the truth and the termination of all settlings of accounts became a historical reckoning beyond any appeal. In so doing, the at other times frequently confirmed hostility of the president toward all theses of collective guilt were only barely evident. Proximity to the traditional convictions of the nation, in contrast, was greater than ever before.

This earned the president the public approval of even his worst enemies, the communists. "This is the way the president should have talked a long time ago; then many mistakes in foreign policy would have been avoided," the chairman of the "Left Bloc," Ortmann, commented.

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At the reception following the speech, one of the nation's agitators, an editor of the former Communist Party organ RUDE PRAVO, peddled the triumphant remark that the president had at long last said what RUDE PRAVO has been writing for five years. This, as is typical of the paper, was certainly exaggerated, but this time it was basically not incorrect.

There are many reasons for Havel's return to the uniform Czech front line. For one thing, other statements and actions of the president also reveal that he no longer wants to hold out in the cold and in isolation, where he has found himself as the result of a few positions that were not acceptable to the government and the people (see, for example, the lawsuit over the Prague Cathedral at St. Veit). The friendly remarks of Prime Minister Klaus, who had naturally been given an advance copy of the speech, were especially welcome in the castle in Prague; no one can quite remember the last time when Klaus had so much praise for Havel.

A further motive for the speech was the disappointment of the president over the mistakes and missed opportunities on both sides, which have been a persistent obstacle to the development of German-Czech relations since the fall of communism. Havel, finally, is clearly angered by the fact that his (in terms of domestic politics) highly burdensome statements and initiatives for the improvement of relations have remained without response from Germany in a majority of cases. Generally speaking, there is a prevailing feeling that, in spite of testimonies to the contrary, Bonn is not mustering a great deal of interest in its Czech neighbor. The Left blamed this on the "softness" of the Czech side and especially the supposed "servility" of the president vis-a-vis the Germans.

Indignation finally built up over the as yet unpaid compensation of the Czech Nazi victims and over Federal Chancellor Kohl, who has declared this matter to be a "secret." Among six great German Europeans, cited by Havel in his speech in a regular confession to the "democratic Germany," the name of Kohl is missing. Finally, the speech was also a settling of accounts with the Association of Sudeten Germans, which from the Czech perspective has reacted to any concession by Havel with new admonitions and catalogues of demands.

Of course, with the categorical rejection of all concerns of the Sudeten Germans, Havel is playing into the hands of those forces among the expellees that from the very outset have doubted the good will of the Czechs. It is almost tragic that Havel with his speech is weakening the position of the Sudeten Germans, to whose laborious reconciliation work he himself has paid tribute time and again, and who up to now have provided the main drive behind the German-Czech dialogue. In the Carolinum, Havel also unnecessarily abandoned the realization, which had trickled into the Czech consciousness only with difficulty, that not all expellees should be treated alike.

Havel's speech instead focused on another contrast, that between the "open society of free citizens" and its "enemies," who indulge in gloomy "tribal sentiments" and rally under "collectivist banners." The neighboring land of Bavaria, which after the war had taken in the Sudeten Germans as the "fourth tribe," in contrast to Saxony, was not officially invited to Havel's speech.

Judging from initial reactions, the Czech nation is extremely content with this speech, which, by the way, Havel delivered in a "disarmed" version. At long last, it is said, the Czech position has been formulated uniformly and obligingly. Now the Germans have no other choice but to react. This expectation refers primarily to compensation for the Nazi victims. Up to now it had been assumed that Prague would one day pay tribute to a corresponding act from Bonn via a "gesture of good will" for the Sudeten Germans. But whether room for such a gesture will remain following the cementing of Czech positions by Havel is unclear. In the stormy applause in the Charles University in Prague, therefore, one or another faint Czech voice could be heard that is afraid that Havel's appeal for dialogue and cooperation (without a concrete proposal) will result in the opposite: in the hardening of positions on both sides and the postponement of German-Czech reconciliation to the indefinite future. The past five years have already demonstrated that Germans and Czechs have more important things to attend to.

Klaus on Stability Pact, Control of Intelligence

AU2103190495 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 17 Mar 95 p 3

[Regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci in Prague on 16 March: "The Idea of a Family Allowance Tax Write-Off Gives Rise to a Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[Krejci] The Stability Pact is to be signed on 20 March. Do you believe it will be of some advantage to our country?

[Klaus] I believe that, over the two years of its existence, Mr. Balladur's idea has undergone numerous changes. It went from the original, very ambitious idea of creating an entirely new alternative organization, which we have tried—even I, personally—to talk him out of, to the present state, when it became a declarative document that fortunately does not assume the foundation of another institution. I am convinced that the mutual Czech-Slovak agreements, for instance, are a good example of how European stability could look.

[Krejci] How do you feel about the idea that the government council for coordination of intelligence services be composed on the party-principle basis?

[Klaus] For various historical reasons and particularly because of the way this was done in communist Czechoslovakia, the citizens may not wish the Security Information Service to be subordinated to the Interior Ministry. I

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respect this, although I do not believe that anything evil would happen if this were the case. Nevertheless, because the government itself cannot control the intelligence services as a whole, there is nothing left but to create for this purpose a collective minister—that is, create a council. What this body—certainly consisting of more than four members—will look like is an entirely different matter. Nevertheless, I do not believe a genuine coalition balance necessary. On the other hand, there is no reason for it to be too one-sided. The purpose of creating this council is to engage in it those ministers closest to the Security Information Service, and that not only in the sense of assigning work but also of the results. So we will certainly form this body according to the responsibility of the ministers rather than according to some simplified quantitative partisan calculations. [passage omitted]

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Meciar Speaks at Stability Pact Conference

LD2003133095 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 20 Mar 95

[Excerpt of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's speech at the opening of a two-day international conference on the Stability Pact; in Paris on 20 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Republic has actively joined in implementing the conclusions of the inauguration conference. We highly praise the contribution of the European Union in organizing roundtables. We are aware, as one of the associated countries, that the Stability Pact, through its course and actual results, will speed up our bona fide participation in the EU. That is why we have understood this important joint action of the EU as one of the key events of multilateral diplomacy of the present time, significant not only for the countries of Central and East Europe, but also for the development of the Union itself.

The Slovak Republic understands stability in a comprehensive manner. It touches upon the topical problems of politics, economy, the social consequences of transformation, and also human rights, including the rights of people belonging to national minorities. It was very important that we approached these questions on the basis of inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, and respect for the existing borders.

The Slovak Republic appreciates the political significance of the Stability Pact also by having added to the list of treaties and agreements its bilateral treaties with neighboring states. We have welcomed the decision of the EU states to add to this list also its bilateral treaties and political declarations with the countries of our region.

Parliament Chairman Views Hungarian Treaty

LD2103142895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Our editor Ludmila Bulakova interviews Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of Slovakia [parliament].

[Begin recording] [Bulakova] A historic agreement; an inevitable compromise; the victory of reason; an inappropriate decision made by the Government of the Slovak Republic. Mr. Chairman, which of these best describes the basic interstate Hungarian-Slovak treaty signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in Paris on Sunday?

[Gasparovic] In my view, all the above-mentioned attributes can be used. However, the fact that the treaty was signed is a real signal to those who kept saying that Slovakia is not able to communicate, not able to reach an agreement, not capable of certain compromises. From this point of view, I really have to assess this treaty as acceptable.

[Bulakova] The Hungarian parliament has already opened the debate on the treaty. When is the Slovak parliament going to discuss the treaty?

[Gasparovic] [Passage omitted] As for the content of the treaty and its consequences, in my view we have already implemented the treaty because all individual rights and civic rights are already enjoyed by the national minorities in Slovakia. [end recording]

Government Rejects Hungarian Interpretations of Treaty

AU2103175695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Mar 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Contribution to Strengthening Stability; Slovak Government Statement on the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic yesterday delivered to TASR a Slovak Government statement that states, inter alia:

At its extraordinary meeting on 18 March 1995, the Government of the Slovak Republic approved the text of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Relations Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic. This document is the result of joint efforts by the governments of both countries to establish positive conditions for the comprehensive development of Slovak-Hungarian relations. In the event of consistent implementation of its provisions, it will undoubtedly contribute to strengthening stability and cooperation in Central Europe. The Government of the Slovak Republic considers the agreed text of the treaty to be mutually acceptable, disadvantageous to neither contracting party, a guarantee of the inviolability of the common state borders, ruling out any territorial claims against the other side, and establishing the appropriate legal space for the implementation of rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, in accordance with the internal legal systems of both countries. However, the Government of the Slovak Republic expresses surprise over the fact that, even before the signing of the treaty, the text of the agreed treaty is being misinterpreted by official Hungarian representatives, especially as regards the article referring to the status of persons belonging to ethnic minorities. In particular, it rejects interpretations by the Hungarian side that the Slovak side has accepted Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201 (of 1993) in the sense that enables the formation of autonomous minority self-administrations. The Government of the Slovak Republic stresses that it has never accepted or laid down in the treaty any formulations based on the recognition of collective rights of a minority, or provisions allowing the establishment of autonomous structures based on an ethnic principle. It insists that it has agreed with including a reference to the Recommendation of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

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No. 1201 (of 1993) explicitly together with the restricting clause "respecting individual human and civic rights, including the rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities." Along with the document's other pertinent provisions, this treaty consistently respects accepted European standards, which are based exclusively on the individual rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities. Any other interpretation is therefore out of the question. This statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic will be delivered to the Government of the Hungarian Republic through diplomatic channels.

In accordance with a Slovak Government resolution, yesterday at 1720 hours in Paris, Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk delivered to Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, a note containing the text of the above Statement by the Government of the Slovak Republic. Simultaneously, Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented in Bratislava an identical note to Jeno Boros, ambassador of the Hungarian Republic to Slovakia.

Meciar: Kovac, Havel 'Thwarted' Klaus Meeting

AU2103213595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava SME in Slovak on 16 March on page 1 carries a 300-word report on Prime Minister Meciar's appearance in the "Press Club" television discussion program on 14 March. Speaking about his planned meeting with Czech Prime Vaclav Klaus, Meciar reportedly said: "My meeting with the Czech prime minister was already in the stage of consultations but, unfortunately, the meeting between the [Czech and Slovak] presidents, and the atmosphere that arose there, have thwarted this meeting. This atmosphere was inappropriate and offensive to Slovakia. This naturally has an impact on contacts between the prime ministers as well. Both sides have acknowledged this. A meeting simply cannot take place at this time. It would not be good if the government's hard work were to be disturbed in the emotional sphere [na pocitovej sfere] at presidential meetings."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 March on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word report signed "bj/mh" and entitled "No Comment from Prague, Bratislava According to Plan." The report opens by saying: "NARODNA OBRODA yesterday inquired about Czech President Vaclav Havel's reaction to the Slovak prime minister's remarks about the atmosphere at the presidential meeting at Lany having been inappropriate and offensive to Slovakia and having thwarted a planned meeting between the two countries' prime ministers. Following consultations with the president and his spokesman, the Office of the President of the Czech Republic stated in reply to our question that Prague Castle does not consider it necessary to react to the Slovak prime minister's words and will not comment on them, in any case." The Office of the President of the Slovak Republic reportedly sent the following reply to NARODNA OBRODA's query about its reaction to Vladimir Meciar's "Press Club" remarks: "Like each of the regular meetings between Michal Kovac and Vaclav Havel, this trip was a planned one. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew about its preparation since January 1995. At a coordination meeting with the parliament chairman, the prime minister, the chairman of parliament's foreign affairs committee, and the minister of foreign affairs on 8 February 1995, the president presented to the prime minister a plan of his foreign trips.

"Moreover, shortly before the realization of the trip, the head of the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic offered to the minister of foreign affairs the possibility of modifying the date of the presidents' meeting, if required by the date of the prime ministers' meeting. Because the Office of the President did not receive any proposals in this regard, the meeting of the two presidents was held as scheduled.

"In the opinion of the president of the Slovak Republic, the delay of the meeting between the two prime ministers is not a consequence of the meeting of the presidents."

Farmers Party Holds Congress, Elects Leadership

AU2103175595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Dagmar Mlynarcikova: "Favorable Signs of Liptov Skies; Third National Congress of the Farmers Party of Slovakia Ended in Liptovsky Mikulas"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Some 110 delegates from 37 districts met in Liptovsky Mikulas on 18 March to assess at the Third National Congress of the Farmers Party of Slovakia [RSS] the party's activity over the preceding year, to update its policy aims, and to define its position on the Slovak political scene. [passage omitted] The RSS has at present some 3,000 members. [passage omitted]

Following a brief discussion, the delegates reelected Pavol Delinga as party chairman. Miroslav Maxon and Ladislav Kazlov were elected deputy chairmen. The resolution and the party's policy orientation for the years 1995-98 were approved without any objections being raised. An important feature of the final document is emphasis on close cooperation with the Farmers Movement of the Slovak Republic, which should result in the formation of a joint political body.

Interior Minister Gives Figures on Refugees

LD2103150395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's government meeting in Bratislava is chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik. [passage omitted] Magda Pospisilova reports from the government building:

[Pospisilova] The most important document from among the seven debated so far are draft principles of a parliamentary bill on refugees. This document, as well as

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two other documents—namely, the Clean Hands program and the national antidrug program—is being presented by Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, whom I welcome now to the microphone. [passage omitted]

Minister, before we discuss details of the bill, let me ask you how many refugees are registered in our country at present.

[Hudek] By 1 March 1995, refugee status was granted to 165 foreigners in Slovakia, who arrived here mainly from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Angola, Bulgaria, Romania, and the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Temporary shelter, as defined by the government's decree, was offered to some 1,200 immigrants from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of these, some 500 have been placed in humanitarian centers, and the rest are with Slovak families.

[Pospisilova] Who can be granted refugee status in our country?

[Hudek] Current legal norm is based on Law No. 498/1990 on refugees. This legislation does not make it possible to appropriately deal with the growing wave of immigrants. Moreover, some of its stipulations contradict the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the legal status of refugees. [passage omitted]

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Horn Discusses Treaty Before National Assembly

LD2103153695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0808 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Address by Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn to the National Assembly—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. Speaker, est. med National Assembly: Let me brief you on the events in Paris yesterday and the day before yesterday, and about the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. [passage omitted]

Was this basic treaty necessary? The answer is yes, certainly, since this basic treaty helps sort out the relations between Hungary and Slovakia. It advances not only the prosperity of the 600,000 ethnic Hungarians living abroad in Slovakia but that of the 10.5 million Hungarian citizens living within our borders.

The treaty means a base for construction, which is expected to deal with innumerable accords, agreements, and the settlement of a large number of contentious issues.

What is this basic treaty like? First of all, it is a good document, which covers all the big issues and principles that are important in relations between the two countries. This basic treaty is unprecedented among Hungarian—that is, domestic—documents, but let me add that it is unprecedented among international documents too. It lays down that European standards concerning human rights should be incorporated into the internal laws of the signatories.

The document also lays down how the implementation of the obligations undertaken and the assertion of rights can be supervised. The basic treaty prescribes not only bilateral supervision but also supervision possibilities that comply with the various documents and rules of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations. Through this, the Hungarians of Slovakia are given the opportunity to put forward well-founded claims to their own internal political forces.

A further detail of the supervision aspect of the basic treaty is that it lays down that the prime ministers and the foreign ministers should meet annually, and this serves the aim of monitoring the implementation of the obligations undertaken.

It is a very important condition too, from the viewpoint of supervising implementation, that the basic treaty has been attached to the European stability agreement. Thus, it has been integrated into an international document that has moral and political significance for the signatory parties too.

On the whole we believe that this basic treaty contains and expresses the application of the three principles and priorities of this government's foreign policy. These are: the establishment of good relations with our neighbors, the assertion of the rights of Hungarians abroad, and the possibility of joining the EU.

I think the basic treaty is also very important from the point of view that, in our very tormented Central-East European region, given the circumstances of a war among Slavs in the south, there really existed a danger of some kind of attempt to revive the odious Little Entente [system of alliances between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania in 1929]. The Hungarian-Slovak Treaty makes it possible to avert this danger.

What is not included in this basic treaty? There are a few things that are not included in it. For example, the treaty does not contain a promise that the government will resign if it signs the basic treaty. The treaty also says nothing about those who go skiing in the Tatry mountains having to take snow chains with them. But let us talk more seriously.

Regarding the Danube issue, which many people have criticized, I would like to remind my esteemed fellow deputies that on 27 January I agreed with Prime Minister Meciar on compensation for the losses we suffered as a consequence of the unilateral diversion of the Danube. According to developments so far, I have no reason, nor right, to doubt the Slovak side's intention to settle this matter. Nor have I any reason to doubt another agreement on the opening of two new border crossing points on 1 March. This has taken place. An economic mixed committee has also been set up. We have also managed to make progress with the Slovak Government about a number of matters that had been left open and unsettled.

As regards the Danube issue, let me also add that we have to a large extent taken into consideration the premise that nothing should be included in the document that could impair Hungary's position before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Regarding the Benes Decrees, I would like to remind my esteemed fellow deputies of the German-Polish and other bilateral agreements concluded at that time. They have put an end to tensions between the countries concerned and their historical grievances but did not eliminate them once and for all. However, it is also a fact that neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia—but particularly Prague, which has long been in dispute with Germany regarding the Benes Decrees—has been able to reach agreement on this issue.

This has not been taken off the agenda, and we are very keen to come to an agreement with the Slovak side to conclude a document that would close the past or establish a practice that would not poison the two countries' relations any more.

As far as guarantees for the agreement's implementation is concerned, I am convinced that everything included in the document expresses international guarantees in addition to the previously mentioned monitoring mechanisms and other factors. It was also clearly stated in Paris that it is also in the West's interest that Hungary and Slovakia live in peace, and that relations between Hungary and Slovakia are stability factors in the Central-East European region. The West's interest is also expressed in this basic treaty.

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Regarding the interpretation of the Council of Europe's Recommendation No. 1201, I would like to stress that the half-sentence added by the Slovak side and the interpretation published later does not in the slightest lead to any kind of legal consequences. I also have to tell the esteemed National Assembly that the Slovak Government's reaction on Sunday was a response, among other things, to certain opposition reactions published in Hungary and, on the other hand, a response to an attack by Mr Jan Slota, who as chairman of the Slovak National Party is a governmental factor. He launched a sharp attack on the basic treaty.

In connection with these guarantees and the basic treaty in general, I would also like to stress the following point: I do not believe that in the past, under the previous government, the situation of Hungarians abroad was any better or had improved. On the contrary, tension and problems had increased. I do not have illusions about agreements, since this is only the first step, a foundation on which we can build. However, we certainly have moved in the direction of finally settling our relations.

Why was the basic treaty signed in Paris? This question has also been posed. We could have signed it in Komarom [on the Hungarian-Slovak border], but the signing would not have been witnessed by leading representatives of 52 countries, international organizations, and the world press. That is one argument. Another point is that today, in these months, Paris is the center of the EU, because it is France's turn to chair the EU. Paris is also the headquarters of UNESCO, and I would also like to remind my esteemed fellow deputies that Paris is the place where the Elysee document on the historical reconciliation between France and Germany was born. Last but not least, it was in Paris that the European Charter was born, the charter that is aimed at establishing new, peaceful relations among the nations of the continent.

We did not sign a document after a lost war, as happened in 1947, but in a period when we would like to become worthy of joining the EU.

I would very much like to ask the esteemed opposition to consider all these arguments and aspects. I also ask them not to mislead the public as regards the government's intentions, the essence of the basic treaty, or its international reception.

I do not believe that any another government in this country has conducted such large-scale coordination talks with the opposition and Hungarians abroad as has our government. Government representatives held talks with representatives of both the Hungarians abroad and the opposition on 17 occasions. I would remind you that during our talks with representatives of Hungarian parties and organizations abroad, Laszlo Tokes said the Sub-Carpathian Hungarians were not consulted in the matter of the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty. I would like you to remember this too.

It is also my conviction that we have to do what is in the country's interest. This is exactly why this basic treaty finally tries to break away from prejudices and tries to establish peaceful relations with our neighbors.

Strangely, it has also been said—yesterday, as far as I know, and perhaps earlier too—that the government, including me, has by signing this basic treaty become a traitor. Well, Funar made the same allegation about those members of the Romanian Government who are calling for a basic treaty with Hungary. [applause]

I beg everybody to keep the actual interests of the country and the nation in view and not to satisfy their own craving for the limelight. [applause]

Are people really traitors who finally want to live in peace with their neighbors, who want us to enjoy each other's company, who want to achieve and establish respect for Hungarians and for Hungary in the community of nations, the whole of Europe, and the world?

I regret to say that regardless of whatever is done or not done by this government, certain extreme elements of the opposition can only disparage [ocsarol] the executive power. I regret this very much.

Let me just recall the criticism we received when we said in December 1994 that we must consult the Russian leadership about the matter of NATO membership. And where has this consultation led to? Now the Russian leadership accepts openly and officially that NATO membership is our sovereign decision, and our accession to NATO would not affect Hungarian-Russian relations.

I would like to stress that we welcome every well-founded criticism. But we reject extremist instigation and demagogy, be it related to the country's international activities or its domestic situation. I would like to call the esteemed opposition's attention to the fact that the government will not let itself be discredited and pushed aside [elleheteltenit] by the kind of endeavors we have seen, particularly over the last few weeks and months.

Maybe the opposition does not support these aims, but I am convinced that the majority of voters do support them. Maybe the opposition is not with us, but Europe is.

Thank you very much. [applause]

Coexistence Chairman Acknowledges Treaty

AU2103175295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Coexistence Movement Chairman Miklos Duray by "K.T." in Budapest; date not given: "We Must Acknowledge the Fact"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After meeting with members of the Hungarian Government and learning the text of the basic treaty as a member of the delegation representing the ethnic Hungarian parties in Slovakia, Coexistence chairman Miklos Duray gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In a joint statement with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ;in

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Romanian, UDMR], you formulated the minimum criteria that, in your view, the basic treaties should contain as regards the national minorities. Does the draft Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty fulfill this requirement?

[Duray] It does, to a certain extent.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What criteria are missing?

[Duray] Let us put it in this way: This text contains the aforementioned system of criteria in the sense that, compared with the past, it represents a certain step ahead. As for how this agreement can be implemented, I have no idea at the moment.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you have any doubts in this respect?

[Duray] I only have experiences that cover almost 80 years—and all this experience warns us that the former Czechoslovakia and then Slovakia have always interpreted negatively all the legal norms that could be interpreted both positively and negatively, and they always tried to implement the regulations to our detriment.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What gives most cause for concern in this case?

[Duray] I do not see enough guarantees in this document to monitor the implementation of the included principles.

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to your statements on 17 March, the national minority leaders in Slovakia acknowledge the treaty. Does this mean that you accept the content of the document?

[Duray] We can do nothing other than acknowledge the events, because we are not the subjects of international law. If two countries agree on such a text, we cannot disregard this fact. Facts are generally acknowledged.

[NEPSZABADSAG] However, a considerable part of the treaty deals with the national minorities. If you do not support the national minority clause, the treaty will die.

[Duray] The treaty will die if the two sides do not observe its provisions.

[NEPSZABADSAG] To what extent will these regulations help the activity of national minority organizations?

[Duray] We must approach them positively and, if we do that, these articles can help us.

[NEPSZABADSAG] It seems, however, that you are not fully convinced that this is how things will actually develop.

[Duray] I expressed my doubts in connection with this.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In the expected ratification debate in Parliament, will the Horn cabinet be able to say that the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia also supports the treaty?

[Duray] We must analyze the text more in depth in order to be able to clearly state the positive and negative points.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is your main concern regarding the text?

[Duray] From the outset, we have doubts regarding the honesty of one of the parties to the treaty. If this is the case, the doubts connected with the ability to implement this treaty seem to be justified.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Did Vladimir Meciar talk to you about the treaty recently?

[Duray] The Meciar cabinet has not discussed anything with us since it took power.

[NEPSZABADSAG] When will you formulate a final opinion about the basic treaty?

[Duray] The opinion we have published now should be regarded as our first reaction. In fact, our position is that the governments in question are primarily facing the consequences of the signing of this treaty.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Can we say that your position is the following: "yes, but...."

[Duray] Let us keep to the formulation according to which we acknowledge the treaty.

Parties Comment on Signing of Basic Treaty

LD2103132695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The debate on the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty continues in the parliament. Andras Kerekes and Tamas Luigits report from the parliament.

[Kerekes] The government will submit the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty to the parliament for ratification within a month, Prime Minister Gyula Horn said.

The preagenda debate on the basic treaty, which was signed on Sunday, lasted more than an hour. [passage omitted]

The parliamentary groups had five minutes each to explain their stance. On behalf of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Gyorgy Csoti said the differences in interpretation rule out the ethnic Hungarians' assertion of autonomy aspirations. The treaty does not make it possible for them to be an integral part of Slovakia as a state-constituting factor.

[Luigits] According to Matyas Eorsi of the Alliance of Free Democrats, it is true that the treaty will not automatically result in a different type of relationship. However, it creates a possibility for putting an end to differences. He said the opposition's concern that the interpretation may cause problems is justified. Had we not signed the treaty, would we be any nearer to having a right to stress that the Hungarians need autonomy?

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Jozsef Torgyan, head of the parliamentary group of the Independent Smallholders' Party, said he does not understand why we had to make this treaty so hastily, giving up our 1,000-year-old rights.

On behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Andras Barsony remarked that one cannot give up nonexistent rights. The Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty is not a collection of declarations but it says that the clauses it lays down, including the Council of Europe's recommendation, have to be built seriatim into the legal system of the countries in question as a legal obligation.

[Kerekes] Tamas Isepy, head of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic People's Party, said the party is backing the conclusion of a basic treaty, however, it is only interested in a good basic treaty. This treaty, however, was made in the atmosphere of mutual distrust.

Speaking on behalf of the Federation of Young Democrats [FiDeSz], Zsolt Nemeth said the Hungarians of Slovakia have lost hope: Nothing practical has been achieved since the government gave up even the Hungarian demand for international supervision in the final phase. [passage omitted]

Horn on Slovak Treaty, Problems With Romania

BR2103135395 Paris LIBERATION in French 21 Mar 95 p 10

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Veronique Soule in Paris; date not given: "Reconciliation Is Needed in Central Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Soule] You have just signed an agreement with Slovakia, but it seems that you have different interpretations of it: In his speech from the platform the Slovakian prime minister condemned any form of autonomy and collective rights for the minorities.

[Horn] We are not asking for collective rights for the Hungarians in Slovakia—a notion which is, moreover, not accepted by Europe. But we are demanding what is stipulated by Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe—in other words: that the Hungarians have the right t form parties, and have associations and representati.e bodies and an autonomous administration. This is not territorial autonomy, especially not because, for our neighbors, this notion is synonymous with separatism. [sentence as published] Indeed, it seems that our Slovak partner wanted primarily to respond to statements by the Hungarian opposition that had been published in the press.

[Soule] So you are on the same wavelength?

[Horn] I sincerely hope so. But I am not saying that there will be no problems in the future. The path toward the normalization of our relations has only just started. The treaty is a good basis for that.

[Soule] Why have you not succeeded in signing a treaty with Romania?

[Horn] This is due especially to the internal situation in Romania: Very hardline nationalist forces are in Parliament and in the government, and they reject not only Recommendation 1201 but the use of the mother tongue in the administration and in the legal system, which is the right of any minority, according to European norms.

[Soule] Have you set a deadline for signing with Bucharest?

[Horn] No. If the political will exists, it could happen in a few days. For Slovakia, it took seven hours (reference to the final marathon session of talks in Bratislava on Thursday [16 March] between the two prime ministers—LIBERATION editor's note). But it all depends on the two camps.

[Soule] What importance do you attach to this pact?

[Horn] Very great importance—and I am not saying that out of courtesy. This initiative relates to fundamental problems: the stability of Central Europe and the Baltic republics. But we are at the beginning. What is important now is how to guarantee the implementation of the different treaties. In the future, the EU and the Council of Europe must be involved when agreements are violated. At present, the task falls to the OSCE alone, and it has few resources.

[Soule] Despite the signing of a treaty, the fate of the minorities would therefore not be solved once and for all?

[Horn] That is true. With the basic treaty we have taken a great step forward. We have formulated a whole series of rights for minorities that the contracting parties must now enshrine in their legislation. That will not necessarily be an easy process. But this is a decisive point. CSCE-type international documents have not hitherto had any binding value. This treaty is binding.

[Soule] Do you now have the impression of being closer to EU membership?

[Horn] Absolutely. I understand that neither the EU nor NATO wanted to welcome countries that have disputes. But by showing that we are doing all we can to overcome our disagreements, by expressing a political will, we have sent a signal to Brussels. As for Europe, our membership has become inevitable. But what is not clear is when that membership will take place. On this point, we want the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to set the date for the start of the negotiations. We are proposing the end of 1996 or beginning of 1997.

[Soule] Is the war in the former Yugoslavia not an example of the dangers minority demands entail?

[Horn] I would look at the question from a different angle. It is not possible to normalize relations among states without solving minority problems. They can be stifled for a time, but that is a potential source of tension. If they are not settled, our region will continue to be unstable. Grievances have continued for decades, and they are all justified. Everybody is right. And everybody is wrong. All nations have suffered humiliations. But the mistakes of the past, the crimes, and the superpower

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diktats cannot be repaired. All that must be left to one side and treaties must be signed.

[Soule] Nonetheless, are not the traumas of history still vividly remembered in Hungary?

[Horn] Yes. But I have no prejudices. When I come to Paris, I think of positive things, I think of the country of democracy, of the historic Franco-German reconciliation, which is very necessary for us in Central Europe. I am not just thinking of the Trianon Treaty (which took from Hungary two thirds of its territory in 1920—LIBERATION editor's note) or the (1947) Paris Treaty. It must be said that those two treaties were deeply unfair. But now, at the dawn of the second millennium, this fact cannot be changed. If we wanted to move the borders, we would have no partners and no support. It is therefore better not to talk about it any more.

Goncz 'Unwell'; Cancels Meeting With Voigt

LD2103154695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The president has been suffering from lumbago since last Friday. This is why Arpad Goncz has not met Karsten Voigt, chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly, who is currently holding talks in Budapest.

However, the president's illness has not prevented him from receiving at his residency the parliamentary group leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Independent Smallholders' Party, and the Christian Democratic People's Party.

Military Pilots' Training, Prospects Viewed

95CH0121C Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Correspondent's report: "Training of Hungarian Air Force Officers—The Third Class Will Be Started This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] (From our correspondent) At their last cabinet meeting, high officials of the Ministry of Defense and the Hungarian Army discussed the situation as regards the training of Hungarian pilots and the tasks that lie ahead. The participants stated that the present training is satisfactory, and that it must be continued, because the army is in need of pilots.

It is well known that at the initiative of the ministry's previous leaders, training of pilots resumed at the Szolnok Air Force Academy after several decades of forced interruption. Initially, 60 cadets were able to begin their training in flying helicopters and fighter planes. In the second year, another 50 cadets were admitted, and this year the third class has 40 cadets. According to plans, we can expect that 15 helicopter pilots and 15 fighter pilots will be trained.

A reminder: Before, Air Force officers were trained in the Soviet Union and Kassa [Kosice]. According to the ministry's calculations, training in Hungary may result in about a 60-percent long-term savings. When trained abroad, cadets had to participate in a preparatory language course that lasted 6 to 12 months, and after they came home, they had to learn the Hungarian aviation regulations as well. According to ministry experts, it is conceivable that the host countries used the tuition fees paid by foreign cadets to pay for other expenses.

Incidentally, the practical training of Hungarian fighter pilots begins on JAK-52 planes. Next, they learn maneuvering on L-39 supersonic planes, after which they fly fighter planes for the first time.

Incidentally, the idea of training foreign pilots in Hungary sometime in the future has already been raised in ministry circles. According to ministry information, there is apparently interest in the idea. Moreover, military experts say that it should be determined whether integrating military and civilian pilot training in the future wouldn't be more expedient and more economical.

* * *

AVIATOR INTERNATIONAL, an independent aviation magazine, has again been published, after a year's interruption. The magazine, which publishes articles in both English and Hungarian, is published 20 times a year, and has a circulation of about 10,000. Its latest issue contains articles on the MIG-29, the aerobatics world cup, Hungarian air disasters, and lessons learned from the Gulf War.

New Finance Minister, Predecessor Compared

95CH0175A Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 27 Feb 95 p 18

[Article by Bela Weyer: "The Hungarian Economy Is Facing a New Start—The Assumption of Office by the Minister of Finance and the Chief of the Central Bank Gives Rise to Hope"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest, 26 Feb—*This week, the new Hungarian finance minister, Lajos Bokros, came into office and, at the same time, the position of chief of the National Bank, which has been unencumbered for months, went to Gyoergy Suranyi. Because both of these liberal economists are recognized, both in political and also economic circles, as being highly competent with respect to their specialties, the chances for a promising new beginning in terms of Hungarian economics policy appear to be favorable.*

Expectations and hopes are running high in Budapest. When, on 1 March, Lajos Bokros (41) assumes the office of minister of finance and Gyoergy Suranyi (41) assumes the office of chief of the National Bank, these key positions will be occupied by specialists of whom it is said that if they do not know how, then no one actually knows how. Both are part of the generation of young reform economists who have been consistently working on introducing a market economy in Hungary since the 1980's. Both men were coauthors of the 1987 study entitled "Turnaround and Reform," which came into being along the margins of

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legality and which presented proof of the need for a systems change in Hungary, not unlike an ideological revolution.

Both men have worked for a time abroad, both are skilled in languages, and both have been successful bankers in recent years: Bokros at the head of the Budapest Bank, joint stock corporation, while he was still functioning as chairman of the Budapest Stock Exchange Council, and Suranyi with the Central European International Bank (CIB), which was also located in Budapest.

Bokros intends to start precisely where his predecessor, Laszlo Bekesi, who resigned, gave up: He intends to start with savings in the state budget. His policies are harsh and strict. Officials must fear for their comfortable jobs, spendthrift bureau chiefs will be compelled toward frugality in their offices, state institutions will have to prove their justification to exist. Even before his appointment, Bokros had compiled his economic policies under 25 points, presented them to Horn, had them formally signed as a sign of approval, and only then submitted them to the parliamentary hearings as finance minister designate.

The difference between Bekesi and Bokros lies in the fact that, although Bokros also considers the budgetary debt to be the principal enemy, he wants to attempt, at the same time, to break the vicious circle according to which, over the last 25 years in Hungary, a growth rate (which was noted in 1994 following several years of drought) has always been connected with a deficit balance of payments. How he will succeed in this balancing act between reforming the state budget and promoting economic growth is, however, questionable.

He cannot count on having a compliant central bank. Although Bokros and Suranyi are friends from the days of their youth and have not only written one book jointly, but have also served together, Suranyi is considered to be a champion of National Bank independence. He confirmed this last week at the German Economics Club in Budapest, where he specifically stated that the Hungarian National Bank enjoys the same degree of independence, based on its legal position, as is enjoyed by the German Bundesbank. In other words, he is not prepared to operate as a field office of the government.

Both of these carriers of hope have the confidence not only of the governing parties, but also of the majority of the opposition (with the exception of a few statements from the far right, where everything having to do with money and banks is viewed as being foreign and hostile), who welcomed this personnel decision by Horn.

The measures that are to be anticipated—Bokros announced that, apart from cuts in budgetary spending, there would be reductions in social services, the introduction of a real estate tax, and measures to combat the underground economy—will provoke many more headlines. Many have also speculated that there will be a strong devaluation of the forint. But Bokros and Suranyi have already officially denied this.

World Federation of Hungarians Holds Conference

95CH0121B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "In Defense of Tokes—World Federation of Hungarians Holds Conference on Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The World Federation of Hungarians [MVSZ] will hold a conference on autonomy this year, on the 75th anniversary of the Trianon Peace Treaty. This will be the first occasion on which the representatives of the 3 to 3.5 million Hungarians living outside Hungary can sit down together to talk, said Chairman Sandor Csoori at the organization's press conference, held in Budapest on Saturday. The MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Office] reported that French politician Raymond Barre was also invited to the conference, and that theoretically he has accepted the invitation. The lesson that can be learned from the smear campaign against Laszlo Tokes, a characteristic of 20th century absurdity, is that innocent people can appear guilty, said Csoori. He noted that signing the Hungarian-Ukranian agreement was done in haste and that he thinks the MVSZ's reservations concerning that agreement were justified after all.

Csoori thinks it would have been historically more justifiable to declare Karpatalja [Subcarpathia] a free trade zone. Deputy Chairman Laszlo Dobos said the MVSZ's point of view is that no agreement signed with neighboring countries can ignore the desire of minority Hungarians for autonomy.

Secretary General Istvan Bakos presented the MVSZ's two-year midrange strategic action plan. Their objectives include the modernization of their membership registry.

* * *

The World Federation of Hungarians issued a statement under the title "Hungarians in Support of Bishop Laszlo Tokes." According to this statement, the forces that threaten Hungarians both inside and outside Hungary are doing everything they can to humiliate the Hungarian nation and deprive it of its rights and national identity. Laszlo Tokes is a symbol of the present struggle of Hungarians, and his radiant personality is an integrating force and a source of faith for many Hungarian communities. They state with sadness that there are also some Hungarians included among those conducting the smear campaign against Laszlo Tokes.

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Walesa Spokesman Criticizes Oleksy Statement

LD2103143795 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1300 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government is going to present a timetable of its actions within a week, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has announced. Both the head of the government and Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko have disagreed with yesterday's critical statement by Lech Walesa. If, after 15 days, one can say that this government did nothing and express disappointment over this, we can guess that not impatience alone is involved, the prime minister said. Presidential Spokesman Leszek Spalinski has commented on the prime minister's statement:

[Begin Spalinski recording] Clearly, his emotions have gotten the better of him. On the grounds of a brief quote from the extensive statement by the president of the Republic, Jozef Oleksy is drawing far-reaching conclusions. This does not give the best prospects for cooperation between the government and the president. [end recording]

According to Professor Kolodko, the government is doing much more than the president. He added that maybe the government had only two months, but the president certainly had only seven months. Leszek Spalinski again:

[Begin Spalinski recording] I can only ask the question how much time the deputy prime minister and finance minister has after preparing the law on taxation, about which the Constitutional Tribunal rules that it is incompatible with the law. [end recording]

Ex-Aide Falandysz Comments on Walesa, Wachowski

LD2203094395 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0455 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 Mar—"Lech Walesa and Mieczyslaw Wachowski have no vision for Poland, either for the next few months or, even more so, for the years," Lech Falandysz told young people from a Warsaw high school, SZTANDAR reveals on 22 March. The former deputy head of the Chancellery of the President of the Polish Republic added that "Poland does not deserve to be ruled by Mietek [Wachowski], unless the people elect him as president."

Falandysz called his work for the president the adventure of a lifetime, in the course of which he got to know both the president and the people of his entourage well. "This is a very interesting duo: an electrician of genius and a chauffeur almost of genius," he said. He describes Walesa as firm, resolute, intelligent, and perfidious. Wachowski is, in his opinion, a master of behind-the-scenes activities, sharp, witty; a fellow for drink and talk. "Perhaps they wish to remain in power, acquire some money for their children," surmises Falandysz.

As to his departure from the Chancellery of the President, Lech Falandysz said that the time for this had come because Wachowski had transgressed the tacit agreement not to interfere in his affairs. He had, indeed, bent the law but not transgressed it. He is no longer certain that Walesa ought to remain president. On the other hand, the candidates put forward are ones that are either exhausted or that mean nothing, said Falandysz during his meeting with young people. SZTANDAR warns that the statements are not authorized.

Zych Responds to Walesa Statements on Parliament

LD2203102095 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych feels that the president does not have and will not have the grounds envisaged by the Constitution for the dissolution of parliament. Speaking on Polish Radio earlier today, Speaker Zych responded in this way to the threats Lech Walesa addressed to the coalition and the government that has emerged from it:

[Begin Zych recording] I judge that parliament will not give such a cause as would permit it to be dissolved in accordance with the Constitution. That is the first thing. And everyone in this country may think about parliament, yes? And so, I do not see in this any kind of threat to parliament. [end recording]

[Announcer] Speaker Zych simultaneously expressed the hope that parliament's cooperation with the president will last well.

Poll: Desire To Strengthen Power Driving Walesa

WS2203123895 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 22 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by P.P.: "CBOS: President Is Performing His Duties Poorly; Under Barrage of Criticism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to 56 percent of Poles, President Lech Walesa is performing his duties poorly; 30 percent of the people express an opposite opinion, suggest the results of an opinion poll conducted in March by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS]. As many as 72 percent of respondents believe that the driving force behind Lech Walesa's activities in the current political crisis is his desire to strengthen his power. Only 18 percent of the respondents think he is driven by concern over the country's problems.

The influence that the president exerted on the political situation in the last month was evaluated negatively by more than half of the respondents. Far more positive opinions were expressed on the influence of the Sejm, even though here many opinions were critical as well (37 percent). Views on this issue do not vary according to sociodemographics—with two exceptions: People with university degrees are particularly critical of Lech

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Walesa's activities, and private entrepreneurs are relatively the most favorably disposed toward his actions. If we take into account political views, the president's antagonists are the most numerous in the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, as well as in the Union of Labor.

According to 45 percent of respondents, if the office of the president were held not by Lech Walesa but by some other person, the general situation in the country would be better. Only 5 percent of citizens express a different opinion on this. Every fifth respondent says that, regardless of who would be the head of state, the situation would be the same as it is now.

Nearly half of the respondents believe that the president's entourage exerts very strong influence over him. Every fourth Pole believes that Walesa's aides exert only a moderate level of influence over him. Evaluation of this influence is definitely negative. More than 50 percent of the people are convinced that the president's performance of his duties is worse as a consequence of the influence of his aides. The aides also negatively affect the image of the office and the approval for Lech Walesa, as well as his chances for reelection. It is understandable, then, that every third respondent believes that the president should change most of his aides.

What do you think is driving the president in the current political crisis?

	Percent
A desire to strengthen his power	72
Concern for the country's problems	18
Hard to tell	10

Walesa Favors Foreign Investment in Press

WS2203122695 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 Mar 95 p 3

[Aarticle by "RAS": "The President Supports Foreign Capital in the Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The security of the press depends on the safety of investments in the press market. Any rationing in this area is a coup on the freedom of the press," wrote Lech Walesa to the head of the Union of Press Publishers.*

"Considering the potential of domestic capital, imposing restrictions on foreign investment will have the character of legislative fiction inviting immoral activities on the fringes of the law," writes Walesa.

Michal Komar, president of the Union of Press Publishers, which is made up of more than 100 of the largest publishers in Poland, sent a letter to the president after a Sejm debate last month on foreign shares in the Polish press. During the debate, deputies predominantly from the Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant Party, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland claimed that an excess of foreign capital in the press is hazardous to the Polish raison d'etat. They advocated introducing a new provision in the press law, stating that foreign investors could not hold more than a 40-percent stake in any one title.

"The process of ownership transformations in the Polish press market has not yet been completed. New transformations are soon to be launched in the press distribution market, in which foreign investors are indispensable," states Komar. "These transformations will not be possible if the threat of nationalization casts its shadow on foreign capital. That is why I have turned with this problem to President Walesa."

"You cannot publish declarations of our aspirations to join Europe on the front pages while barricading yourself from it with a wall of restrictions on the market," said Walesa in his letter.

Oleksy To Focus on 'Neighborly Cooperation'

AU2103205795 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 13 Mar 95 pp 1, 4

["Exclusive" interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Pavol Minarik in Warsaw; date not given: "I Intend To Devote a Great Deal of Attention to Neighborly Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy gave the following interview to RUDE PRAVO just after he entered office. This is the first interview he has granted to a foreign newspaper.

[Minarik] Will the appointment of your government mean an end to the political crisis in Poland?

[Oleksy] I would like to look at it like this. It seems to me that the crisis was exaggerated and unnecessary at the current time, which requires stabilization and peace. But such are the elements of our Polish transformation and the stabilizing of Polish democracy. I assume that the appointment of the new government will mean an end to the so-called war at the top and also an end to the various formal disputes. I realize, of course, that the matter-of-fact disputes about resolving Poland's problems will continue. But, in the long run, these are desirable in the democratic processes taking place in our country.

[Minarik] Where do you intend to go for your first foreign visit?

[Oleksy] I have been prime minister for a couple of days, and I have not yet managed to deal with this matter in greater detail. However, I definitely intend to devote a great deal of attention to neighborly cooperation, including the Czech lands and Slovakia.

[Minarik] You make no secret of your political past, but, all the same, some people are constantly reminding you of it. How do you feel about this?

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[Oleksy] I am not ashamed of my past. History leads nations along different paths. For example, it was my lot to live in socialist Poland and I have no reason to be ashamed of my life. In this period, I worked, studied, and developed; I had successes and happiness and problems. No one has the right to claim that it was all just bad, wretched, and catastrophic. I make no secret of the fact that I was a member of the PSDS [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] and was also a functionary in it. I tried to live honorably and I tried to help people, not injure them. I never abused my position and I did not even get rich. I do not know why some people expect that I should not serve my country now, in the new era. After all, I am not serving myself. I also do not know why anyone would condemn me because of my past. Only those who look at the course of history very superficially and consider their political hatred to be the supreme criterion for any assessment are doing this.

[Minarik] You have said that the governing coalition did not keep its nerve in recent weeks when the president was attacking its government. Are you not concerned that this will be repeated after a while?

[Oleksy] I am concerned, but only theoretically. Everything will depend on the goodwill of the president, the political parties, the Sejm, and also the parliamentary opposition. If there is a lack of goodwill, of course, the political situation in Poland will continue to be tense. I want to believe, however, that there will not be a lack of goodwill, because it is vital for political stability. I can declare that I will certainly not be a source of conflicts or tensions. I have one aim. I want to be a real prime minister and administer a real government. A government that, in accordance with the current Constitution, has executive authority in Poland. Tension could erupt in our country if the political parties and the bodies of executive authority were to outline their tasks and powers differently than the Constitution entitles them to do.

[Minarik] The reform of the economic center is being discussed in Poland. When will it take place and what can be expected from it?

[Oleksy] The first phase should be ready at the end of this May. This will involve the legal preparation stage, because it has to have legislative foundations to create the new structures for the economic center. In the next few days, I will summon the government's plenipotentiaries for the establishment of this center; they will coordinate all the legislative work associated with it. This will be the most complicated stage of the entire process. We would like to implement the second phase by the end of the year; it will be based on the establishment of two or three new sectors for the center: public finances, the economy, and the national treasure [statni poklad]. The third phase should follow next year and should be linked to the complete commencement of the new economic structure. I am talking about the individual stages, because we do not want to reform the economic center unnecessarily quickly. In the final analysis, it will involve the breakup of the hitherto branch method of management and governing in Poland.

[Minarik] You set up a government committee for the struggle against organized crime. Is the situation regarding the population's safety really as bad as the Polish press is making out?

[Oleksy] People in our country have a really bad feeling about their safety. According to the public opinion polls, up to 80 percent of Poles consider the personal safety of themselves and their families and friends to be the most major issue at the moment. This means that the crime rate and delinquency in Poland have gone up considerably. Moreover, crime has an organized and aggressive form. People in our country do not feel safe on the street, at home, in school, or in public places. The establishment of this committee is not a propaganda move on the part of the government. The safety of the population really is a priority for my cabinet. Considerable changes will be made in the criminal law, police jurisdiction, and police equipment spheres.

[Minarik] Relations between Poland and the Czech Republic are not bad, although the pessimists maintain that they are almost nonexistent. What is your view?

[Oleksy] I personally think that they are so good that they do not need any new impulses. I consider them to be the relations of good neighbors who have common or similar aims. We are mutually and voluntarily associated within CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Zone—RUDE PRAVO note), but also within the Visegrad Group. Independently of their individual approaches to certain issues, the Czech Republic and Poland share the similar aim of integration into European structures. These are not empty words. The facts speak for themselves—and they underline the good nonconflictive relationship between our countries. And, if cross-border cooperation were made even better and new border crossing points were built faster, then everything would be absolutely in order.

[Minarik] How do you assess the activity of the Visegrad Four, that means of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary?

[Oleksy] As we have a politically similar view of Europe's future, regionalism in the political sphere is not necessary separately. I personally understand the Czech side's reservations about a kind of exaggerated institutionalization of the Visegrad Group. The Visegrad Four was a necessary idea that has served our common European aspirations. I approach the Visegrad Four with a certain frame of mind, and I think that there are spheres in which more use could be made of cooperation.

[Minarik] You have described Poland's presence in European structures and NATO and the acceleration of integrative efforts as one of your new government's priorities.

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[Oleksy] This is really a priority for Poland's foreign policy and, therefore, for our government too. Although, I have to say that the orientation toward NATO and the European Union is not the only activity of our foreign policy. After all, the world does not end in the European Union. Admission into it is our major aim, but Poland wants to have good relations not only with European states. We anticipate Poland's rapid admission into NATO. Our main activity is moving in this very direction. We are aware of everything that is associated with this. We are also aware that a certain decisionmaking process has to evolve on the part of the West and NATO. We would be pleased if it were as brief as possible. Our side is ready for this step, even though it is still not absolutely clear to the Polish public what all of this will mean for Poland. In our country—but not only in it—in making the decision in favor of admission into NATO, little consideration is given to the fact that this organization will be different in the future than it is now. However, this concerns the discussion on the future of the European structures and the mechanisms for their activity. We will deal with this when we are in them. Today, however, we want to enter into the EU, which exists. We cannot imagine that the West would not fulfill the expectations that Poland associates with its admission into these structures, and also NATO.

[Minarik] Your eastern neighbor, the Russian Federation, however, evidently disagrees with your admission into NATO. Will this influence your foreign policy?

[Oleksy] Our foreign policy is not dependent on Russia's points of view. We are a sovereign state and we mark out our own objectives. How we view the issue of our country's security is also our affair. However, we want to have good relations with Russia. After all, our endeavors for admission into NATO and the EU are not directed against anyone. We want to join NATO, but, at the same time, we do not want our decision to be an obstacle to good cooperation with Russia and other countries. We live here, we do not choose our neighbors; we have them. Independently of the concerns and fear that persist from the past, we want to be on good terms with Russia and the levels on which we may and can negotiate are obvious to us.

Okhotsk Feud Leads to 'Tough' Year for Fishermen

MM2203122895 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 14 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by "LES": "Dalmor's Difficult Year: It Cannot Live by Fishing Alone..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another round of Moscow talks ended in fiasco for a Polish delegation seeking a solution to the problem of the presence of the Polish fishing fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. Russia continues to insist that our fishing vessels withdraw from the international waters in that sea area.

Recently, however, Russian negotiators indicated that we might be allowed to haul in 75,000 tonnes of Alaskan pollock annually in Russia's territorial inshore waters. We would have to pay $200 per tonne of fish for that privilege. However, the Dalmor fishing company claims that it would end up a loser in such an arrangement. The Russians also suggested that we could be allowed to catch as much fish as we wished in international waters, but only on the condition that we cooperate with Russian fishing companies. This, in turn, was not at all to the Polish negotiators' liking.

The Dalmor SA Fishing, Fish Processing, and Fish Trading Company ended 1994 with very good financial results. Its general revenues amounted to more than 1.9 trillion [old] zlotys [Z], and revenues from the sales of its products brought in nearly Z1.6 trillion. The company's gross profits were Z42 billion, while its net profits came to Z23 billion. These results were much better than those achieved the year before.

The greater proportion of the company's products was sold abroad, and the profits from that amounted to almost Z1.3 trillion—that is, almost $54 million. Dalmor's main clients who buy its fish hauls include Germany, the United States, France, and Japan. Dalmor is the biggest exporter among Polish food-processing companies that sell their products in the European Union.

In addition, very good financial results were recorded by Dalmor's holding company, which is made up by Dal-Pesca, Dal-Mors, and Dal-Rem, (the last of which is currently in liquidation). Last year the holding company's revenues amounted to almost Z2 trillion. The group made gross profits to the value of Z85 billion, and net profits of Z60 billion. These results were also much better than those of the previous year.

However, all indications now are that 1995 will be very tough for Dalmor. This is first of all because our fishing fleet may have only restricted access to deep-sea fishing grounds in the Sea of Okhotsk. In addition, the company's directors expect that this year a decision may be made to extend the jurisdiction of sea-bordering states beyond the 200-mile territorial zone. And this would make the Sea of Okhotsk an "inland" sea for both Russia and the United States. If this happens, we cannot hope to retain access to the fishing grounds there.

Furthermore, this year Dalmor will have to carry out a major overhaul on six trawlers belonging to its fishing fleet, which will cost more than 70 billion old zlotys. While being overhauled, the vessels will, naturally, be unable to fish, and this will doubtless also affect the company's economic results this year.

The Dalmor fleet currently runs 13 fish factory trawlers and employs 2,595 people, including 364 onshore employees.

"Faced with the possibility of losing its fishing grounds in the Sea of Okhotsk, Dalmor has joined forces with the

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Zarnowiec Nuclear Power Station (currently in liquidation), together with which it proposes to set up a special economic zone," Director Grzegorz Wesolowski told us. "This will embrace both the power station site and the whole area of the fishing harbor. That is why we are trying to attract foreign and domestic investors involved in international commercial exchange. Tax exemptions should provide an additional attraction here."

In this way, Dalmor intends to diversify its operations and thus reduce its dependence on just a single area of activity—that is, fishing and fish processing. Once the new holding company has been established, a further step will be to separate the central structure from the operations division. In addition, the holding company intends to place its surplus cash in a number of different projects. One of these will be a consolidation of its involvement in Gdynia's World Trade Center, to which Dalmor brought assets in kind in the form of its own land site in Kosciuszki Square in Gdynia.

Chances of 'Solidarity' Forming Party Viewed

WS2103124595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by "B.I.W." and "M.D.Z.": "Can 'Solidarity' Transform Itself Into a Political Party? It Would Not Be an Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "'Solidarity' ["S"] may change into a political party unless it manages to conclude a political contract with the bloc of post-solidarity groupings," said ["S" Chairman] Marian Krzaklewski at a meeting in Bydgoszcz on 18 March. "S" itself has not made a decision yet, and politicians of other groupings doubt whether this idea will really be implemented and whether it really can help the union achieve considerable success.

"The chairman spoke for a rather long time, and journalists reported only what they were able to grasp," Stanislaw Alot, secretary of the Presidium of the "S" National Commission, explains Krzaklewski's statement. According to Alot, the leader of the union really...

Meant "More Than That"

He says that Krzaklewski made a reference to the resolution of the National Commission of 15 March.

The union is to send an official letter to most political parties, with the exception of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, and ask them whether they are interested in cooperating with "S." It will also send them a special questionnaire with questions concerning issues that are most important to the union (the questions will be prepared by the Presidium of the National Commission by the end of March). "S" would like to know which parties are in favor of, for example, the right to stage a lockout, the idea of handing state-owned property over to people, etc. Once it has received answers to those questions, the union will determine with which party it agrees on two issues, and with which it agrees on 12 issues, for instance. Then it will order "S" regions to start local cooperation.

The National Commission has also recently ordered that coordination groups be set up which would consist of representatives of the union, political parties, self-governments, and community groups. The integration of social forces is to be based on a joint program. In a more remote future a bloc would be set up which would field its candidates on the same ticket in parliamentary elections. "It is important to have...

A Possibility of Articulating

...one's arguments in politics. Unless such an alliance is formed, the union may, perhaps, establish a labor party which it will task with implementing and articulating its arguments. Just perhaps," Stanislaw Alot stresses the context of the chairman's statement.

However, such a decision can be made only by the congress of the union, but not this year's congress; it should be preceded by an internal referendum within the union.

It would also be up to the congress who would be tasked with establishing the party and how he would do it. Alot believes that the union might use the services of members and sympathizers of the union, former deputies in its parliamentary clubs who are experienced in political activity. "If we were to make this decision, then I suppose there would be many more people willing to become activists of such a party," says Alot. The polls that have been taken so far indicate, however, that "an overwhelming majority" of unionists "negatively evaluate" the idea of forming a party.

"Right now it is not the intention of the union to establish a party, because there is no climate to do it," states Stanislaw Alot.

Former "S" Deputy Chairman Bogdan Borusewicz, who is now a Sejm deputy of the Freedom Union, believes that...

There Are Such Splits in the Union

...that it is right now unable to form one party. The union's needs might be satisfied, Borusewicz believes, by "cooperation with those who can offer more on a specific issue." This certainly does not involve a permanent electoral alliance. According to him, the main supporters of a "Solidarity Party" would be the advocates of Lech Walesa.

The anticommunist right wing, which is still split, would perceive the establishment of a new party by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] "S" as yet more troubles—voters trying to find their representation would become even more confused. According to Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the statement by Marian Krzaklewski is a consequence of internal games played within the union

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rather than an announcement of real actions. The leader of the Center Accord [PC] recalls that until recently the "S" leader objected to the idea of establishing such a party and thus his current statements may result from pressure being exerted on him by his fellow unionists.

"As a party, 'S' ran in the elections twice (in 1991 and 1993) and the results that it achieved were not very good. This does not really jeopardize the position of other rightist groupings, even though I certainly...

Wish These Voters Had Supported the Right Wing,"

says Jaroslaw Kaczynski. The PC chairman believes that "unless NSZZ 'S' is able to arrive at an understanding, based on principles of partnership, with rightist parties (only with serious groupings, not with such blocs as the Secretariat of Center Right Groupings—SUC), then it really seems most reasonable to establish a party."

Politicians of SUC, which is closely linked to "S," believe that the idea of establishing a common party is a show of Marian Krzaklewski's impatience rather than something else. "It would be a dramatic step. In addition, it would not be all that easy to form such a grouping because too many people with a political temperament have already left the union," believes Andrzej Anusz of SUC. If, however, a "Solidarity Party" were really established, then SUC would be interested in close cooperation with it. "We would like to form a coalition," says Anusz. He does not think, however, that such a party would be strong enough to achieve a far better result than the result achieved by "S" in the last elections (the union's tickets were supported by 4.9 percent of voters). "It would not be an alternative to the present configuration," he says.

Poll: Parliament Lowest Ever, Radio Most Popular

WS2103145995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by "an": "CBOS: Opinion Poll Favorites"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Never before have the Sejm and the Senate ranked so low in popularity polls as in March. The most popular institution was...Polish Radio.*

Political whirlwinds connected with the bringing down of Pawlak's government did not do much harm to Lech Walesa (nor did they win him any new supporters). Although disapproval for Walesa remains unchanged, the president still remains low on the popularity lists. Two-thirds of those polled give Walesa negative marks, and only one in four Poles supports him.

The first stormy days of March have brought harm to the parliament: The number of supporters of the Sejm and Senate decreased by approximately 10 percent over the past two months. Disapproval for both houses of parliament has risen by more or less the same amount. Approximately one-half of those polled have a negative opinion of the Sejm and Senate.

Sympathy for trade unions has declined sharply: The All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] has lost 11 percent of its support and "Solidarity" 10 percent. Although "Solidarity" continues to enjoy more support than the OPZZ (a difference of 8 percentage points), it does have more critics (6 percent more of those disapproving).

Nonpolitical institutions are also losing rating points. March proved a poor month for the police (a 9-percent plunge in popularity, just as many new disapproving voices), private and state banks (private banks are supported by 20 percent of those polled, state banks by 40 percent), courts (a drop in support of 6 percent, the same growth of disapproval), the Supreme Chamber of Control (a 4-percent decline in popularity), the Army (3 percent lower approval), and the ombudsman (2 percent fewer supporters).

The church gained 2 percent new supporters and Polish Television 1 percent. These are the most widely approved institutions in Poland, although this time Polish Radio took the crown (it was included in the ranking for the first time).

The government was not evaluated because, at the time the poll was being conducted, it had been ousted and Jozef Oleksy's new cabinet was still being formed.

Approval of Institutions

	Percent
Polish Radio	84
Army	72
Television	72
Ombudsman	71
Church	57
Police	57
Self-government	56
Supreme Chamber of Control	52
Courts	45
State banks	42
Sejm	37
Senate	32
President	25

Note: Polish Radio appeared in the poll for the first time. Those polled did not evaluate the government because it was being changed at the time of polling.

* * *

The poll was conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] on 4-6 March on a representative group of 1,208 Poles.

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Silajdzic: Bosnia Has No Alternative to Fighting

LD2103221495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has stated that the failure of the international peace plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina has left the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with no alternative but to fight.

Mr. Silajdzic made this statement in Zagreb after his talks with Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic. The two prime ministers agreed to hold a joint government meeting this weekend there, to discuss the further strengthening of relations between the two countries.

Prime Minister Silajdzic gave a lecture this evening in the hall of the Islamic Center in Zagreb on the current political and diplomatic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Ganic Says Serbs 'Understand Only Force'

AU2103165295 Paris AFP in English 1622 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 21 (AFP)—Moslem-led Bosnian forces will break the current truce if Bosnian Serbs continue attacking a key Sarajevo supply road, Bosnian Federation Vice-President Ejup Ganic warned Tuesday, adding that Serbs only understood force.

"These barbarians understand only force," he told a news conference here, adding that the Bosnian Army was forced "to resist."

Serb shelling of the UN-proclaimed safe area of Tuzla in northeast Bosnia on Monday went to show "what (leader Radovan) Karadzic Serbs mean by cessation of hostilities," he said.

A cessation of hostilities agreement was concluded between the two warring parties for a four-month period, starting on January 1.

But the "cease-fire finished a long time ago for Karadzic and his killers," Ganic said, adding: "What do you expect us to do?"

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said Bosnian Army forces launched a series of concerted attacks Monday against Serb positions in central and north-eastern Bosnia, notably near Tuzla, which Serbs then shelled in apparent retaliation.

Sarajevo Radio said 21 people were killed and 74 wounded in the shelling.

UNPROFOR suggested that the Serbs had hit Bosnian Army barracks, killing 26 soldiers and wounding up to 80. UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi, who met with Ganic in Zagreb on Monday, expressed concern over the Bosnian Army attacks which he termed "a major blow to the cease-fire."

Ganic, speaking of his meeting with Akashi, said he had told him that if the Serbs continued to attack the Mount Igman road, the only government-held route out of Sarajevo, "we will go back to the behaviour of before the cessation of hostilities."

"We will compensate for those (Serb) actions," he said, speaking in English.

Ganic Views U.S. Trip, Federation at Briefing

AU2103221095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Report by Mehmed Alijasisic on news conference by Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, in Sarajevo on 21 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the state presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, first spoke about the talks held in Petersburg, near Bonn, where the Bonn treaty on further implementing the federation was accomplished. Afterwards, he spoke about a federation roundtable that was hosted by Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock.

Ganic then spoke in more detail about the Washington ceremony marking the federation's first anniversary. Here Ganic cited an excerpt from his speech—namely, how the federation is a strategic, not tactical, issue for us. From the speech he delivered in Washington, Ejup Ganic recounted certain passages:

[Ganic] I also spoke about certain matters hindering the federation. I spoke about the unregulated situation on the border and customs duties, control of the roads, an empty federal budget, and other problems. [Words indistinct] which are the methods to progress. So far, we have mostly built the house [words indistinct] and (?how to) now start building the house from the bottom up. Naturally, I emphasized two things—I called upon the Serbs in Pale to join the federation and, second, I demanded that in the course of the federation's constitution, we try to preserve a multiethnic society as much as possible to avoid further divisions and preserve the state so that it would at least somewhat resemble the country we had earlier. I also emphasized that for us, the federation is primarily a strategy of building Bosnia from within and the strategy to preserve Bosnia within its international borders.

The second part of my speech referred to relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I spoke about the things that bring us together and also about the problems that stand in the way to our close cooperation. In this (?speech) I promised that I will (?champion) the signing of, as we call it, a

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free trade agreement—that is, trade without customs [word indistinct] links and tariffs. I also proposed some additional steps that demonstrate that we are interested in building confederal relations with Croatia. Unfortunately, here I drew attention to two problems that in a way discourage our cooperation. The first is the problem of visas for our refugees who would like to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They simply cannot pass through Croatia. The second problem is an agreement that has already been worked out, referring to Ploce harbor and access to Neum. This was agreed and should now be initialed by the Croatian authorities.

[Alijasisic] Afterwards, I spoke about our foreign policy and, within this context, the weaknesses of the international community in resolution of the difficult situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ganic emphasized. I also stressed Bosnia-Herzegovina's legitimate right in conformity with the UN charter for self-determination. Dr. Ganic said the following about President Alija Izetbegovic's letter to the hosts of the federation's anniversary and the stance of President Clinton, unveiled during the meeting.

[Ganic] [Passage omitted] Our delegation was subsequently received by President Clinton. President Clinton said two things—first, that he—that is, the U.S. Government—supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its international borders. This is the only way [words indistinct]. Second, that he supports the federation of (?as they say) the Bosniaks, the Croats, and others who live on the territory where these two peoples form the majority. (?He supported this federation. This is all).

[Alijasisic] [Passage omitted] We also met with the representatives of the countries that would like to send their troops for the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We favor an increased UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] presence here; however, we demand that it be far more efficient, Dr. Ejup Ganic stressed, because there are areas where it is performing its task at only 5-percent capacity.

At the end of his analysis of the tasks accomplished during the above trip, Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, emphasized that we were very satisfied with the treatment and attention received in the United States.

Afterwards, the correspondents asked several questions. One of them referred to the Bonn Treaty, which also specifies responsibility for the implementation of the agreed issues of the Federation. Dr. Ganic explained this issue.

[Ganic] This responsibility primarily refers to us being able in municipalities with currently domineering Bosniak and Croatian population, because we will assume the responsibility for election of the municipal heads, municipal assemblies, the constitution of cantons, and similar, [changes thought] this refers to our influence on the ground as (?personalities) and, naturally, as members of relevant political parties. The Party of Democratic Action fully supports my efforts in this respect and is backing all promises that I made. I met today at noon with all political parties that have deputies in the parliament, and they upheld [words indistinct], therefore, I will support this [word indistinct].

[Alijasisic] The next question referred to relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the federation.

[Ganic] Regarding the federation, (?those of us who) insist that the Federal Government perform its role in conformity with the [words indistinct]. The Croatian side complains that the federation is dominated by the republican government. However, we are willing to strengthen the Federal Government, that it assumes all powers vested upon it by the Constitution [word indistinct]. In this case, the only powers to remain with the republican government will be those necessary for the [word indistinct] of the republic. However, as the federation's government will spring into life on the ground all other administrative arrangements that are illegal, that is, all other administrative arrangements on the ground would cease to exist.

[Alijasisic] The correspondents were more interested in the situation and relations surrounding the tragic case of General Vlado Santic in Bihac.

[Ganic] I maintain normal contact with the Croats, even after this incident. Naturally, I am deeply sorry that this has happened, [word indistinct], what happened (to the general) I am deeply sorry. Whoever did this has done something against the Bosniaks, against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and against the Croats. However, whoever did this did it to make the position of the Bosniaks in Bihac more difficult.

[Alijasisic] [passage omitted]

Bosnian Croat, Muslim Leaders Hold Talks

LD2103234895 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2015 GMT 21 Mar 95

["TV Parliament" television studio phone-in program with Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Croat-Muslim Federation and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, live from a studio in Sarajevo, and Dario Kordic, chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, live from a studio in Mostar; among participants in the Zagreb studio are Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic, and Bosiljko Misetic, President Tudjman's special envoy in Bosnia; moderated by program presenter Branimir Bilic—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Bilic] Let us immediately let Sarajevo have their say—Mr. Ganic and Mr. Topic (chairman of Croat cultural association in Sarajevo). Mr Ganic, why is the Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Federation still rather a dead letter? Let me ask you: spring begins today, what will spring bring to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation—death or life?

[Ganic] [Passage omitted]

[Bilic] I will ask Mr. Kordic to see what it means—who is for the Federation? For example, how many displaced persons have you, Mr. Ganic, and you, Mr. Kordic, sent back? What is meant with reference to the special agreement in Petersberg [suburb of Bonn where Izetbegovic met German leaders recently]: Is the authority of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina disappearing when set against that of the Federation, and the authority of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna? Mr. Kordic, can you answer?

[Kordic] I want to say that the immediate result, over the past year since the signing of the Washington agreements, is that over 40,000 Croats have in various ways been forced to leave the area of the Federation which is controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, not solely as a result of physical pressures but because of the many questions which have not been regulated, regarding initial military call-up and mobilization into formations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, questions which have not been resolved relating to the curriculum in schools, and many other things. Above all, you have no right to set up new municipalities, something which represents the future and the prospects for the survival of Croats in all areas, and also those of the Bosniak Muslims.

At the same time, I would like to point out that since the Washington Agreements were signed, and up to today, over 10,000 Bosniak Muslims have returned to areas under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. These are arguments which cannot be refuted and they are one of the results of the past year, which are certainly unfavorable and to the detriment of the Croatian people. [passage omitted]

[Ganic] You see, I share the opinion of the international community, that the Croatian nation is behind in the implementation of the Federation compared to the Bosniak nation. If you look at what the Federation's most important friends are saying, you will see that this is the case. [passage omitted]

Our Bosniak strategic commitment is to cooperate with the Croats. That is in our interest. When you write it all down and work it out, this pays off for us. However, at the same time it pays off for you, too. Not only for the Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but globally for the Bosniaks and Croats as nations—both the Croats in Croatia and those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the Bosniaks in Bosnia and elsewhere. Therefore, our cooperation is our mutual strategic commitment for survival.

There is too much talk about the Federation. Thank God it is talked about, but, gentlemen, do not force us to abandon the republic, because the part which is not covered by the Federation is occupied, and we will not give up on it. We have not and we will not lose it on the battlefield; why should we then give up on that part of the republic in negotiations?

We are concerned about our borders. If our international borders are not safe, the borders of other countries in the region will not be safe either, as both we and you were told.

[Kordic] [Passage omitted]

[Ganic] I will tell you straight away. The Federation is satisfactory as a final solution because we are happy with a federal setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will establish a federal system in 58 percent of the territory covered by the Federation. As for the other part of the territory—which we will not abandon because the Bosniaks and Croats were driven out of it—we would like to see a federal system in that territory, as well in the final instance. However, since there seems to be little possibility of that at the moment, that part will have a different system and will form, together with the Federation, a unitary single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From that viewpoint the Federation is not an interim solution: it is both the final and strategic solution for us.

As for the links with Croatia, please, judge them by results and not discussions. In Washington too, I suggested three or four projects straight away because cooperation with Croatia can only be measured by confederal projects. Only when confederal projects start functioning can we see that there is a confederation with the Federation, or rather between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. [Passage omitted]

[Bilic] [Passage omitted]

[Kordic] First of all, I would like to say that the Croatian people have been in mourning for 12 days now, following the whole affair concerning the disappearance and most probably the death of Major General Vlado Santic. [passage omitted] We cannot see this as an isolated incident. We do not want to bring into question all the relations between the Croatian and Bosniak Muslim nations, but we cannot ignore this incident because it certainly is a blow at the honor and dignity of the Croatian people.

The minimum we demand is that, in addition to those who committed the crime, higher ranking individuals in the hierarchy of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, from Gen. Atif Dudakovic to his superiors, be held responsible for the incident. If we want to build fair trust in the new state, we must take it for granted that responsibility lies with the people who either gave orders or ideologically inspired certain orders. They are guilty of not having taken the necessary steps to avoid this. So, much more senior people than those who are now in prison must be held responsible for the incident if we are to develop any relations. [passage omitted]

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[Bilic] Mr. Ljubijankic, here is a question for you. Does the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation mean an end to the competences of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? A Bosniak Muslim from Zagreb asked this question.

[Ljubijankic] No, it does not mean that, because the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will retain its international and legal status.

[Bilic] In international relations, that is. But how do you see the internal setup?

[Ljubijankic] The Federation is a form of the country's internal setup. Mr. Ganic has said that we cannot extinguish the republic's institutions, because as yet we do not have a solution for that part of the republic which we have not abandoned. It would be a disaster and a tragedy for both Croatia, and the Croatian people too, if we did give up that territory. So, the complete extinguishing of the republic's functions is out of the question until the status of the republic as a whole is solved.

[Bilic] A group of viewers from Herceg-Bosna would like to know whether it is true that Mr. Izetbegovic wants to create a civic state, according to the principle of one man-one vote, after the earlier models of Milosevic and Markovic, whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina would soon become a national state of Muslims.

[Ljubijankic] That is not true, and I would like to comment now on the accusation very frequently made against Mr. Izetbegovic, that he is an opponent of the Federation. There are attempts to vilify Mr. Izetbegovic by accusing him of being against the Federation and wanting to form a civic republic based on one man-one vote, which would lead to a majority rule by the Muslims in the near future. I would like to stress now that this is simply not true. Mr. Izetbegovic is one of the people who advocated the Federation from the very beginning and he has lent great support to all our initiatives to implement the Federation on the ground. [passage omitted]

There is another point I would like to make. It seems to me that the forces which are trying to strangle the Federation are very powerful. I would like us to identify them. I do not know who they are, but analyses show that...[Pauses] I, too, would like to analyze those forces. Was it by accident that Mr. Izetbegovic's visit to Bonn was reported by all the world media, while on 18 March, VJESNIK in Croatia did not report a single word on the visit? Did that happen by accident? If it did, I will withdraw my argument. But if it did not, that means that somebody is trying to use Mr. Izetbegovic's failure to go to Washington as proof that he is against the Federation. At the same time, the public was denied the information that Mr. Izetbegovic was in Bonn at the time, and that he could not possibly be in Washington. The visit to Bonn was scheduled a month and one-half in advance, and the program was set out long before he received the invitation to go to Washington. [passage omitted]

[Bilic] Mr. Misetic, it is your turn.

[Misetic] I will be brief. I respect Mr. Ganic and I hold him in exceptional esteem, but I am surprised that he is citing international power brokers and blaming us for slowing down the implementation of the Federation and the alliance. If we want to have an alliance and Federation we should not accuse each other. We used to blame each other for the Muslim-Croat war, and now we are beginning to accuse each other for putting the brakes on. However, Mr. Ganic, if one really wants the alliance and the Federation, then there should not be any events such as the celebration of the liberation of Kraljeva Sutjeska [Bosnian Croat Catholic monastery, captured by Muslims] three months after the cease-fire came into effect, and after the Washington agreements. Who liberated it and from whom? A monastery existed in Kraljeva Sutjeska as early as 1375 AD, 100 years before Jajce, where the Bosnian king had his throne, and was captured by the Turks of that time. A Croat was killed during this so-called celebration of the liberation of Kraljeva Sutjeska, exactly one year after his son was killed in the same place.

Is that the way to set up the alliance and Federation? Are we building the alliance and the Federation with a trial in Zenica, where 130 Croatian soldiers from Bugojno have been charged with genocide and war crimes against the civilian population? [passage omitted] Croats have to define their national program and the strategic interests of all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Orasje in the north to Neum in the south.

We spoke about the return of the refugees. The situation in Bosnia is horrific. Above all, the Croats have to stop the further exodus of Croats, because the Muslim authorities are not concerned. If the exodus continues on this scale, we will not have anybody to build the alliance and the Federation for. This problem has to be addressed primarily by the Croatian state, Herceg-Bosna, and the Croatian controlled areas in Muslim-held Bosnia.

How can we speak about an alliance and a Federation if the HVO is being called the aggressor. Even today, nobody here has apologized to the HVO in connection with General Santic. Nobody has apologized to the Herceg-Bosna authorities; the HVO is a part of Herceg-Bosna. These realities are constantly being avoided. Mr. Ganic, I know you will say that the Constitution of the Federation does not mention Herceg-Bosna. The Constitution of the Federation, the Washington agreements, provide for administrative arrangements. Herceg-Bosna is not mentioned because it was not an internationally recognized state then and it is not today. However, Herceg-Bosna is a reality.

Government Troops Accused of Killing Croat General

LD2203171495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1301 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Drvar, 22 Mar (TANJUG)—Jasmin Topal, Ramiz Bajramovic and Ramiz Duzdic,

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three members of the Bihac-based 502nd Brigade of the 5th Corps, which is loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, have been accused of murdering Major General Vlado Santic.

According to Radio Bihac, the investigation is being conducted by Fikret Hodzic, judge of the Bihac military court.

Muslims Impose Taxes on Croat Republic Products

LD2103160795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1523 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 21 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Muslim authorities Tuesday introduced taxes for all goods imported into parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by the Muslims and manufactured in the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna (CRHB), the CRHB radio has said.

The radio said that the decision of the Muslim authorities is a countermeasure to a March 1, 1995 decision by the CRHB government to introduce taxes for all goods imported from Croatia into the Muslim-Croat federation.

Following year-long battles over territories, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in March 1994 in Washington succumbed to U.S. pressure and signed an agreement on setting up their own federation in Bosnia.

In practice, the federation does not function because the nominal allies maintained their own armies, police and customs and accuse each other of obstructing the joint state.

Muslim-Croat federation Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, a Muslim, last week called on Zagreb to urge the CRHB government to change its decision on taxes.

General Delic on 'Unified Command' With Croatia

BR2203145595 Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Mar 95 p 6

[Article by Philippe Deprez: "Truce in Bosnia Doomed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "A fair peace can only be achieved through the use of arms." Not long ago, this was a leitmotiv in the discourse of Bosnian Serb leaders. Today, it has been adopted by General Rasim Delic, commander in chief of the Bosnian Army (Armija BiH, mostly Muslim).

His troops took advantage of the winter to reinforce their weaponry despite the embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia. No Bosnian leaders, including President Alija Izetbegovic, have any intention of renewing the four-month truce concluded early this year, unless the Serbs sign the peace plan drawn up by the "Contact Group." Consequently, the population is convinced that the cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not going to hold much longer.

"The Serbs have never respected the truce, especially in the Bihac region," General Delic told LE FIGARO. "In three months, we saw no improvement in the peace process. In my opinion, the international community has yet to put together mechanisms suitable for achieving the global agreement we want."

The general accuses the Serbs of trying to "freeze the situation" without agreeing to any compromise, of trying to "create a Cyprus-type situation, with the Blue Helmets present" on every front line. In such a context, "an extended truce is extremely unlikely," he says.

This prospect of renewed fighting highlights the significance of the military cooperation agreement recently concluded by Zagreb and Sarajevo: "We shall certainly fight alongside the HVO (the Croatian forces in Bosnia)," Rasim Delic says: "This is in our mutual interest." According to him, a "unified command" is going to be established with Croatia, modelled on the one created a year ago by Bosnia's Croatian-Muslim Federation. This command will "not control the two armies, but coordinate the two countries' military capabilities," he says. "Nothing has been signed, there is no need for it," he adds.

Mistrust

Such assurance on his part is rather perplexing. So far, cooperation within the Croatian-Muslim Federation has been hindered by a deep-rooted, reciprocal mistrust stemming from a year of fighting among the two communities. [passage omitted]

Serbs Take Gun From UN, Artillery From Depots

AU2103210495 Paris AFP in English 2027 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs seized a heavy machine gun and a thousand rounds of ammunition from a British UN vehicle at a checkpoint near Sarajevo on Tuesday, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Coward said the weapon and box of ammunition were seized at the "Sierra 4" checkpoint from a British vehicle attached to a radar unit, tasked with scanning the Sarajevo skies for banned heavy weapon fire.

This followed the hijacking on Monday by an armed Serb soldier of a UN vehicle in the Grbavica area of Sarajevo.

One Swedish and one British military observer, along with their interpreter, were forced to hand over the car which then disappeared.

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Bosnian Serbs have also helped themselves to several artillery pieces, kept at a weapons collection point at Lukavica barracks, Coward said.

The removal of the weapons came at a time of increased tension following reports of Bosnian army attacks in the northeast and centre of the country.

One 20-mm cannon was illegally taken from the collection point on Monday and four more artillery pieces, including a 105-mm cannon and a 120-mm mortar, disappeared overnight.

The guns were confined to several collection points in line with a decision last year to ban heavy weapons from within a 20-kilometer (12 mile) radius of Sarajevo. Serbs are allowed regular access to their weapons for inspection and maintenance purposes, but are forbidden to remove them.

Serbs Release Russian UN Military Observer

AU2103170995 Paris AFP in English 1638 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs Tuesday released a Russian UN military observer they had arrested for belonging to an alleged spy group, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here.

Major Alexey Nikolyenko, 32, had been held by the Serbs since his arrest on Saturday outside Sarajevo.

He was not himself accused of being a spy, but had been a member of a UN military observer "team in Brcko which was evicted from Serb-held territory for allegedly passing information to the enemy," UNPROFOR spokesman Alexander Ivanko had earlier said.

As such he was "persona non grata" in Serb-held territory.

Brcko, in the north of the country, is located in the strategically-important Posavina corridor which links Serb-held territories in west and east Bosnia.

Nikolyenko, who has been based in Tuzla, central Bosnia, since November was seized at gunpoint at a Serb checkpoint as he sought to pass in a UN vehicle in the company of a Norwegian military observer. The Norwegian was not detained.

UNPROFOR on Upsurge in Vehicle Hijackings

AU2203105195 Paris AFP in English 0857 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SARAJEVO, March 22 (AFP)—Armed men, believed to be Serb soldiers, have hijacked two UN vehicles outside Sarejevo, the latest in a series of such incidents around the town, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here Wednesday.

Around 6.15 p.m. Tuesday, several armed men, wearing Serb army uniforms and driving a Golf car, held up a Danish UN vehicle driving through Serb-held territory betweeen the "Sierra 3" and "Sierra 1" Serb checkpoints, west of the city.

The Danish soldiers were forced from their car at gunpoint and the hijackers drove off in the two cars, also taking weapons and a radio transmitter.

Shots were then fired at a UN civilian police car which turned up and attempted to give chase, UNPROFOR spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said.

Just over an hour later, several armed men intercepted a French UN vehicle travelling in the same area, hijacking the car.

Such hijackings are now taking place on a near daily basis around Sarajevo, with Bosnian Serbs authorities blaming "bandits" or "uncontrolled elements" for the robberies. A UN official described the explanation as "absurd," pointing out that many of the stolen vehicles turn up in nearby Pale, the Serb stronghold, painted in fresh camouflage colours.

UNPROFOR has suggested the Serbs are bent on escalating tension with blue helmets on the ground.

UNPROFOR Notes Fighting in Majevica, Travnik

AU2103134895 Paris AFP in English 1329 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Report by Francis Curta]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 21 (AFP)—[Passage omitted] Speaking in Zagreb, UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi said Bosnian Government attacks, which began Monday notably outside Tuzla, were "a major blow to the ceasefire," which came into force at the start of the year, UNPROFOR spokesman Alexander Ivanko reported. The truce is due to expire on May 1. [passage omitted]

Nearly 900 shell explosions were monitored in the north and northeast of the country on Monday after 2,000 Bosnian soldiers, backed by at least five T-55 tanks, apparently sought to capture a television relay station atop the 900-meter-high Stolice feature, in the Majevica hills, UNPROFOR said.

Fighting was also reported northeast of Tuzla where, according to UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Coward the Moslem-led Bosnian Army might have gained some ground. Early indications suggested government forces had failed to capture Stolice and suffered heavy casualties in their initial attack, Coward said.

After a lull Monday afternoon, due possibly to heavy snowfalls across much of the country, fighting picked up

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again Tuesday morning with Serbs firing 250 shells in the Majavica area and Bosnian troops firing back 19, Coward said.

A battle was also under way southeast of Tuzla, around Kalesija, with 228 shell explosions reported.

Tuzla airbase, south of the city, the scene of recent suspected air drops by unidentified aircraft, also came under fire with UN observers reporting 43 explosions in the area.

UNPROFOR spokesmen said Bosnian Government restrictions to the movement of observers in the area was preventing them from fully assessing the situation. [passage omitted]

Elsewhere in the country, fighting was more low key, except near the central town of Travnik where another Bosnian Army push was under way, according to the Serbs.

There again Bosnian troops were believed to be trying to seize a radio transmission centre atop a 2,000-meter-high mountain. [passage omitted]

Banja Luka Radio Describes Military Situation

AU2203172395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 21 March carries in its regular 35-minute newscast several reports on the military situation in the "former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Describing the situation in the theater of operations of the 1st Krajina Corps, the studio announcer says that "enemy forces carried out attacks on Serb defense lines and residential areas. This afternoon, units of the so called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army renewed fierce attacks on Serb defense positions" on the Vlasic front using "all types of artillery weapons" from strongholds at Ljuta Greda, Javorak, the valley of the Ugar, and Crni Vrh. The studio announcer goes on to say that "particularly heavy fighting was reported at 1300 [1200 GMT] and 1500. The fighting continues on the Vlasic front. There are dead and wounded on both sides."

Djordje Miletic reports from Knezevo on the more than 700 refugees who fled the Vlasic area finding shelter in the town, saying that the humanitarian situation "is bordering on disaster" as there is a shortage of food and medicines.

In his report from Majevica, Vlado Krizic says that "intensive Muslim attacks on the Serb defense lines" continue. He says that "Islamic fanatics" are also pounding residential areas in the Majevica area "with all available artillery weapons." He says that "the most fierce attacks of the 2d Muslim Corps are being carried out in the area of Banj Brdo, around the Stolica radio relay station." He reports that the Serb soldiers are "resisting those attacks heroically, inflicting more and more damage on the enemy, and, in the counteroffensive near Lukavica, the Serb soldiers dealt a heavy blow on the enemy, forcing it to withdraw to its initial positions. Enormous losses and obvious failure of the offensive spread panic among the Muslims."

Lidija Zaric reports from Doboj and says that "most prominent combat activity" originated from "infamous enemy strongholds southwest of Doboj and the western separation lines," and that Muslim "small-arms and antiaircraft weapons fire targeted Serb defense lines seriously wounding one Serb soldier." She says that "Serb soldiers responded adequately to enemy attacks."

She goes on to describe the situation on the Trebova front and says that "Muslim units opened sniper and small-arms fire on the eastern part of the front. Heavy small-arms fire from Oblic, Sofici, and Hadzica Glavica targeted Serb positions to the northeast of the town of Doboj. There were no consequences among the Serb soldiers who responded adequately."

Talking about the situation on the Ozren-Vozuca front, Lidija Zaric says "it has been mostly quiet. Apart from intensive reconnoitering activity, Muslim units opened small-arms and antiaircraft fire south of the town of Doboj against civilian targets on the right bank of the Bosna River, but without consequences or a Serb response."

She says that "on the Teslic front, units of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army did not carry out significant attacks on the Serb defense lines."

Reporting from the Srbobran (Donji Vakuf) front, Borislav Djuric says that "the Muslims fired 15 82-mm mortars on Serb defense positions from the area of the village of Vejici, 6-km southwest of Srbobran, and from the Marijanovici area, 7-km south of Srbobran. Furthermore, enemy forces from the direction of wooded area of Kos used small arms to target the Serb defense lines. There were no casualties on the Serb side. Serb soldiers did not respond to those attacks."

The studio announcer, describing the situation on the Kupres front, says that "Serb Republic Army soldiers spotted the enemy regrouping and enemy reinforcements moving toward Kupres and Komar from the direction of Bugojno. The enemy refrained from combat activity against Serb soldiers on this part of the front."

He continues to cite the report by the Brcko Press Center and says that "in the past 24 hours, combat activity by Croat and Muslim units has not been registered in Posavina," but that "Serb soldiers have reported that Muslim units are regrouping."

Banja Luka TV Reports on Muslim, Croat Attacks

AU2103212795 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 20 Mar 95

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian at 1930 GMT on 20 March carries

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within its regular 35-minute newscast reports the military situation in the "former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The Information Service of the Serb republic army headquarters reported that "early this morning, the Muslims launched an offensive on the Majevica and Vlasic fronts," but that "control of the defense lines was maintained." An unidentified correspondent says that the "2d Muslim Corps" attacked on the Majevica front, and the 3d and 7th Corps attacked on the Vlasic front. She adds that "at 0400 [0300 GMT] this morning, the infantry attacks, strongly supported by artillery and mortars, began on both fronts." She adds that the fighting at Vlasic continued this afternoon and that some shells were fired, but there were no casualties. On the Majevica front, "fierce infantry fighting continued throughout the day, and the civilian population is in shelters," she says. The Serb forces have been responding, and "all the defense lines are firm."

An unidentified correspondent reports that on the Kupres front three artillery shells were fired at Serb positions from the Kuk area. On the Orasje part of the Posavina front, the joint HVO (Croatian Defense Council) and Croatian Army launched an artillery-infantry attack at about 1100, which was "warded off." There were "occasional provocations" south of Brcko. On the Doboj front, there were infantry and artillery attacks during the night, and the Serb soldiers "were forced to return fire," hence repelling the attacks.

The Cajnice Brigade Command has "reliable information" that the "Muslims of Gorazde are preparing for the spring offensive" against Serb positions in the area, "the goal of which, as the Muslims say, is to lift the blockade on Gorazde." Furthermore, the report says the "Muslims" have planned to attack from Treskavica, Igman, and Bjelasnica simultaneously. During the past 24 hours, "Serb reconnaissance groups have observed vehicle convoys in the area." Military sources claim that people and arms are being transferred from the left bank of the Drina River to the right bank, "before the very eyes of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. The Muslims have several demolition squads ready for action. All Serb soldiers are fully ready for combat."

An unidentified correspondent from Sarajevo says there have been "only occasional infantry and sniper provocations" on the Sarajevo front during the past 24 hours, "most probably because of the bad weather conditions and snow." The attacks were reportedly aimed at Novo Sarajevo and the Slavisa Vajner barracks. The correspondent says that there were no casualties on the Serb side.

Muslim Army Offensive on Majevica 'Slackening'

AU2103221295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest Muslim offensive on Vlasic has triggered a new wave of refugees from several villages. More than 250 people—mostly women, children, and older people—were accommodated at the Omar Hotel in Knezevo today. What about the situation on Majevica? Vlado Trisic reports:

[Begin recording] The intensity of the Muslim attacks on the Serbian defense positions on Majevica is slackening. Civilian settlements on Majevica are also the targets of offensives by the Islamic fanatics, which they are pounding from all available artillery arms. The most powerful attacks by the members of the 2d Muslim Corps continue to take place in (?Banj Brdo), Koljevka, and around the Stolice radio relay station. The Serbian fighters are persisting heroically in their defense and are inflicting ever growing losses upon the enemy.

In a counteroffensive on part of the Majevica front near Lukavica, the Serbian soldiers struck a powerful blow, causing the enemy to return to his initial positions. Enormous losses and the indisputable failure of the offensive are causing growing nervousness and panic among the Muslims. Thus, the forces of the 2d Muslim Corps from Tuzla today completely blocked the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] at Dubrave airport and at the Tuzla Hotel. Namely, a certain number of UNPROFOR soldiers was supposed to travel to Majevica to see who was violating the cease-fire agreement.

The wrath of the Muslim commanders was provoked by last night's UNPROFOR statement, carried by all international agencies, in which it was stated that the members of the 2d Muslim Corps in yesterday's fighting on the Majevica front suffered horrendous losses in manpower. According to this source, Tuzla hospital yesterday received approximately 200 soldiers with various degrees of injuries. The total of fallen Muslim soldiers on the Majevica front is approximately 80. The Muslims suffered the biggest losses in Lukavica, near Snjezica Lake, in Panjik, and in Gornja Tuzla.

More than 200 Muslim soldiers, among them numerous recently recruited young men between 18 and 20, took part in the first ranks of yesterday's offense.

While reporting this—and it is roughly 1840 [1740 GMT] now—the fighting in Majevica continues with unabated ferocity. [end recording]

Muslim Troops Fight To Halt Advance on Vrnograc

LD2203114595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1058 GMT 22 Mar 95

[Received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perovac, 22 Mar (SRNA)—Units of the 5th Corps of the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army this morning launched a fierce artillery and infantry attack in the area of Vrnograc, 25 km northeast of Velika Kladusa.

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According to Velika Kladusa media, members of the 5th Corps are opening fire from mortars and infantry weapons from the direction of Mekanovici and Dolovi in an attempt to stop a further advance by units of the People's Defense of Western Bosnia, which captured a part of Vrnograc yesterday.

This morning Muslim radio in Bihac confirmed that seven 5th Corps soldiers were killed and 20 seriously wounded in yesterday's clashes.

5th Corps Repels Attack by Krajina, Bosnian Serbs

AU2203121795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 22d day of March in the western part of the Bosnian Krajina started with offensive activities by the joint [Bosnian and Croatian Serb] aggressors and the Kladusa paramilitary formations [of Abdic] on the front line around (Rasteva Luka), on the very border with the so-called Serbian Krajina. The fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps successfully repelled the fierce infantry attack supported by artillery and has pushed the enemy back to their initial position.

On the other parts of the Velika Kladusa front, there have been artillery attacks and small arms fire, along with the massing of enemy forces in the UN Protected Areas in the so-called Serbian Krajina. Frequent violations of the cessation of hostilities with snipers and the occasional shell have been registered on the Bosanska Krupa and the Grmusa-Srbljani Plateau fronts. It has been generally quiet this morning on the Grabez Heights, while sniper fire and small arms fire have been reported around the Bihac protected zone.

The grouping of enemy forces and military equipment has been observed in the Gola Pljesivica area. This morning, however, there has been no [words indistinct] on the Bihac front.

Inter-Muslim Fighting Intensifies Near Bihac

LD2203142995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1356 GMT 22 Mar 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, March 22 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim troops loyal to leader Alija Izetbegovic early on Wednesday launched a strong infantry-artillery attack on positions held by followers of moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic.

The local radio based in Velika Kladusa, the administrative centre of the autonomous province of west Bosnia, proclaimed by Abdic in September 1993, specified that Izetbegovic's troops attacked Abdic's troops in the area of the village of Vrnograc, 25 km northeast of Velika Kladusa.

The province's authorities do not recognize the Sarajevo Muslim authorities.

The radio said that Abdic's forces launched a counter-attack, pushing back troops of the Sarajevo Muslim government's Fifth Corps.

The Bihac radio, controlled by the Muslim Sarajevo government, reported early on Wednesday that the Fifth Corps had eight killed and 26 heavily wounded in the fighting.

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Martic, Stoltenberg on New Blue-Helmet Mandate

AU2103173895 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Article by Tamara Motrenko on statements by Thorvald Stoltenberg, chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and RSK President Milan Martic following a second round of talks in Belgrade on 21 March—recorded; Stoltenberg speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Motrenko] After the talks and consultations held in Belgrade yesterday about the future of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate in the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and Croatia, RSK President Milan Martic again talked with Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the conference on the former Yugoslavia. Speaking about the talks that lasted more than two hours, the UN envoy assessed them as follows:

[Stoltenberg] Today we exchanged views that were very interesting and useful. This is all a constituent part of the process of my collecting material for the report I am going to submit to the UN secretary general. This is why I travelled (?from) Belgrade to Zagreb and back so that I could collect the material for the report. I will submit this report on the talks I held here in Belgrade and in Zagreb to the UN secretary general very soon. Of course, the UN secretary general should be informed about these conclusions first.

[Motrenko] Using this same diplomatic vocabulary, Stoltenberg also presented the talks he had with Croatian representative Sarinic in Zagreb last night and this morning, and RSK President Milan Martic said the following:

[Martic] This [word indistinct] was a continuation of yesterday's talks in which Mr. Stoltenberg, special envoy to the UN secretary general, conveyed his [rephrases] brought [word indistinct] from the meeting he held with Messrs. Tudjman and Sarinic in Zagreb their opinions and compared their stands with ours.

As far as we are concerned, today we reiterated our unchanged position that we want the peace forces to stay on the territory of the RSK, because we want peace to continue to reign.

We conveyed to Mr. Stoltenberg our belief that the UN Security Council will assess objectively the results of the peace forces achieved to date on the basis of the Vance plan. It is known that, on the basis of Vance plan, peace has been reigning in the RSK for the last three years. True, there have been occasional violations of this peace by Croatia—as is known, there have been three instances of aggression—but in any case, some sort of peace has been ensured.

We hope that the Security Council will objectively perceive all positive sides of the Vance plan, and that the peace forces will remain on the RSK territory with an unchanged mandate, as protection forces, and that we in the RSK will be able to expect peace to reign in the future as well and to talk with the Croats on an equal footing as a neighboring state about economic, political, and all other issues that are under dispute today.

[Motrenko] In reply to the question of whether some new conditions have been set by Zagreb, Martic said the following:

[Martic] Of course, there is something that one reads in the press, and their conditions are known. I would say that this was a show by Mr. Tudjman to the effect that he demanded that UNPROFOR should go and the end result should be that the UNPROFOR mandate would be changed to Croatia's benefit. I believe that this will not be accepted, that the Security Council will objectively assess both our participation so far and our relation toward the peace forces, and that it will, above all, evaluate the results of the peace forces' work on the basis of the Vance plan.

[Motrenko] Journalists' questions about the possible new blue-helmet mandate also involved the number of troops that would be optimal for the RSK.

[Martic] We are tolerant there. We are leaving it to the gentlemen in the Security Council to assess this and decide what number is optimal for performing these duties. Therefore, this may be more or it may be fewer, a number that would be able to ensure peace along the line of separation, between the warring sides, between us and Croatia. We do not particularly mind if this number is reduced to 5,000, 6,000, or 7,000. We agree. Also, if this number is higher than this, we are tolerant and agree that it is up to the Security Council to estimate it.

As regards the deployment of UNPROFOR along the borders with the Serbian Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to the Vance plan, they also had the right of supervision before. Regarding control, I do not agree with that.

[Motrenko] Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, insisted on the interpretation of the procedure of changing the blue helmets' mandate according to which, after serious consultations with the RSK and Croatia, he will submit his report to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, who will then submit his report to the Security Council, which, after all, has the final say about the future of the blue helmets.

Martic Not Against UNPROFOR Numbers Change

LD2103184095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1818 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 21 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina President Milan Martic said Tuesday that the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] is not

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opposed to changing the number of U.N. peacekeepers in the safe areas, but he demanded that their mandate remains [as published] the same.

'The Security Council should decide about the optimum size of the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR],' Martic said following the second round of talks with U.N. mediator Thorwald Stoltenberg in Belgrade.

Martic said that the 12,000 peacekeepers currently deployed in Serb Krajina and Croatia 'could be reduced to 5,000, 6,000 or 7,000.'

The Croatian authorities in early January decided to eject UNPROFOR after its current six-month mandate expires on March 31, but a week later revoked the decision after talks with U.S. representatives. Zagreb said it would demand the withdrawal of UNPROFOR on condition that its size is reduced and its mandate changed.

Martic said that UNPROFOR's size could be bigger or smaller than the current one, but should be such to 'enable it to secure peace along the separation lines.'

Serb Krajina demands that UNPROFOR remains [as published] in its territory, Martic said and added that he had insisted on this during the first round of talks with Stoltenberg in Belgrade on Monday.

UNPROFOR was deployed in Serb Krajina in the spring of 1992 in keeping with a plan by then U.N. mediator Cyrus Vance. The plan also calls for the renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate until the Krajina Serbs and the Croats reach a negotiated poltical solution.

'We hope that the Security Council will objectively consider all positive aspects of the Vance plan and that the peacekeepers will remain in the territory of Serb Krajina with the same mandate, as a protection force,' Martic said.

Martic said he had demanded from Stoltenberg that a Serb Krajina representative be present when the Security Council discusses this issue. Martic said that currently the Knin-Zagreb talks on the implementation of the Dec. 2 economic agreement had been frozen until UNPROFOR's mandate is resolved.

'If the Serb Krajina demand for an unchanged UNPROFOR mandate is met, I believe the talks will resume,' Martic said. Asked to comment the possibility of deploying UNPROFOR on the border between the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Bosnian Serb Republic, Martic said the Vance plan had empowered the peacekeepers to monitor the border between the Bosnian Serb republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but underscored that 'regarding the control (of borders)—we cannot agree.'

Stoltenberg said he would submit a report to the U.N. secretary general about [illegible] talks in Belgrade and Zagreb. In Zagreb Stoltenberg met on Monday evening with the Croatian president's special advisor, Hrvoje Sarinic. 'My task is in fact to find the common denominator for a plan which could be best implemented to the good of all the people in the region. I am looking for all the common points which could result in a new mandate for the U.N. troops,' Stoltenberg said.

Martic: Mikelic, Babic 'Avoiding' Consultation

AU2203093095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 9

[Report on an interview with Krajina Serb leader Milan Martic by S.N. Adamovic; place and date of interview not given: "I Have Met With Milosevic as Well"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "One day before the meeting between President Slobodan Milosevic and the prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, I also met with Milosevic in Belgrade, and we talked about many things in connection with the stay of UNPROFOR in our region, as well as the continuation of the peace process," Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina says, having been asked by NASA BORBA whether he was invited to take part in a meeting between Serbian President Milosevic; Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina government; and Milan Babic, foreign minister of Republic of Serbian Krajina, which took place in Belgrade on Tuesday [14 March].

As is known, this meeting, like many others before, has remained thickly covered with the veil of secrecy for our public because neither Mikelic nor Babic were ready to make any statement regarding the issues discussed at the talks. Of course, the typically reticent president of Serbia did not make any comment, explanation, or any other sort of statement for the public, either.

We asked the president of Republic of Serbian Krajina how he interpreted Milosevic's meeting with Babic and Mikelic, since it came about precisely at the moment immediately after Martic's initiative to demand prime minister Mikelic's removal was not passed by the Republic of Serbian Krajina assembly.

"I see no reason to draw such a connection, because this topic was also discussed at the meeting. It is known that prime minister Mikelic heads the economic negotiating team in which Babic also takes part and that, if UNPROFOR stays with its mandate unchanged, the economic talks will continue," the president of Republic of Serbian Krajina said.

"I think that any siding of Belgrade with this or that party might be ruinous," Martic underlined, commenting on our suggestion that such a thing might happen in the conflict between Mikelic and Martic. "We have to deal with our internal problems alone. Otherwise, the consequences might be really fatal. Any interference in such things as the settling of internal political problems, siding with this or that party, and particularly with the party that dodges the question of responsibility

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for its own work, or rather idleness, would be viewed, to put it mildly, as a sign of ill will toward us.

"President Milosevic may invite for a meeting those whom he considers to be relevant, which also means Mikelic and Babic. However, it would be normal for the prime minister and foreign minister to inform me, as president, on such talks, which they are avoiding doing. Unfortunately, despite my efforts, Mikelic and Babic are avoiding consulting with me on issues crucial for the destiny of our state. More precisely, I may say that for the past several months no such cooperation exists whatsoever, and I consider this to be an attempt to introduce parallelism in decisionmaking, which may have catastrophic consequences for the Republic of Serbian Krajina," Milan Martic said.

Answering perhaps the most difficult question regarding Babic's personal motivation to meet with Milosevic, Martic said that it would be logical for Babic to observe the interests of the Krajina people and global Serbian interests. "It is possible, of course, that his motivation was personal or partisan. It is a matter of taste," Martic concluded.

[Box, p 9]

Martic made a statement for NASA BORBA yesterday on the latest events regarding the UNPROFOR's stay in the UN Protected Areas. On this occasion he repeated that, with regard to Tudjman's latest decision, such a development did not surprise anybody in Krajina. "It was all a diplomatic game that was not initiated by Zagreb, intended to put pressure on us and the UN Security Council. It also helped Tudjman to improve his ratings considerably, but these will fall back after this decision and he will have great problems with the opposition in explaining what Zagreb has received in exchange for this radical change of attitude," Martic believes.

"As for Zagreb's other expectations that UNPROFOR will block the border between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian Republic [Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] or Yugoslavia, no such thing will happen as long as I am the president of Republic of Serbian Krajina," he underlined.

He added that peacekeeping forces are already positioned on the borders and they, as observers, do not bother Krajina. "However," Martic stressed, "the Krajina Serbs will not accept any blockade of the border between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian Republic or Yugoslavia, and I do not see any way of accomplishing that."

RSK's Tanjga Attends Session in Belgrade

AU2103162395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by "S.N.A.": "Tanjga Participated in Work of RSK Government in Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Rade Tanjga, defense minister in the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], has not been arrested. That is, if he had been arrested—as was suggested by Branko Vujic, leader of the Serbian Radical Party bench in the Republic of Serbian Krajina Assembly, at the meeting of the Radicals in Benkovac two days ago—then he must have been released in the meantime.

NASA BORBA reporters yesterday met Tanjga in the hall of the building in Terazije, in front of the Belgrade bureau, and the minister refused to comment on the news of his arrest.

We met the Tanjga yesterday after the end of the consultative session of the RSK Government, which was held in the bureau. The session of the RSK Government went on for four hours. No official statement was issued after the session, and Prime Minister Mikelic stated at the end of the session that the meeting was "of a working nature" and not interesting to the public.

What might be interesting to our public is the fact that, while the RSK Government was in session in Belgrade, RSK President Milan Martic was very active diplomatically. He was visited in his residence in Belgrade by Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Army Intelligence Chief Primuzak Views Goals

AU2203101395 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with Brigadier Branko Primuzak, head of the army intelligence service, by Tomo Vicic; place and date not given: "There Is No Possibility of Misuse of Information"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We talked with Brigadier Branko Primuzak, the defense minister's aide in charge of the political, personal and Security-Intelligence Service. He was born in Duga Resa and is one of the founders of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] in that region, where he managed to found 38 branches of the HDZ and to mobilize around 2,500 members as early as in 1991.

[Vicic] You have also advanced to high functions quite rapidly. How do you explain that?

[Primuzak] It must be very well known to you that the HDZ was the first to start the struggle for an independent Croatian state. It is well known that the HDZ members made up the majority of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia, and I am one of these as well. I have been directly involved in the Croatian Army for more than four years, and I think that it is owing to this that I have attained a really high military post with the Defense Ministry.

[Vicic] Is it appropriate that a member of a political party should occupy a high position in the military structure?

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[Primuzak] My party membership is absolutely my own private affair. As a high official of the Defense Ministry I carry out orders issued by the defense minister that are in the interest of the Croatian Army and the Croatian state. The system of the Croatian Army does not permit positions determined by party membership, because we are one of the democratic countries that do not want to induce any kind of political indoctrination in their armies by promoting any political party. My party membership and professionalism, which my duty requires of me, are strictly separated. Since you have already mentioned the practice in armies throughout the world, you certainly know that with a change of the party in power certain state bodies also undergo staff changes. Such changes take place also within the Defense Ministry, which does not deflect from democratic practice at all, nor is it any sort of totalitarian practice.

Professional Organization

[Vicic] You head the army intelligence service. How do you obtain data on what is happening on the other side of the demarcation line?

[Primuzak] We are a highly professional organization and there are many ways of obtaining information on all important events that are of interest for the Croatian Army happening in the temporarily occupied regions. Still, I hope you do not seriously mean that I should disclose to you the methodology of collecting such data, do you? You know yourselves that our job is extremely important for the security of the Republic of Croatia.

[Vicic] Your service possesses information of great importance for the security of Croatia and its future. Is there within the Security-Intelligence Service [SIS] any efficient way of supervising in order to prevent the misuse of this information?

[Primuzak] All data that we acquire in our operative work is classified under the category of highly confidential information. I maintain categorically that there is no possibility of the misuse of information that we acquire. In practice a slip sometimes occurs, but as a rule it has never happened with the important documents that we own. We pay extremely great professional attention and [attach great] importance to the efficient supervision of information, and this springs from the role we have within the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Croatia.

[Vicic] What is cooperation like between the military and the civilian secret service?

[Primuzak] Cooperation is extraordinary good and efficient. Our mutual task is the security of the Republic of Croatia and all its citizens, hence the need to cooperate and coordinate actions.

Situation in Occupied Regions

[Vicic] Do you have any news on the situation among the rebels in the occupied part of Croatia?

[Primuzak] In the temporarily occupied regions of Croatia the situation is unbearable for the great majority of the citizens. The political and military leaderships of the rebel Serbs are terrorizing citizens and they sow paranoid fear from [as published] the Croatian state. In recent times such attempts have become less and less successful. The majority of people in those regions have understood that their dream of a greater Serbia at the expense of the Croatian regions will never come true and they feel double-crossed. In contrast to the ordinary citizens who are surviving thanks to the aid provided by the international humanitarian organizations, its leaders and war profiteers have deposited in Serbia considerable hard currency reserves, with which they think they can secure their existence until the end of their lives.

There are more and more prominent Serbs, as well as ordinary people, who openly support peaceful reintegration into the legal-political system of Croatia. It is realistic to expect that the rebel Serb leaders will continue with repressive measures against their own people in order to maintain themselves in power even further. However, it can also be expected that there will be increasing numbers of political forces among the local Serbs that have realized all the senselessness and tragedy of the military rebellion and will offer enough resistance to local barons who are pushing them toward inevitable catastrophe.

[Vicic] You were a candidate for a high political office, that of the deputy chairman of the party. Do you still have political ambitions or will you remain faithful to the military?

[Primuzak] As long as our fatherland is not completely free within its internationally recognized borders, I would want to remain in the Croatian Army. I consider that to be a great honor and my duty. After peace is restored there will be enough time to think about what is to be done further, and how. Of course, politics will remain relevant in the new choices I make for the future, and particularly with regard to my political experience so far, which is not inconsiderable. But time will show what will be.

[Vicic] Karlovac County has many problems with cadres. Its cadres are insufficiently present in various state bodies.

[Primuzak] I am not at all sure that Karlovac County does not have enough expert staff, but I agree that they are not sufficiently present in the state institutions. On this matter talks were held on many occasions with the most responsible people in the Republic, and it was concluded that considerable improvements should be made in that respect. I personally believe that, besides myself, there will be more people, cadres from Karlovac County, in the state bodies—because, frankly, I believe that we shall take part in the executive authorities proportionally to the significance of Karlovac County in the Republic of Croatia.

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To Avoid Differences Through Dialogue

[Vicic] In Karlovac County, within the leading political party, there is constant conflict, and factions are developing as well.

[Primuzak] Unfortunately, we have to be aware that within the ruling party there are individuals who are concerned most with their personal gain, and who are trying to make use of membership in the HDZ for the improvement of their personal positions. I can maintain with certainty that such people are in a minority, because the greatest number of HDZ members will persevere in accomplishing their task, which is the establishment of the democratic and sovereign Croatian state regardless of the personal sacrifices that are inevitable in the accomplishment of such a project. We must not forget that it was only four years ago that we introduced a multiparty system in our society, and that a part of the disagreements and disputes actually springs from the lack of knowledge and also from different visions regarding the role and work of a democratic, parliamentary party such as the HDZ. Therefore I do not pay much attention to such disagreements, but I agree that in the democratic dialogue differences in opinion among a party's members may be efficiently eliminated without causing a breach among them.

[Vicic] Together with Josip Jakovcic, current chairman of the county, you are a cofounder of the HDZ in the region of Duga Resa, while today you are the chairman of the Town Board of HDZ in Duga Resa.

[Primuzak] That region has always been Croatian, and its citizens have always fostered Croatianhood. We started to meet in 1989, when, in only several months, thanks exclusively to the Croatian national feeling that had been inhibited for decades, we founded 38 branches of HDZ in the villages and places of Duga Resa region, and mobilized 2,500 members. Such a force, which few Croatian regions were able to boast at the time, brought about the victory in the first elections, while today it is the major initiator of all political, social, and economic advancements in that part of Karlovac County.

[Box, p 7]

[Vicic] Once it was KOS [Counterintelligence Service] that was in charge of intelligence work in the military, while today it is SIS. What are the differences?

[Primuzak] The differences are great. Just remember how much fear and anxiety among the citizens was caused by the very mention of KOS in the former Communist regime. Such organizations did not shrink even from brutal murder, blackmail, staged trials, and so forth. We are a service that operates in the democratic state of Croatia and that is under the control of the Croatian Assembly. Without any sort of political indoctrination, we have organized this service that is considerably ahead of the former KOS in terms of its efficiency, professional and expert achievements, and therefore we enjoy the full trust of our citizens.

[Box, p 7]

[Vicic] Some people in certain political structures of Karlovac claim that you are the main ideologist and representative of the cadres.

[Primuzak] If one can talk about cadres, this may refer exclusively to the tasks that have been assigned to me at the state level. I thereby refer chiefly to the current function in the Defense Ministry. When speaking of the policy on cadres, I believe that I am implementing exclusively the policy of the president of the Republic, Franjo Tudjman, for which he obtained the support of the Croatian people through a plebiscite. In the selection or designation of the cadres at the local level, I take part as far as my office on the County Board of HDZ permits.

Commentary Criticizes Government Control of Media

AU2203101995 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 95 p 6

[Commentary by Miko Tripalo: "UNS: A Lever of Dictatorship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today it can be already said with certainty that totalitarianism has not only penetrated Croatia, but has also taken root in many areas. This is why the struggle against such a system is more complicated and difficult. For the sake of those who are not familiar with the term and who are engaged in politics or science, it should be underlined once more that totalitarianism is a system in which the state controls all aspects of social life, trying to regulate it thoroughly and leaving ever less room for actions taken by individuals and/or groups. That tendency is connected with the ever-increasing centralization of assets and the centralized appointment of the heads of the most important institutions.

Therefore it is no surprise that the Executive Board of Croatian Radio-Television has decided to stop the live coverage of Assembly meetings. That decision is yet another blow to democracy in Croatia and represents a further reduction of the possibilities for the public to become familiar in the most convenient way with the plurality of political options on the Croatian political stage.

The deteriorating image of President Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] after every public television broadcast is good enough reason for the ruling party to make such a decision. That is to say: It is not about the protracted nature of Assembly debates, the uneven quality of the opinions, or the fact that the public has had enough of it but is, rather, an eminently pragmatic decision by the ruling party to prevent the erosion of its public popularity. The best proof of this is the latest television panel discussion—or rather: the duel between

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Runjic and Domljan shown in "Dangerous Connections of Open Television"—while, in addition, almost every Assembly session has left a somewhat negative impression about the respectability of the ruling party, because the opposition's arguments have been far stronger, with the result that the ruling party has had to resort to the tyranny of the majority, manifested by unscrupulously voting down the opposition.

Nevertheless, to understand things better, this decision to stop live television coverage of Assembly sessions should be linked to the growing censorship in those newspapers under the influence of the HDZ, the various means by which the distribution of independent newspapers is being hindered, the imposition of a special tax on FERAL TRIBUNE, and so forth. Unfortunately, today there are only two dailies, NOVI LIST and GLAS ISTRE, that are not controlled by the HDZ; and a number of weeklies that are keeping their heads above water, mostly thanks to aid from various European or U.S. foundations whose goal is to help develop democracy in postsocialist countries. Thus, it is no wonder that the state body appointed by the Law on Telecommunications is also dragging its feet over allocating frequencies to several television stations that would be in a position to start broadcasting immediately.

This Country Needs Only Its Leader

The argument that debates on certain important issues and ministers' question times will still be broadcast is a poor consolation for what has been lost owing to the cessation of these broadcasts. It is hard to trust reports on the Assembly's work carried by Croatian Radio-Television, because these are selective and always slanted to suit the interests of the ruling party. It would be normal to have a multiparty editorial team to put these reports together, while before every Assembly session the Assembly chairman should determine which items on the agenda might be of particular interest to the public and therefore should be broadcast.

These are processes that are going on in our multiparty life and in the media. If we add to this what happened with the selection of judges for the Supreme Court and before this the choice of members of the State Judicial Council, then it is understandable that judicial independence in Croatia has been called into question. The news of the resignation of Minister Crnic, which is a laudable and highly moral act, was reported by only a few newspapers. The statement of the prime minister announcing the possibility of a more detailed discussion on the position of the administration of justice, was based on two weak premises.

The first was that, under conditions of tripartite administration, the prime minister is able to do rather little, while the second is that Milan Vukovic and Ante Potrebica do not have a sufficiently developed sense of ethical behavior to resign. Unfortunately, many interventions and even concrete actions on this entire issue were linked to the state president's office. The violation of the principle of the division of authority has also been indicated at a government meeting chaired by the president of the republic. The meeting's conclusions imply that this country does not need an assembly, but only a leader, a government that will obey him, and the HDZ deputies' club, which will play the role of an assembly as much as possible.

UNS [Office for National Security] Is Based on the Constitution [subhead]

The strengthening of the president's dictatorial edicts is proven by the UNS bill, which gives unlimited authority to the president on the direct management of intelligence work, that is, the intelligence service and the secret police. The proponents of the bill base the setting up of this on Article 94 of the Constitution, which states: "The president of the Republic represents the Republic at home and abroad, is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution, and ensures the existence and integrity of the Republic, as well as the regular activities of the state administration." However, the president of the Republic cannot perform these duties irrespective of the Constitution, or by violating it, because otherwise, for instance, he could decide that, in order to ensure the existence and integrity of the Republic, he should introduce a personal dictatorship or put the army in power. That would be an example of a flagrant violation of the Constitution and abuse of the president of the Republic's authority.

The president does not have a right to form, independently of the government or the state administration, any bodies that have executive power. Only Article 100 of the Constitution, which refers to the president as the supreme commander, mentions the foundation of the People's Defense Council. Any other body set up by the president may be only of an advisory nature.

Thus, Article 106 reads: "In carrying out his duties, the president of the Republic is to be assisted by the Presidential Council and other advisory and ancillary bodies, whose members are appointed by the president of the Republic." This is to say that the UNS is a body that is not based on the Constitution and one that has led to even greater dictatorial powers in ruling Croatia.

Swedish Delegation Interested in Returned Refugees

LD2203125095 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1130 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Lunch Echo will continue with the Bosnian Croat refugees who are being sent back to Croatia. The question is what happens to them afterward. A Swedish delegation has travelled south to find out about that. Here is our correspondent in the Croatian capital Zagreb:

[Correspondent Staffan Heimerson] It is not the first time that Sweden throws out Bosnian Croat refugees, it is noted here in Croatia. Statistics here in Zagreb show

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that when 1,600 Bosnian Croats were deported from Sweden during one year, only 60 of them were given the right to stay in Croatia with refugee status. There are 385,000 refugees in Croatia; half of them, some 200,000 come from Bosnia. Not mincing his words, Adalbert Rebic, the Croat minister for refugee affairs says that 30-40 percent of them, some 70,000 people, are to be sent back to Bosnia, war or no war. In any case, there is a risk of war hanging over Croatia too.

This policy is today clearly explained in, for instance, the Zagreb paper VJESNIK. In the past, the minister has said that as far as he is concerned refugees may even be sent back to Sarajevo. Not even the Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, whom I interviewed here in Zagreb yesterday, is much agitated over the treatment of his fellow countrymen.

[Begin Silajdzic recording in English] They did not have time maybe to get our passports, the Bosnian passports. This is the problem in Germany too. [end recording]

[Heimerson] These Bosnian Croats may not have had time to acquire our passports, Bosnian passports. This is a problem in Germany too, says the prime minister in a matter of fact way, without condemnation. This coolness may be because Bosnia in practice is now one nation, dominated by one population group, the Muslims. The heart of the Muslim prime minister bleeds less for exposed people from the other population group. [passage omitted]

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Foreign Ministry on Talks With Greece, Embargo

AU2103162795 Skopje MIC in English 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In relation to the latest statements for continuation of the Macedonian-Greek negotiations, published in the press, the Macedonian Foreign Ministry assesses the agreement for the start of direct negotiations between the governments of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the Republic of Greece, in the presence of Cyrus Vance, as a positive step. The direct negotiations have always been a proposal and stance of the Republic of Macedonia, as there is no other way for neighbors to negotiate.

As to the negotiations, our stance in regard to the name is well known, while we can discuss everything else. However, we are convinced that real, equal negotiations are not held under conditions of an embargo. The lifting of the embargo would be the right step that would create a favorable atmosphere for necessary trust and a successful course of the negotiations. Therefore, if the statement is true that the embargo should last also during the negotiations, we are expressing our standpoint that this is unacceptable to the Republic of Macedonia.

Commentary: Dispute With Greece, U.S. Mediation

AU2103190095 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "A Step to Direct Dialogue?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From what we have seen this past weekend, it seems that a certain change should be expected in the Greek-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] dispute in the coming weeks. The main news from New York is that there is soon to be a direct Macedonian-Greek meeting at the ministerial level. If this is true, then it means that we are entering a new, higher phase in the search for a solution to the problems that have been imposed on Macedonia since it first became independent.

Although our public might be a little surprised at this sudden resolution of the dispute, if we follow the events properly, we can see that something has to happen this spring that will move the negotiations out of deadlock. Now that the government and the authorities in Macedonia have become stable and both countries—as they would say at the headquarters of the world organization—have met the requirements of the electoral calendar, there are no significant reasons why negotiations cannot be resumed. This means that, if the reason why the direct negotiations have so far been postponed was first the parliamentary elections in Macedonia and then the presidential elections in the Greek Republic, now the mediators do not see any reason why the two sides cannot come together. It is clear that Macedonia—which has recently been accused, and not only by Greece, of hindering the process and of being unwilling to make concessions—cannot postpone the search (not even using the excuse that it is being blackmailed by the illegal embargo) for a mutually acceptable solution, which is something that appears to suit both sides better and which helps avoid all the negative connotations of the word "compromise."

At the same time, the United States, aware of its influence in both countries, has recently been particularly active in assuming the responsibility to mediate. Here it has not limited itself simply to the role of mailman, but has been actively involved, particularly via Cyrus Vance and Matthew Niemitz, and with the recent assistance of Undersecretary of State Richard Holbrooke, in removing the deadlock. This gives grounds for believing that the process of rapprochment between the two countries is becoming accelerated under Washington's sponsorship.

What does the future hold for Macedonia and what does it expect itself? Time has thus far worked indisputably in our favor, and in addition to the fact that the world has seen the whole absurdity of the situation, it has also become clear that the name Macedonia in itself does not constitute a threat and cannot ever endanger the world. On the contrary, it has become apparent that destabilization and the threat to security are caused by the stubbornness of our southern neighbor, which has been reluctant to admit that it was a fatal mistake to deny Macedonia's existence after it became independent. However, although we must be careful in the information we give about the timing of the new direct negotiations, it is obvious that we have to sit together at the negotiating table where, as Matthew Nimeitz said in New York last fall, there will be some give and take.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong if we now started calculating what Macedonia can give and how much. The negotiations, which Macedonia insisted should be face to face, will show whether anything has to be given, and how much. The essential aim of the direct talks is to familiarize both sides with the demands, prejudices, expectations, and the willingness of each party to understand what is standing in the way of the other side and what it is insisting on. Macedonia was the one that pledged itself to negotiate on all the open questions, since negotiations are the best possible way to discover all the fears, save time, and avoid the mediators interpreting things in their own way. It seems that at this stage it would be not only unproductive and undiplomatic, but would lead nowhere if we start a public discussion about the flag, the articles of the constitution, the name, and so forth. To start prognosticating about whether we should give them the flag and they in return forget about the name will not, despite the fact that the media could make it attractive and arouse the normal and understandable interest of the public, contribute much toward reaching the goal, which is a solution that will make both sides feel comfortable, that will satisfy them both, and that will not make either of them the winner or the loser. In this

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context, let us recall the statement by the head of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Macedonia, Tore Boches (VECER, 3 December 94), who said the following about how a dispute imposed on a country can be solved: The best way to resolve the matter is to have reasonable people sit together and talk... This is how many other international questions and complex problems have been solved. For instance, it became possible to resolve the dispute between Israel and its neighbors only when representatives of the two sides sat down together and talked.... Only reasonable people of good will from both sides can, with the help of international organizations, sit down together and talk over their viewpoints....

Diplomatic Relations Established With Vietnam

AU2103190395 Skopje MIC in English 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the Socialist Republic Vietnam have established diplomatic relations, and the appointed ambassador, Vladimir Petkovski, submitted his credentials to Vice President Nguyen Thi Binh.

During the talks, it was concluded that the establishment of diplomatic relations would present further stimulus for the advancement of the relations and cooperation between the two countries, the Foreign Ministry announces.

Mazowiecki on Tetovo University, Tension in Kosovo

95P20643A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 3 Mar 95 p 5

[Interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, by Nefail Maliqi in Geneva; date not given: "As Little Ethnic Tension as Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mazowiecki] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] must improve its laws, which are unfavorable to non-Macedonians. The situation in Kosovo is tense and about to erupt. It is true that there is very little about Kosovo in my most recent report, because Belgrade prevented me from visiting Kosovo. We have good cooperation with the Skopje authorities in the area of human rights.

[Maliqi] These are only a few of the statements of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia—with whom we spoke recently at the UN offices in Geneva—in regard to the nonobservance of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and Macedonia. [passage omitted] From his first report to his latest one, his 14th, which he recently presented at the 51st session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which is currently being held in Geneva, Mazowiecki has reported in detail on what has been happening to the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and elesewhere, using terms such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, apartheid.... Last year, the UN Security Council continued, for another year, Mr. Mazowiecki's mission of examining the situation in the former Yugoslavia....

[Maliqi] Mr. Mazowiecki, what is the current situation in regard to human rights and freedoms in the former Yugoslavia?

[Mazowiecki] For almost three years I have been following the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the respecting of human rights and freedoms. These rights were flagrantly violated by all parties, but especially by the Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and others. My reports, which I sent to the UN Security Council, prove this. The drastic violation of human rights in Kosovo began after 1981, when the situation was intensified with the outbreak of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H].

The dimensions of the human rights violations in B-H are being manifested in the cruelest of forms, by ethnic cleansings instigated by the military operations of Radovan Karadzic. The international community, and especially the UN Commission for Human Rights and Freedoms, are paying careful attention to these violations of human rights, and they are aware that the main purpose of these repressions is ethnic cleansing.

But, unfortunately, this repression by the Serbian police has been exerted upon the Kosovo Albanians for years. In the meantime, the mass violation of the rights of the Albanians has begun to be noted in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia....

[Maliqi] The situation of the Albanians in Kosovo is included in all your reports. Can you tell us what currently characterizes the situation in Kosovo?

[Mazowiecki] I discussed the violation of human rights in Kosovo—in this case, the rights of the Albanians—in my last report. Unfortunately, the situation has not changed for the better, in Kosovo. On the contrary, the Albanians are being subjected to even crueler oppression, on a daily basis. This violence is carried out by the Serbian police, on Belgrade's orders. Kosovo is faced with open conflict because of the escalation of Serbian repression against the Albanians.

Because of this tense situation, we are in constant contact and close cooperation with the European Union of Independent Trade Unions, which has monitored the situation in the region—especially in areas where a conflict might erupt, such as Kosovo, Macedonia and other places. Thus, the EU has expressed its willingness to help not only in resolving the situation but also in solving the issue of Kosovo.

[Maliqi] Mr. Mazowiecki, your most recent report seems to be less comprehensive than previous reports in regard to the violation of the rights and freedoms of Albanians in Kosovo.

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[Mazowiecki] You are right. This is because the Serbian authorities in Belgrade prevented me, in various ways, from carrying out my mission, in which I was supposed to get a direct knowledge of the situation in Kosovo.

When I presented the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia at this year's session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, I stressed that the rights of the Albanians were being violated in a flagrant manner. On this occasion, I said that my efforts to help initiate a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade were futile.

Even if the Serbs try to create obstacles for international observers, as they have done in my case, in order to cover up what is happening in Kosovo, this will be futile, because nothing can be hidden in the world today.

[Maliqi] Mr. Mazowiecki, as you know, after the opening of the University of Tetovo, there were tragic and bloody clashes between the Albanian people and the Macedonian police, a situation which further increased the tension in Macedonia. As a UN official, how deeply were you involved in this situation, and how do you evaluate these events?

[Mazowiecki] I was very well informed in regard to the situation, but I must say that before we went there, the authorities in Skopje, in contrast to those in Belgrade, expressed their readiness to cooperate with us in the area of human rights and freedoms. This readiness was expressed by Macedonia, as a democratic country, when it was admitted to the United Nations, and this cooperation has been fruitful so far.

Unfortunately, however, the situation in the FYROM has been even more tense recently, immediately after the opening of the Albanian-language University of Tetovo. The Macedonian authorities continue to refuse this request [for the university], considering it to be "illegal."

In the future, in order to avoid confrontations, this former Yugoslav republic must improve its laws, which are to the disadvantage of non-Macedonians.

Recently, because of the tragic events in Tetovo, in which a young Albanian lost his life and many others were wounded in clashes between the Albanian population and the Macedonian police, tension has increased in the Republic of Macedonia.

The government of Macedonia must take concrete measures to alleviate this situation. After all, on the basis of the Albanian structure, the [establishment of the] University of Tetovo is a legitimate and incontestable right of Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. On the other hand, the government is being pressured by the Macedonian Opposition in regard to nationality issues, and we must take this into consideration. Thus, the recent dramatic events in Tetovo could result in the escalation of interethnic conflict.

In connection with the recent events in Macedonia, I have received a number of statements from the governments of different countries of the world and from the international community—specifically, from the OSCE and the Helsinki Committee—expressing regret over what is happening in this former Yugoslav republic. In all these statements, recommendations and suggestions are made for lowering this tension in order to avoid an unexpected conflict.

In my most recent report, I discussed the violation of human rights in the FYROM. However, I do not want these statements of mine to contradict what has been said by the international community, the EC and others-...because I am of the opinion that peace and quiet should prevail in Macedonia, of course, while respecting the rights of all those who live in this former Yugoslav republic.

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Golob on Military Alliance With Croatia, NATO

BR2103140295 Madrid ABC in Spanish 19 Mar 95 p 30

[Interview with Ignace Golob, Slovenian secretary of state for foreign affairs, by Cristina Lopez Schlichting in Madrid; date not given: "We Slovenians Have Been Too Successful To Remain Outside the EU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Madrid—*I did not ask him, but he would probably have described himself as a "practical liberal." Ignace Golob, aged 61, is the Slovenian Foreign Ministry's "number-two." Slovenia is a small and prosperous central European country which has two overriding goals: joining the European Union and NATO. As long as no other countries—such as Italy—block its passage, Slovenia hopes to join the EU very soon: "We have simply been too successful to remain on the outside."*

[Schlichting] Italy has just lifted the veto on negotiating a Community treaty of association with Slovenia. It had been opposed to this because of the claims to property and rights of the Italians who emigrated from Slovenia during the war. Does this change of heart have anything to do with Berlusconi's fall from office?

[Golob] It is the combination of various reasons. One reason is certainly the fact that the current government is not run by one political party and is essentially pragmatic and administrative, which makes it easier to discuss this kind of thing. In addition, Italy has made things unnecessarily complicated for itself. Its veto made relations with the EU difficult and threatened the stability of NATO in this region of Europe. Lastly, I would add that more than 70 percent of our exports go to the EU and 78 percent of our imports come from the Union. Quite simply, we are too successful to remain outside the EU.

[Schlichting] Croatia has extended the Blue Helmets' stay in Krajina but neither the Serbs nor the Croats are prepared to give ground. There could be a Serbian-Croatian war. Would you enter into a military alliance with Croatia?

[Golob] No, thank you very much. Never, never. However, it is most likely that the conflict will fester, as in Cyprus. Now, we are saying clearly that we are more than concerned that there should be peace in the Balkans and that peace can only be built on justice. We do not think that the Serbs should seize all the areas they live in and that Croatia should lack guarantees for its borders. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] says it wants to ensure humanitarian aid, but it is certainly not helping bring about change and in the meantime things are getting worse.

There are too many foreign advisers in this war airing their views about everything without knowing the whole story. For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a Communist invention but a historical entity, 200 years old, which is essential for balance in the Balkans.

[Schlichting] Which are the most important countries in your balance of trade?.

[Golob] Germany in the foremost position followed by France, Italy, and Austria which are more or less equal.

[Schlichting] What is your view of "German expansionism?"

[Golob] Since the Habsburg empire broke up, the future of Europe has always depended on relations between Germany and Russia. This is not expansionism. Germany has always played a key role, sometimes accepted, as now, and sometimes not, as under Hitler.

The stability of Eastern and Central Europe depends on the enlargement of NATO which is nothing more than the system to ensure democracy and the control of militaries by civilian authorities and, in this way, Germany has led the way and is currently exerting a good influence. There will always be a special love-hate relationship between Berlin and Moscow.

People's Party Wants Justice Minister To Resign

AU2103173195 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Supreme Court ruling that Justice Minister Meta Zupancic acted unlawfully in the nomination of Sergej Majhen as a notary has shown that this is the first government that has been proven to have committed an unlawful act. This is how Marjan Podobnik, president of the Slovene People's Party [SLS] and his assistants justified the proposal for interpellation in the work of the justice minister at a noon news conference. Sandi Frelih reports from the news conference:

[Begin recording] The justice minister, Marjan Podobnik says, should resign in the light of the Supreme Court ruling, that is, she should be replaced by Prime Minister Drnovsek. In Majhen's case, the minister was responsible for the protection of human rights. She is also responsible for the ambiguous penal legislation that sanctions economic crime. Marjan Podobnik warns: If the prime minister replaces one or two ministers than this is a praiseworthy action because it shows that he wishes to punish the behavior of his ministers. However, when the reshuffles have involved nearly half of all ministers and there appears to be no end to them in sight, this gives rise to a question of shifting responsibility. Perhaps some ministers were appointed for a limited period of time, during which they were supposed to do the dirty work, while the prime minister would remain unblemished. [passage omitted]

The SLS bench is drafting an interpellation on the work of the justice minister, which it will file if Drnovsek will not replace the minister by the end of this week. [passage omitted]

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Federal

Diplomatic Relations Established With Moldova

LD2103143495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1359 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Mar (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Moldova have established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced today.

The decision to establish diplomatic relations reflects the desire by both governments to step up contacts and develop relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, the statement says.

Confidence Motion Debate in Chamber on BORBA

AU2103220995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Mat 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, deputies of the Federal Assembly Citizens' Chamber resumed the first session of the first regular sitting, which had opened three weeks ago. Several bills were adopted at the session. Late in the afternoon, a debate was opened on the proposal of a vote on confidence in the Federal Government regarding its decision on the BORBA daily. Here is a report by Vladimir Nikolic:

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] [Passage omitted] Late in the afternoon, debate was opened on the occasion of the initiative of the opposition parties, to hold a vote of confidence in the Federal Government regarding its decision on the BORBA daily. Expounding on the proposal, Srdjan Darmanovic said that the Federal Government violated the Constitution with its decision on BORBA whereby it had taken upon itself the powers of the Federal Assembly. For this reason, a vote on confidence in the Government should be held. This is how Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic replied to this:

[Kontic] First of all, one should point out, once again, what is involved here is a property dispute. Neither the Federal Assembly as a founder of the BORBA newspaper, nor the Federal Government ever made decisions on the transformation of the BORBA newspaper, nor did they give consent to the merger, that is, the closure of the Borba Enterprise. This was done by some unauthorized individuals on behalf of the state who then gave away a very significant social property for symbolical compensation. [passage omitted]

[Nikolic] According to the federal prime minister, the dispute started because of some irregularities in the procedure of BORBA transformation and was initiated—according to law—by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in order to protect the rights and interests of the federal state as regards the use, administration, and management of property. The Federal Government did not initiate this procedure, did not appear as a participant in it while it lasted, and did not, through its decisions or otherwise, affect the work the of corresponding bodies, the payment service, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, or the commercial courts. The election of political officers belongs to the authority of the Federal Assembly, while their appointment, being an executive duty, belongs to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. [passage omitted]

[Kontic] According to everything that I have said, it is clear that by issuing the ruling to appoint the Borba acting director, the Federal Government did not violate the Constitution, but, on the contrary, it met its obligation that results from its Constitutional powers and the decision to take over the founding rights of BORBA, a public medium performing a task of a federal interest.

[Nikolic] From everything that has been said, one can clearly conclude that the Federal government has not violated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in any way, Prime Minister Kontic asserted categorically. [passage omitted]

Having realized the importance of timely and objective information about events at home and abroad, the Federal Government devoted special attention to the federal media. In the case of the appointment of the acting director of the Borba Newspaper Publishing Enterprise and the chief editor of the BORBA newspaper, the Federal Government acted according to its powers regarding the media founded by the Federation, so it cannot be accused—under the guise of the freedom of press—for having performed tasks within its jurisdiction efficiently and responsibly.

[Kontic] How far the democratization of the information domain has gone is best demonstrated by the fact that nearly 2,000 public media have been registered in our country, many of them privately owned, something that a few countries can boast of, even including those belonging to the so-called developed democracies.

[Nikolic] The attempt to transfer a property dispute regarding Borba to the field of the smothering of the independent media, and to accuse the Federal Government of this, has a primarily political character and cannot maintain a serious critical approach, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said.

[Kontic] This assessment has been corroborated by the fact that, in a very short period of time after the original status was resumed at BORBA, a new newspaper, NASA BORBA, was registered and, as far as I know, it has been coming out regularly and doing so on the basis of the well-known and recognizable previous editorial policy. And nobody is obstructing it.

This is the best denial of the claims that the freedom of the press is being smothered, as the group of deputies claims.

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[Nikolic] From this entire statement, Prime Minister Kontic said, it is clear that, in the case of BORBA, the Federal Government has not violated the Constitution in any way or smothered the freedom of the press. The Federal Government has acted according to its rights and obligations regarding federal public media. It appointed the acting director of the Borba Newspaper Publishing Enterprise and chief editor of the BORBA daily only after a valid court statement was issued and thereby created basic prerequisites for the efficient functioning of this newspaper. This assertion has been corroborated by the valid ruling of the Belgrade Commercial Court, Prime Minister Kontic said and added:

[Kontic] It is therefore clear that the demand for a vote of no-confidence in the Federal Government was inspired by political motives. In the absence of real arguments, there was an attempt to create a so-called political case out of a property and legal case. I am certain that the deputies have seen through this intention. It is clear that this time, again, there are no constitutional, legal, or political reasons for a motion of no-confidence in the government.

[Nikolic] The debate on this case in the Citizens' Chamber is under way. [end recording]

The Citizens' Chamber session ended about 15 minutes ago and it is expected to resume tomorrow.

Hyperinflation Curbed Without Foreign Aid

LD2103135495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1307 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 21 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia succeeded in 1994 to curb the world's highest inflation—300 million percent in December 1993—despite an economic blockade and without any foreign assistance.

Dragoslav Avramovic, the national bank governor and architect of the Yugoslav 'economic miracle', writes in a study soon to be published that what Yugoslavia has done was specific and unprecedented.

The governor said in the study titled 'Reconstruction of Monetary System and Economic Recovery of Yugoslavia 1994' that such a 'job had not been done anywhere in the world without foreign financial support, a great drop in wages, a rise in unemployment as well as a fall in production.'

Yugoslavia began under the conditions of blockade its specific program of economic recovery in January 1994 with an original economic formula in which one dinar was put on par with the German mark based on gold coverage.

The recovery program brought inflation almost to zero, while the industrial production—for the August-October 1994 period alone—rose by a record 37 percent.

In 1994, about 200,000 people found jobs in private and state firms in Yugoslavia.

World economic experts estimated in November's issue of the U.N.- sponsored publication UNCOMMON OPPORTUNITIES that Yugoslav experts had achieved an economic miracle which could serve as an example to countries with hyperinflation.

The publication's June 1994 issue said that despite a total economic blockade Yugoslavia was that year among the 15 countries in the world with the most stable prices.

In spite of all the praise given him, Avramovic said in his study that everything that had been done in Yugoslavia had been done with 'considerable luck, a bit of solid theory and firm and broad public support.'

He said that Yugoslavia had been under the total economic blockade for three years and that was why the program of economic recovery of Yugoslavia had to suffer the consequences of sanctions until they were definitely lifted.

Spring Sowing To Begin Despite Shortages

LD2203115195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1126 GMT 22 Mar 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—Spring sowing will be carried out in Yugoslavia this year on 2.5 million hectares and cost at least 600 million dollars.

Yugoslav experts in this field say the sowing this year has begun under very difficult conditions due to shortages in imported materials, such as diesel fuel and fertilizers.

Yugoslavia is under a total economic blockade since May 1992. This has rendered imports of the necessary production materials for spring sowing virtually impossible.

This year's plan envisages that maize dominates with 1.4 million hectares, while sugar beet will take up 100,000 hectares, sunflower—200,000 and soyabean—70,000.

Autumn sowing was carried out on an area of 900,000 hectares, of which wheat accounts for 98 percent.

Despite the economic embargo, Yugoslavia turns out annually more food than required to feed the nation. Yugoslavia produced last year a total of 3.6 million tonnes of wheat. This was enough to meet the needs of the population for two and a half years.

Yugoslav economists claim that Yugoslavia could export annually at least 1.5 million tonnes of wheat worth about 300,000 dollars.

Last year, Yugoslavia harvested about 5.2 million tonnes of maize, which was 30 percent up on the 1993 figure. Sugar manufacture in 1994 stood at about 360,00 tonnes or 80,000 tonnes more than needed.

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Serbia

Democratic Party Leader on Muslim 'Offensive'

LD2203123195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2119 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Mar (SRNA)—Predrag Protic, vice president of the Democratic Party of Serbia, said in Belgrade today that the latest Muslim offensive and cease-fire violations clearly indicate that the Muslims were not in favor of the resumption of the peace process and that "the Muslims are desperately trying to turn the tide of the war they have lost."

Protic told SRNA that the Muslims are again relying on the support of the international community but that the Serb side cannot be expected to remain indifferent toward this type of provocation.

"If the international community was objective and if there was a realistic view of the situation, it would be yet further proof of who was responsible for the resumption of the war and yet further proof that an agreement with the Muslim side is not possible at this moment," Protic said.

According to Protic, "the only solution for resolving the war in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina is for the international community to understand that the Bosnian Serb republic is a reality that cannot be altered."

Refugee Association on Accusations of Desertion

AU2203110795 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 95 p 13

[Article by "S.G.": "Disputed Appeal for Taking Refugees to Fronts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Deserters to the fronts! The Krajinas are in danger. There are 240,000 deserters from Krajina in Serbia. Our children do not want to die for a deserter's home!" says the latest poster issued by the Association of Serbs from Serbia.

Chairman of the association Vlajko Popovic says that the poster that has been posted in the center of Belgrade is a reaction to the action by the Association of Veterans of Wars since 1990 on gathering volunteers among the citizens of Serbia for the war outside Serbia. The letter that Popovic sent to the association of war veterans says that 96 percent of the fighters of the 1990 war are citizens of Serbia, and that about 16,000 young people have lost their lives. "While our fighters were fighting in the Krajinas, the Krajina people came to Serbia in an organized fashion, took jobs and apartments, and organized war profiteering. Now the deserters from the Krajinas are well off, while the fighters-invalids and the families of killed fighters, all Serbs from Serbia, are living off hand outs," says Vlajko Popovic's letter.

The moral dilemma, to be a deserter or a fighter, is reaching unprecedented heights now. Lawyer Vojislav Vukcevic from Osijek, who is now deputy chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement, says that most of the refugees are for peace and that no one has the right to hunt them down and send them to the front.

No one in the bureau of the Serb republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] wanted to comment on the posters. They only said that, according to the Commission for Refugees, there were far fewer refugees that are men of military age than the suggested 240,000.

Milorad Muratovic, chairman of the Association of Refugees and Expelled People in the FRY, says that he has recently received a lot of calls from all over Serbia and Vojvodina, expressing support for this association and condemning the posters issued by the Association of Serbs from Serbia.

"The refugees are not deserters. The authors of the poster are abusing the commitment of these people to peace, as well as the peace-loving policy of the majority of people and the FRY Government. The posters are fascistic, but we hope that this is only a passing and insignificant occurrence," Muratovic says.

According to Muratovic, the Association of Serbs from Serbia is deploying dirty tactics and tricks, and supporting the forces of chaos and war. The refugees are for peace and normal life, Muratovic says, adding that they must not be used for war-mongering purposes, as the authors of the poster are doing.

Bosniak Institutions Discuss Status of Sandzak

AU2103154595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of representatives of Bosniak institutions, organizations, and associations was held in Novi Pazar on 19 March. Political parties and individuals dealing with the issue of Sandzak's status and the status of Bosniak Muslims living there also attended the meeting.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's document on the position of Bosniak Muslims in Sandzak and elsewhere in Serbia and Montenegro was endorsed at the meeting. The document was assessed as being an encouragement on the road to achieving a just solution for Sandzak's status.

It was moreover agreed that it was necessary to establish mechanisms for the protection of national Bosniak institutions, organizations, and associations in Sandzak from various forms of the regime's subversive activity, and to ensure adequate cooperation and coordinated activity with similar institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Parties, Associations Form Monarchist Movement

AU2103143495 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by B. Radivojsa: "MOPOS Hopes To Take Part in the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Several days ago the Monarchist Movement of Serbia [Monarhisticki Pokret Srbije]—MOPOS, a coalition of several nonparliamentary parties and associations, was founded in Belgrade. The founding of the coalition was initiated by the Serbian Royalist Bloc and the Serbian Workers Party; the Movement also includes representatives of the Economic Party, the Progressive Party, the All-Serbian Union, the Movement for the Unification of Serbia and Montenegro, and the "Davidovic-Grol" Democratic Party. Last Friday [17 March] the Council (presidency) of MOPOS was also founded, which includes representatives of the associated parties. [passage omitted]

The new MOPOS coalition intends to organize discussion forums and start a monthly paper. The association will not have a permanent president; instead, the presidents of the member parties will rotate the leading position of the Council every two months. "We have no leader, since the king is the person who is above us," lawyer Mladenovic said.

Montenegro

19 Charged With Possession, Trade in Arms

LD2203101195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0916 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 22 Mar (TANJUG)—The public prosecutor in Plav has brought charges against 19 persons who were caught in the criminal act of illegal possession and trade in arms at the end of October last year.

According to the indictment, Hasan Jasavic, Hamdija Sarkanovic, Ramo Tosic, Sait Jadadic, Semso Music, Dzafer Jasavic, Halim Radoncic, Hamdo Tosic, Salih Kandic, Husnija Tosic, Sucko Sabovic, Hasan Cirkovic, Safet Jucic, and Amir Canovic have been charged with illegal possesion of small quantities of weapons (one or two) and ammunition under Article 204 of the Montenegrin Penal Code. Sentences from six months to five years in prison are envisaged for this type of criminal act.

Zufer Tosic, Mirsad Canovic, Hajrudin, Huseinovic, Aljo Mujovic, and Zavdija Canovic are also in the dock of the Plav court. They have been charged with illegal possession and trade of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. Sentences from one to ten years in prison are envisaged for this type of criminal act.

Kosovo

Serbian Opposition Leaders Discuss Kosovo

AU2103132695 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by S. Palic: "New Memorandum Is Being Prepared"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—A number of "distinguished Serbian intellectuals," mostly members of opposition parties, met yesterday in Belgrade with the leaders of the Serbian Resistance Movement from Kosovo Polje, and, after a two-hour discussion, came to the conclusion that the Serbian state and national issue, in particular in Kosovo, had not been solved, and that a new Memorandum should be made. Academician Miodrag Jovicic, historian Rados Ljusic, and law professor Kosta Cavoski were given the task of preparing a draft version of the new Memorandum.

In addition to the initiators from Kosovo (Momа Trajkovic, Miroslav Solevic, Dusan Ristic, and Svetozar Arsic Basara), the meeting was attended by Vojislav Seselj [Serbian Radical Party leader], Zoran Djindjic [Democratic Party leader], Vojislav Kostunica [Democratic Party of Serbia leader], Nikola Milosevic, Slobodan Rakitic, Mladen Markov, Dragoslav Aksentijevic, all of whom were attending as private individuals, whereas Matija Beckovic, Vasilije Krestic, Novak Kilibarda, Veselin Djuretic were invited but were not able to come.

This Memorandum, which is to provide a solution to the Serbian national and state issue, as well as to respond to Albanian separatism in Kosovo, will be presented for the approval of an assembly of around 100 Serbian intellectuals, scheduled for 8 April in the Pec patriarchate. [passage omitted]

The results of the yesterday's meeting were satisfying both to Vojislav Seselj ("everything was good and serious") and Zoran Djindjic, who stressed that the main aim of the all-Serbian congress in Gracanica was the organizers' intention to show those people that there was still someone who cared about them and to give them hope.

At the Pec conference, a national council will be formed, which will pass the final judgment about the Memorandum. Next Friday in Belgrade another meeting of a technical nature is to be held, at which the list of participants of the Pec conference will be finalized.

Vojvodina

New Ethnic Hungarian Organization in Vojvodina

AU2103190895 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 20 Mar 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Presentable Hungarian Way—a Nostalgic Organization of Vojvodina Hungarians Has Been Formed in Zenta"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The political map of the Vojvodina Hungarians is increasingly multicolored. One year after the more liberal thinkers left the once autocratic Democratic Association of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK) and established the Federation of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ), the third national minority organization was established this weekend, namely the Civil Movement of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMPM).

According to the declared intention of the founders, the goal of the new organization is to protect the interests of the Hungarians living in Serbia, guarantee their education and the use of their mother tongue, and create their economic strength. The new movement thinks it can create all this by cooperating with the prevailing government in Belgrade and every opposition party, even with the VMDK and the VMSZ.

There is nothing bad in the program of the new organization that advertises itself as the third way: The program includes the operation of the mother-tongue schooling system, the Hungarian cultural institutions, and the press house, the fostering of national awareness, peaceful coexistence with the majority nation and the other national minorities, the political unification of Vojvodina Hungarians, the elimination of Hungarian-Hungarian confrontation, economic prosperity, and the helping of small entrepreneurs.

However, even with the circumstances of its establishment, the VMPM gives rise to speculations. One and a half months after the publication of the declaration of intention, the initiating committee presented the program of the movement in the presence of only some 20 people, a program that is a combination of the goals of the existing two Hungarian organizations and the policy of the Hungarian Government regarding the ethnic Hungarians beyond our borders. The only originality of this program lies in the fact that it fully rejects the minority autonomy and big-heartedly offers rapprochement to the Serbian government.

Even if it was not openly voiced at the founding meeting, the founders of the VMPM would actually like to restore the former situation prevailing in Vojvodina: Before the forced abolition of this region's autonomy (in 1989), the national minorities in Vojvodina were envied for their good treatment compared with situation in the neighboring countries. Since then, however, the Serbian political leadership fully centralized the economy and consolidated the national state and, consequently, it reduced the national minority rights.

The citizens of Zenta regarded the appearance of the VMPM with suspicion. The politicians of the VMSZ think that the VMDK is behind this new initiative. Independent intellectuals, however, think that the new movement was established by Milosevic's Socialist Party, a way of making the national minority demands acceptable by excluding the demands for autonomy.

In any case, it could be clearly seen at the founding meeting that, for the time being, the new movement is made up of a few nostalgic pensioners and a few entrepreneurs. Even if there is no doubt to their good intentions, this movement can be used in many ways by skillful manipulation.

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